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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. looks at the structural sources that make the continuation of U.S.-Soviet conflict likely, but argues that a series of steps can be taken to reduce the risk of that conflict leading to nuclear war.

MICHAEL E. KRAFT and NORMAN J. VIG examine environmental policy in the Reagan presidency and argue that radical changes imposed through an administrative strategy jeopardized both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the administration's decision-making.

THOMAS JOHN BOSSERT analyzes different strategies that international agencies have used to promote new health policies in two Third World countries, Guatemala and Honduras.

ROBERT L. MORLAN contrasts voter turnout in local elections with that of national elections in six west European nations and nine states of the German Federal Republic, with some comparisons to the United States. He finds turnout lower in local elections in all countries studied, but also that turnout is best in the smallest municipalities.

LUCIEN S. VANDENBROUCKE applies the decision-making models formulated by Graham T. Allison to the decision to proceed with the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961. The author evaluates the explanatory power of these models in the abortive Cuban invasion and suggests complementing Allison's conceptual framework with the findings of cognitive theory.

DUNCAN L. CLARKE and EDWARD L. NEVELEFF assess several measures instituted or attempted by the Reagan administration concerning secrecy and foreign intelligence. They contend that some of these measures raise serious threats to civil liberties.

STEVEN METZ argues that United States support for decolonization in Africa actually began in 1958, rather than in 1961 as is commonly assumed. This change was part of a larger alteration of the American view of the world that took place during this time.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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U.S.-Soviet Relations and Nuclear-Risk Reduction

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.

Since the decline of détente in the 1970s, there has been an increase in public concern about the U.S.-Soviet relations and the risk of nuclear war. This is not the first time that public concern has been aroused, nor is it likely to be the last time. Managing relations with the USSR has never been easy for the United States.

One reason is the Soviet Union itself. The marriage of the old Russian empire and a universalistic ideology has produced a state that sometimes looks like a traditional great power and sometimes like an expansionist revolutionary power. A repressive and secretive political system frustrates efforts to fathom Soviet intentions. It is small wonder then that Americans often have divided views about the nature of their principal opponent. Even lifelong experts do not agree about the nature of the Soviet state and its goals. Although the Soviet Union will remain an enigma, its nuclear capability remains an inescapable fact, and there is broad public concern over whether we can manage the relationship in a manner that reduces the risk of nuclear war.

Bases of Soviet-American Tensions

There are several deep-seated reasons to believe that tension is likely to be a continual feature in the U.S.-Soviet relations. First, as Alexis de Tocqueville already saw in the nineteenth century, the enormous size and resources of the Russian and American nations foreshadowed a future bipolar rivalry. Then in 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution added a layer of deep ideological incompatibility. When

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World War II destroyed the multination balance of power existing before 1939, it left a bipolar structure of world power centered on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. The accumulation of vast nuclear arsenals overshadowing those of all other nations has consolidated that "special relationship." From a power politics point of view, the probability of tension is built into the very structure of the relationship.

Nonetheless, at different times there have been different degrees of tension and hostility. American attitudes, responding in part to Soviet tactical moves and in part to the requirements of democratic politics, have tended to alternate between overemphasis and underemphasis on the threatening nature of Soviet objectives. The result has been missed opportunities and an inconsistency in policy. During the cold war, our exaggeration of Soviet capabilities prevented us from negotiating at a time when our position was strong. Subsequently, the ideological interpretation of policy and domestic political constraints prevented American policy from exploiting the diplomatic opportunities in the Sino-Soviet split for more than a decade after it occurred in the late-1950s. Conversely, the enthusiasm for détente in the 1960s and early 1970s led American officials to underestimate the Soviet military build-up, to delay an appropriate response, and to encourage false domestic expectations of future restraint in Soviet international behavior.

At the same time, it is worth remembering that the worst outcome has not occurred. Despite hostility, there has also been prudence in managing the world's first nuclear balance of power. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons introduced a disproportion between most ends that the superpowers seek and the major military means at their disposal.

The situation has led to the evolution by a process of trial and error of some primitive rules for avoiding and managing crises. The rules are so primitive that they might more correctly be called "prudent practices." Indeed, they began well before the onset of détente. As described by Stanley Hoffmann, "one such informal rule was the non-resort to atomic weapons. . . . A second rule was the avoidance of direct military clashes between the armed forces. This meant that their games of chicken had to end with the retreat of one of the players rather than with a fight. . . . A third element was the slow (and for America) painful learning of limited wars . . . calculated so as to limit the risks of escalation, even if those constraints made a clearcut victory or a rapid settlement impossible. Later came the beginnings of nuclear arms control between Washington and Moscow."[1] Rudimentary as these rules or prudent practices are, they are significant if one believes that a stable balance of power requires a degree of moderation in the actors' behavior, as well as military balance.

Where there is a degree of common interest in stability, the balance of power can become a positive game in which both sides win. Indeed, an international "regime"—a set of tacit or explicit rules and procedures—may be developed to

[1] Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy or World Order* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 11. See also Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 3.

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encourage a stabilizing perspective of long-range rather than short-range self-interest. The nineteenth century balance of power and the contrast between Otto von Bismarck's restraint and the failure of his successors is often cited as an example.

To say that the postwar U.S.-Soviet balance of power has been embedded in such a regime would be to stretch the point.[2] The rules have been ambiguous and not openly accepted by both sides. In 1972 and 1973, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed agreements that seemed to codify the rules, but the ambiguities (such as exceptions for "war of national liberation") later led to a sense of cheating and deception after the Middle East war of 1973 and the Soviet transport of Cuban troops to Angola in 1975 and 1976. Moreover, an agreed regime implies reciprocity and flexibility in bargaining behavior as the opponents seek to avoid jeopardizing the regime. In U.S.-Soviet relations, however, reciprocity has proven to be limited in time and on issues. It is difficult to "bank good will" from one time or issue to another in the relationship. While both sides have a degree of interest in preserving stability in the form of preserving nuclear bipolarity and the avoidance of nuclear war, their competition makes it impossible to agree on the status quo. While a common interest exists, it is severely limited and strained by the competitive dimension.

Another reason why the effects of this common interest are limited is the difficulty of communication between the two societies. The secretive nature of Soviet society makes it something of a "black box" to us. We see what comes out of the box, but cannot understand what goes on inside it. It is difficult to bring evidence to bear on our differences of opinion over Soviet intentions and the nature of their internal processes. Obviously, this situation can result in misperceptions, but it is hard to prove what is or is not a misperception. There is none of the relative transparency that characterizes relations with most countries. This indeterminacy exacerbates the struggle for definition and control of appropriate policy responses in the United States. American foreign policy making is a notably untidy process. In the words of Edwin S. Corwin, a great constitutional scholar, the constitution establishes an invitation to struggle for the control of foreign policy.[3] Thus, it is not surprising that we find it even harder to figure out what is happening in a "black box."

At the same time, incoherence and inconsistency in U.S. policy can lead to Soviet misperceptions and miscalculations of American intentions and concerns. Josef Stalin must certainly have been surprised by Harry Truman's reaction in Korea so soon after the U.S. had declared it outside its defense perimeter. Nikita Khrushchev may also have been surprised by the strength of John F. Kennedy's reaction to the emplacement of missiles in Cuba after the acceptance of defeat at the Bay of Pigs. Soviet intentions are opaque to us because of Soviet secrecy.

[2] See Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982).

[3] Edwin S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1940), 200.

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Our intentions may be opaque to them because of incoherence and multiple—and often contradictory—signals. They may be a black box to us, but we may confuse them with "white noise."

In dealing with a stronger Soviet Union in an age of nuclear parity, we will not have as much leeway for incoherence, inconsistency, and inefficiency as in earlier periods. Thus, the fact that past crises have not led to nuclear war in nearly four decades cannot justify complacency about the future. Nuclear-risk reduction deserves a high policy priority.

Types of Risk-Reduction Measures

Efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war must start with an understanding of the likely paths by which a nuclear war might begin. As Table 1 illustrates, there are at least five significantly different paths by which a nuclear war might arise. First, conventional wars could escalate to nuclear ones. Second, pre-emptive attacks might be launched in desperation in times of crises because one side believes (rightly or wrongly) that the other intends soon to strike first. Third, nuclear weapons might accidentally be used through malfunctions of people or machines. Fourth, nuclear wars could be initiated by nuclear-armed nations other than the superpowers or by terrorist organizations. Finally, surprise attacks by one superpower might be made on all or part of the nuclear forces of the other. For each of these generic paths, a number of possible scenarios can be constructed.[4]

There are also a variety of actions that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of each path leading to nuclear war. Many of these measures of nuclear-risk reduction involve unilateral political and military measures to enhance deterrence, reduce the vulnerability of forces, reassure other nations, and improve procedures and devices to prevent accidents or unauthorized use. In other words, many significant measures of nuclear-risk reduction do not require cooperative action with the Soviet Union. At the same time, as Table 1 indicates, cooperative measures of crisis prevention and management can also help to reduce the risk of war associated with nearly all of the paths.

Most nuclear-risk reduction measures share a common approach. In contrast to those aspects of arms control and disarmament that focus on reductions of the number of nuclear weapons, risk-reduction measures are more concerned with the prospects of use of such weapons regardless of numbers. On the other hand, the terminology surrounding nuclear-risk reduction measures is sometimes confusing, with terms like "crisis management," "crisis prevention," "stabilization," and "confidence building" often used in overlapping ways. Measures may vary along dimensions of technical versus political, unilateral

[4] This table was developed jointly with Graham Allison and Albert Carnesale for the Avoiding Nuclear War Project at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. For elaboration of scenarios, see Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel Huntington, Joseph Nye, Scott Sagan, *Living With Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Bantam Books, 1983), ch. 3.

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TABLE 1

Nuclear-Risk Reduction

Paths to Nuclear War	*Factors Affecting Likelihood of Path*	*Actions to reduce Likelihood of Path*
(ranked by probability)		
1. Escalation of Conventional War	U.S.-Soviet conventional war Balance of general purpose forces Vulnerability of theater nuclear forces Misperception/miscalculation	Crisis prevention and management Maintain balance of general purpose forces Reduce vulnerability of theater nuclear forces Improve command/control
2. Pre-Emption in crisis	War appears imminent and unavoidable Balance of nuclear forces Vulnerability of nuclear forces Misperception/miscalculation	Crisis prevention and management Maintain balance of nuclear forces Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces
3. Accidental or Unauthorized Use	Procedures and devices designed to prevent accidents and unauthorized use (that is, Permissive Action Links) Communication systems	Improve procedures and devices Improve communication systems Crisis prevention and management
4. Initiation by a Third Party	Third party access to nuclear weapons and delivery systems U.S. and Soviet presence in conflict areas	Inhibit nuclear proliferation Crisis prevention and management
5. Surprise Attack	Extreme U.S.-Soviet hostility Balance of nuclear forces Vulnerability of nuclear forces Misperception/miscalculation Irrationality	Strengthen incentives for peace Maintain balance of nuclear forces Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces

versus cooperative, global versus regional; general versus specific, and so forth. Sometimes confidence-building measures are narrowly used to describe specific technical or military initiatives. But the term can also be used more broadly to refer to any efforts to increase confidence and predictability.

Another way to distinguish various nuclear risk reduction measures is by their proximity in time to the causes of a possible nuclear war. (See Table 2). With any complex event, we often distinguish precipitating, contributory, and deep

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causes. For example, the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the rigidity of mobilization schedules were precipitating causes of World War I; the competition between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans and Serbian adventurism were contributory or intermediate causes; and the increased rigidity in European alliances was a deep cause. Alternatively, the simple metaphor of starting a fire can be applied—a match is a precipitating cause, kindling is an intermediate cause, and the piling up of logs is a deep cause.

Table 2 differentiates risk-reduction measures in these terms. Crisis management refers to measures to deal with a crisis once it has begun, and to prevent the precipitating factors that could lead to war. Crisis prevention refers to efforts to deal with intermediate or contributory causes that give rise to crises in the first place. Long-range stabilization relates to efforts to deal with the basic causes of conflict inherent in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. All three levels are part of nuclear-risk reduction. At each level, confidence-building measures and stabilization devices can be designed to increase openness and predictability, to provide warning and reassurance, and to demonstrate a common interest. In this broad sense, such measures can touch the core as well as the marginal dimensions of conflict.[5] We can look at the costs, benefits and limits of such measures at each level.

Crisis Management Measures

The U.S. and the Soviet Union have been involved in the practice of crisis management for a long time, at least since the Berlin Crisis of 1948. In Berlin (in 1948 and later), Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and the Middle East, the two superpowers established limits on their objectives and means that successfully avoided the escalation of such crises to U.S.–Soviet war (not to mention nuclear war). As mentioned above, however, such crisis management tended to be ad hoc prudent practices rather than codified rules of procedures.

Alexander George has listed seven operational requirements for crisis management:

- Each side must maintain top level civilian control over military options.
- The tempo of military movements may have to be slowed to provide time for diplomatic exchanges.
- Military movements must be coordinated into diplomatic strategy, including a strategy for termination.
- Military signals of resolve must be consistent with one's limited diplomatic objectives.

[5] See J. J. Holst, "Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival* 25 (1983): 2. Holst defines CBMs as "arrangements designed to enhance . . . assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states and the facts they create." He argues that they "affect the margins of international conflict, they do not address the core." See also F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe, eds., *Confidence Building Measures in Europe.* (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983).

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TABLE 2

Approach to U.S.-Soviet Nuclear-Risk Reductions

	Basic Goals	*General Strategies*	*Some CBMs and Stabilization Measures*
1. Crisis Management (of possible precipitating causes of nuclear war)	• Crisis stability • Credibility • Limits • Termination	• SOPs that buy time • clear signals • constant communication • civilian control of force movements • termination plans	• declaratory policy • crisis exercises • Hot Line • crisis center
2. Crisis Prevention (of possible contributory causes of nuclear crises)	• Avoid misperception and miscalculation of interests • Avoid loss of control to small states • Avoid loss of control due to military mistake	• preventive diplomacy • classic diplomacy • early consultations • general and specific limits	• mediation • military zones, buffers, etc. • regular meetings • arms transfer talks • nonproliferation
3. Long-run Stabilization (of basic conflict that creates risks of nuclear crises and war)	• Increase transparency and predictability • Demonstrate common interest	• increase contacts • increase reciprocity	• arms control • monitoring/inspection • informal talks • exchanges

- Moves that give the impression of resort to large-scale warfare, and give an incentive for pre-emption, should be avoided.
- Options should be chosen that signal a way out of the crisis other than a military solution.
- Proposals should be formulated that are compatible with the opponents' fundamental interests.[6]

Some of the requirements are basically prudent practice that can be applied unilaterally—for example, standard operating procedures (SOPs) that ensure civilian control and integration of military and diplomatic moves in a single strategy. Crisis control exercises and political-military games can help to develop such SOPs. Another useful device are SOPs that buy time. One suggestion is a declaratory policy of "no second strike in response to small scale nuclear attacks until there has been communication with the enemy."[7] In principle, both sides could agree to make such a statement.

Rapid and reliable communication is an essential component of crisis management. Recognition of the importance of communication gave rise to one of the first formal cooperative crisis management procedures, the Hot Line, established in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. While its existence is a useful safety device, the Hot Line has in practice rarely been used, and has not really been a substitute for more formal diplomatic communications. Various proposals have been made to upgrade the Hot Line to a visual and voice link or to supplement it by establishing a permanently manned crisis control center. The visual and voice link, however, does not guarantee better communication and control in a crisis. On the contrary, it may communicate (rightly or wrongly) *too much* information (such as strain or fatigue), while making careful formulation of a response more difficult. In 1983, the United States proposed a modest upgrading of the Hot Line by adding the capability to transmit facsimiles.[8]

Another idea that has recently received a good deal of attention is the proposal by Senator Sam Nunn that the U.S. and the USSR establish a joint crisis-control center.[9] The value of the jointly operated center would vary with the crisis path or scenario that is assumed. It might be particularly valuable in case of accidental or catalytic use of a nuclear device (paths 3 and 4 in Table 1) when not only rapid communication would be important, but rapid agreement among experts on the nature of technical evidence might be necessary to avoid misperception or overreaction. It might be less valuable in cases of pre-emption or deliberate escalation or bluff in a conventional war situation (paths 1 and 2 in Table 1). While the permanent staff might have developed ways to calibrate each

[6] Alexander George, "Third Areas Competition: Problems of Crisis-Management and Crisis Prevention," in J.S. Nye, ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

[7] This ideas was suggested by Robert MacNamara in *Newsweek*, 5 December 1983, 50.

[8] Caspar Weinberger, *Report to the Congress by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on Direct Communication Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 11 April 1983).

[9] Sam Nunn, "Arms Control: What Should We Do?" *Washington Post*, 12 November 1981.

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others' reliability, it is not clear that such staff would be at high enough a level to be fully informed of their governments' actions in such a situation. In that case, the joint center might be ignored, or even worse, the trust or calibration at the staff level might be turned to deceptive purposes by the higher level decision-makers.

In short, crisis management measures for nuclear risk reduction will involve a major component of unilateral domestic procedures. Some elements of such procedures might be discussed with the Soviets. Both declaratory policy on standard procedures for response to small (possibly accidental) attacks and general discussion of procedures for avoiding accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons might be discussed. Similarly, a jointly operated center might provide expertise that would reinforce rapid communication in cases of accidental or third party use. But in regard to other paths toward war in a crisis, most of the requirements for crisis management listed by Alexander George would have to be met by improved domestic procedure, good communication, and ad hoc limits established in particular crisis bargaining situations. Or to put the point in a slightly different way, there is a greater margin for nuclear-risk reduction in preventing rather than managing such crises.

Crisis Prevention

Crises can arise from a variety of sources. One way is through U.S. or Soviet misperception or miscalculation of the other side's interests and likely responses. Berlin, Korea, and Cuba are cases in point. Such crises may be averted by effective deterrence where relative stakes and capabilities are clear to both sides. But many ambiguous cases exist, the Persian Gulf for example, which is in the Soviet Union's geographical "back yard" but in the Western world's economic "front yard."

Another source of crisis lies in the political instability of Third World states. With more than a hundred fragile polities suffering the pressures of turbulent social change, there is almost always bound to be some government or its opponents who will "search for borrowed power" by involving the United States or the Soviet Union.[10] Among the ways to avert small states' conflicts becoming East-West crises are preventive diplomacy and cooperative diplomatic measures with the Soviet Union.

Yet a third source of serious crisis could arise in situations where U.S. and Soviet forces confront each other. In Europe, the full military panoply of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact alliances face each other. In such circumstances, there is always some danger of military accident, mistake, or miscalculation. A number of military confidence-building and disengagement measures have been suggested to prevent such possible crises.

Military confidence-building measures (CBMs) can be a limited but useful

[10] William Zartman, "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts," in Alexander George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 362.

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form of crisis prevention. The 1972 Agreement on Incidents at Sea, with its procedures for early and regular consultation, has helped to defuse what was once a series of minor but aggravating incidents. At the strategic level, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaties provide for non-interference with national technical means of verification, and the existence of the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC), provides a channel to raise questions regarding possible violation of the SALT agreements. One could envisage further measures, such as prior notification of missile launches or agreements to establish submarine stand-off zones, that might avert crises through military accidents or misperceptions. Similar measures at the regional level in Europe, such as mutual notification of military maneuvers, drawbacks of armored divisions, removal of bridging equipment, and rights to observe, are among the useful confidence-building measures that are likely to be discussed in the context of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe which convened in Stockholm in January 1984.

If one regards the prospects of crisis by accident or military mistake to be relatively low in the first place, however, these measures are of limited importance. And skeptics warn that there are potential costs attached to some CBMs. False confidence may be as great a danger as unwarranted suspicion. Indeed, the popularity of CBMs in Europe may reflect a political tendency to substitute them for the détente of the 1970s. Richard Betts has argued, for example, that there have been no pure surprise attacks in this century; rather, the primary problem of surprise attack is not intelligence warning, but political disbelief. If CBMs contribute to a lulling effect, they may enhance conditions for surprise. Betts favors CBMs that force the exchange of information with closed societies or that enhance military warning, but is skeptical of those that would curtail NATO's preparedness.[11]

The danger of building false confidence is not a trivial problem. One way to protect against it is to divide CBMs into those with a primary military or a primary political function. In fact, both types have political effects, but those with a military purpose of providing warning, information, or constraint on offensive preparations are less dangerous than those entered into solely to improve the political climate. At least in the former case, there is some built-in protection against deception. The best approach to CBMs is to start with the militarily useful and hope for a bonus effect on the political climate, rather than vice versa.

A more likely source of crisis than attack in Europe is a conflict in the Third World that the superpowers are progressively drawn into by local actors. This is the area that the general principles of 1972 and 1973 were supposed to affect, but as argued above, the generality and ambiguity of those agreements led to misunderstanding rather than to cooperation in conflict prevention. Given the difficulty of achieving U.S.-Soviet cooperation in this area, the first devices to be tried should be unilateral or multilateral preventive diplomacy. This has worked in situations like the Sinai, Zaire, and Zimbabwe, but not in other cases such as the West Bank, the Horn of Africa, or Namibia.

[11] Richard Betts, "Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (Winter 1980–81): 551–72.

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Despite the difficulty of getting precision in U.S. and Soviet interpretations of general principles, there have been a number of instances when the two states have used classic diplomatic devices of crisis prevention, such as spheres of influence, neutralization, buffer states; international forces, and so forth.[12] Examples are the treatment of Finland and Austria in the first postwar decade; the treatment of Laos in 1961; and of Cuba in 1962 and 1970. One could imagine enhancing such classic practices by regular or early consultations on crisis prevention regarding specific situations. One could do likewise under the rubric of discussions of conventional arms transfers or on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.[13]

Looking at crisis prevention measures, we find as we did with crisis management that there is a significant role for unilateral measures. We also note that political measures that deal with specific cases, often by classic diplomatic means, are more valuable than statements of general principles. Indeed, the latter may be counterproductive unless efforts at implementation bring a more detailed level of agreement. Military CBMs to reduce risks of accidents and mistakes can be useful within narrow limits. More basic efforts to control the security relationships have to go deeper into the nature of the overall conflict between the two countries.

Long-Run Stabilization and Political Linkage

Stability can have several meanings in U.S.-Soviet relations. Political stability is difficult to agree upon because the two societies have different ideological perceptions of what is the legitimate status quo over the long run. On the other hand, both sides may find common prudential interests in interim or specific situations of political stability in which long-run questions of legitimacy can be begged. Moreover, both sides may also discover joint interests in crisis stability (or the absence of incentive to pre-empt in a crisis), and a less vigorous arms race if economic constraints continue to grow.

Given the different nature of the two societies, explicit agreement on long-run stabilization will not be easy. But given also that there is some finite probability of nuclear deterrence failing by accident or miscalculation, a strategy for nuclear-risk reduction cannot ignore the possibility of trying to ameliorate the basic conditions of conflict, however slow that process may be. As argued above, the secretive nature of Soviet society and the disparate nature of our two societies enhances the dangers of miscalculation as a path to war. Thus, one of the goals of long-run nuclear-risk reduction measures is to increase the transparency and predictability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship as a means of reducing the chances of miscalculation. The aim is to poke holes in the black box. A second goal of such measures is the canonical CBM goal of demonstrating the existence

[12] See Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry,* 31–64.

[13] See Barry Blechman, Janne Nolan, and Alan Platt, "Negotiated Limits on Arms Transfers: First Steps Towards Crisis Prevention?" in ibid., 255–284.

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of common interests between the two rivals. And as noted above in relation to more restricted CBMs, care must be taken to design the measures to enhance warning and minimize chances for deception. The pursuit of such goals would involve strategies of increased contacts and exchanges, particularly those that develop in a climate of reciprocity. Openness and information on the Soviet side is a key objective. There are a variety of such exchanges and contacts; the following discussion deals with those in the military domain.

Viewed from this perspective, one of the potentially most significant CBMs and stabilization measures is the process of arms control negotiations. All too often, arms control efforts have been judged solely in terms of formal treaties and reductions in numbers of existing weapons. But arms control can also contribute to the enhancement of transparency or clarity about the adversaries' behavior in the relationship. When one compares the discussions in the 1950s with those today it is evident that the Soviet Union has gradually come to disclose more information. Cases in point are: provisions such as non-interference with national technical means; regular meetings of delegations and of the SCC; acceptance of cooperative surveillance measures (such as in the unratified 1976 Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions); and provisions for the exchange of information and establishment of common data bases.

In fact, if one wished to enhance the role of arms control as a CBM or stabilization measure, one might supplement the existing negotiations by incorporating them in a broader framework of nuclear stabilization talks.[14] Such an approach would have several tracks. Talks would deliberately be designed to enhance transparency and communication rather than to reach reductions. They might include, for example, regular meetings between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Soviet counterpart. They would not necessarily seek a particular agreement, but would discuss specific problems relating to stability- and confidence-building measures, such as occur in the context of current agreements for controlling naval incidents at sea. In fact, this might be a significant, if less obvious, role for a joint crisis-notification center. Officially, the center would coordinate U.S. and Soviet reactions if a nuclear weapon were exploded by a terrorist group or a Third World country. But it might also involve the exchange of information more generally in relation to stabilization measures.

Yet another track in the nuclear-stabilization framework could consist of seeking limited agreement where possible. We have seen examples of this approach relating to physical areas: fencing off Antarctica from the arms race, for example, or fencing off the seabeds and outer space from nuclear weapons. We have also seen it in certain technologies. Whatever the merits of particular proposals—the list can be readily multiplied—the larger point is that formal arms reduction talks are only part of the repertoire of arms control when approached as a strategy for nuclear-risk reduction.

[14] See J. Nye, "The Future of Arms Control," in Barry Blechman, ed., *Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982), 223–46.

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Naturally, there are certain risks to approaching arms control as a CBM or stabilization measure. One danger is that public opinion in democracies would be lulled into complacency by the comforting existence of the process, and would underinvest in defense. The effect of SALT in the 1970s is sometimes cited as an example. On the other hand, this lulling effect can be exaggerated. U.S. defense budgets declined in the 1970s as a result of changing domestic priorities and reaction to the Vietnam War (well before SALT I), and the debate over SALT II probably accentuated attention to defense issues. In any case, overall Soviet political behavior was probably more important in its effects on U.S. opinion than the existence of arms control talks. Recent events have shown that arms control may be a domestic political necessity in democracies. If so, it can be better designed to fill its role as a nuclear-risk reduction measure.

There will always be two types of linkage between nuclear-stabilization measures and U.S.-Soviet relations generally. One type is inherent: whether we want to or not, our democracy could not ignore a bloody invasion of Poland or Iran. The other type is tactical, in which we choose to make an explicit connection. The latter is a question of degree and of choice. There may be a situation in which, if we had a richer menu of stabilization measures, we would be more flexible in some linkage possibilities instead of being compelled to put pressure on only a major arms-control negotiation. It is interesting to note that the Reagan administration came into office committed to the idea of tactical linkage, but seems largely to have eschewed it in practice. In any case, predicting the effect of a worsening climate of relations on various risk-reduction measures will depend on how an administration chooses to respond in light of public perceptions of particular Soviet behavior, the reaction of allies, and of the existence (or absence) of other policy instruments for response to Soviet behavior.

Generally, an improving climate will help new initiatives, and a worsening political climate will make new measures difficult to initiate. Nonetheless, if the U.S. is publicly perceived to be more at fault, the worsening climate may increase popular demands to enhance certain existing stabilization measures. Thus, in the area of crisis management, deteriorating relations might increase pressure to upgrade the hot line or to establish a crisis control center. But the same conditions may make it difficult to negotiate the details of a new initiative. In the domain of crisis prevention, a deteriorating climate need not interfere with ad hoc classic measures of averting crises. After all, these early forms of crisis prevention originated at the height of the cold war as a result of the prudential concerns outlined at the beginning of this article. On the other hand, new initiatives in consultations or military CBMs for crisis prevention would be difficult to develop in a climate of deteriorating relations. Roughly the same pattern could be expected to be true for long-range stabilization measures. Domestic concern might lead to pressures to initiate arms control talks, but mistrust would probably make their completion more difficult. At the same time, the willingness to initiate new exchanges, stabilization talks, or cooperative measures, is likely to be more difficult under deteriorating relations.

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Conclusion

The basic conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has deep roots and will persist for a long time. During that time, there will be some danger of a breakdown of deterrence. The paths are outlined in Table 1. The most likely path is through miscalculation of intentions and escalation in an area of ambiguous interests in the Third World. A somewhat less probable, but still significant, path to breakdown would be through accident, mistake, or chaos surrounding unforeseen events in situations where the two military forces confront each other. Further in the future, and somewhat lower in probability, is the prospect of catalytic nuclear war started by a third party. Least likely of the paths is a pure "bolt out of the blue" surprise attack.

A variety of measures can be taken to reduce the risk of nuclear war along each of these paths. Many of the confidence building measures that stress early warning (such as notification of multiple missile launches) are aimed at the lowest probability paths. Nonetheless, if well designed, they can have some military value and a larger political symbolic value. Other measures, such as improving physical communications (like upgrading the Hot Line) or sharing and evaluating information about third party explosions (such as joint crisis center) are useful in dealing with managing a crisis that has already begun, but may not be very significant in preventing crises from arising in the first place. Moreover, they must be carefully designed to minimize their use for deception.

Because they often deal with less probable paths to nuclear war, or only with precipitating rather than deeper causes, CBMs are often treated as marginal in value and priority. It would be a mistake to ignore even such modest improvements in lowering nuclear risks. But it would be equally mistaken to constrain a strategy for nuclear-risk reduction to measures that deal with the least likely paths (in Table 1), or only the precipitating rather than the deeper causes (in the terms of Table 2). A serious strategy for nuclear-risk reduction should work across the whole range of paths and proximity of causes. Those measures that deal with dangers of miscalculation between a closed and on open society should not be neglected simply because they are more political and less technical. On the other hand, particularly if there is a climate of deteriorating relations, it may be easier to start with more limited and technical measures. But measures such as the joint crisis control center should be designed with an eye to their potential and perhaps subsequent effect on broader and longer-term confidence building measures. Similarly, arms control and other negotiations should be designed to give long-term transparency and communication considerations as prominent a priority as the signing of formal arms-reduction treaties. In this broad sense of the term, CBMs and stabilization measures can play a significant role in a strategy of nuclear risk reduction.*

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Environmental Policy in the Reagan Presidency

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NORMAN J. VIG

The Reagan administration is rapidly gaining a reputation as one of the most effective presidencies in recent history. At least in domestic policy, President Reagan has accomplished greater change in less time than any administration since Franklin D. Roosevelt's "hundred days." Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of environmental policy, where the administration has tried to reverse a cycle begun fifteen years ago. Notwithstanding intense opposition from environmental organizations, Congress, and the public, leading to the forced resignations of his top environmental officials during 1983, Ronald Reagan has set federal environmental regulation on a new course in the 1980s.[1]

Few would have predicted such dramatic change prior to 1981. Despite Reagan's longstanding antipathy to regulation, his espousal of the "sagebrush rebellion" in the late 1970s, and a mandate from the 1980 Republican platform to review the costs and benefits of existing environmental programs, most observers assumed that Reagan's agenda for regulatory relief would be blunted by strong public support for environmental protection. Both the Carter administration and Congress had shown increasing interest in use of cost-benefit analysis to improve the efficiency of environmental programs, but neither had questioned the basic premises and goals of the "environmental decade" of the 1970s. By 1980

[1] See Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, eds., *Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan's New Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984).

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progressive environmental administration appeared to have matured into a permanently institutionalized and publicly accepted function of government.[2]

Literature on the presidency has suggested that presidents are rarely successful in radical policy initiatives. Most scholars have argued in recent years that presidents are severely constrained by limited resources and political capital; institutional opposition from Congress, the bureaucracy, and the courts; a zealous and critical mass media; a diverse and demanding assortment of interest groups; and the complexity and inertia of the executive branch itself. Before the Reagan administration, references to a "no-win presidency" and an "illusion of presidential government" had become common.[3] For example, in his preface to the 1980 edition of *Presidential Power*, Richard Neustadt reminded his readers that presidential weakness was the underlying theme of his original book and noted:

> Weakness is still what I see. Expectations rise again and clerkly tasks increase, priorities are needed more than ever but are harder to maintain, and prospects for sustained support from any quarter worsen as political parties wane.[4]

In his reappraisal dealing with the Carter administration, Neustadt was moved to ask: "Is the Presidency possible? Even in the humble sense of keeping the game going, handing on the office reasonably intact?"[5]

Such conclusions may have to be revised in light of the Reagan presidency. Reagan's "revolution" is predicated on a radical reassertion of presidential powers and prerogatives, and his domestic agenda is primarily a *negative* one—cutting back taxes, spending, and regulation—which renders it less vulnerable to the usual political constraints. This article uses the case of environmental policy to examine how an incoming presidential administration strongly committed to reversing previous policies can achieve systemic, nonincremental policy change. What were the Reagan administration's environmental policy goals and what strategies were used to pursue them? What questions do these goals and strategies raise about presidential intervention in regulatory processes? And what are the consequences for environmental protection?

Environmental Policy Change and the Presidency

Reagan's intervention in environmental policymaking goes far beyond precedents set by previous chief executives. Although President Richard Nixon played

[2] Helen M. Ingram and Dean E. Mann, "Environmental Policy: From Innovation to Implementation," in Theodore J. Lowi and Alan Stone, eds., *Nationalizing Government: Public Policies in America* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978); Dean E. Mann, ed., *Environmental Policy Implementation: Planning and Management Options and Their Consequences* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982).

[3] Paul C. Light, "Presidents as Domestic Policymakers," in Thomas E. Cronin, ed., *Rethinking the Presidency* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982); Hugh Heclo and Lester Salamon, eds., *The Illusion of Presidential Government* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981).

[4] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), xi.

[5] Ibid., 241.

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an important role in launching the "environmental decade" in 1970, most of the new environmental regulation that followed was the product of congressional legislation that owed little to presidential leadership. Most of the new social regulation of the 1970s, that is, federal programs that used regulatory techniques to achieve broad social goals, reflected strong pressures from environmental and consumer organizations backed by a massive shift in public opinion favoring vigorous protection of public health, safety, and the environment. Moreover, such legislation was developed through bipartisan coalitions in the key House and Senate committees that sought consensus on the major environmental issues.[6]

Most of the new environmental legislation delegated broad areas of discretionary authority to the implementing federal agencies. Many statutes also authorized citizen suits to enforce compliance and provided for judicial review of administrative rules and regulations. As a result, virtually every major environmental decision made by the agencies was contested in the courts, which came to play an important role in environmental administration. Although they upheld most agency actions, the courts put increasing pressure on the agencies to support their decisions with substantial evidence and a full public record of the administrative process.[7]

All presidents tried to exert coordination and control over environmental regulation in the 1970s, but they had relatively little impact on the development of agency policy. Presidents Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter each established new mechanisms for reviewing agency rulemaking. Nixon set up an advisory council representing industry to convey business concerns over the new air and water pollution requirements. He subjected environmental regulations to "Quality of Life" review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other agencies. Ford required "inflationary impact statements" on new environmental regulations. Carter initially abolished such reviews, but in 1978 established an even more far-reaching regulatory oversight process through a new Regulatory Council and a Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG). RARG, staffed by the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS) and the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), singled out a small number of proposed regulations with major economic impacts (over $100 million per year) for cost-benefit analysis in an effort to find regulatory alternatives that would reduce inflationary pressures. Although none of these initiatives had a major influence on the development of regulation, they made such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) increasingly sensitive to economic considerations and

[6] Walter A. Rosenbuam, *The Politics of Environmental Concern*, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1977); John C. Whitaker, *Striking a Balance: Environment and Natural Resources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976); and J. Clarence Davies III and Barbara A. Davies, *The Politics of Pollution*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Pegasus, 1975).

[7] Lettie M. Wenner, *The Environmental Decade in Court* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); R. Shep Melnick, *Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983).

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helped to stimulate more flexible and innovative approaches to policy implementation.[8]

General pressures for regulatory reform gathered more steam through the 1970s. By the middle of the decade Congress, as well as the White House, was showing increasing concern over the rigidities and anticompetitive effects of economic regulation by such older regulatory commissions as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal Aviation Administration. In the Carter administration a start was made toward deregulating transportation and energy. By the latter part of the decade attention began to shift to such new regulatory agencies in the executive branch as EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).[9] Most economists advocated greater reliance on market incentives to reduce the costs of regulatory compliance; two examples from environmental policy are taxes on pollution discharged into the environment and permits to discharge pollution that are fixed in number and exchangeable among polluters. While Congress did not accept this general approach, there was growing support for new methods of cost-benefit and risk-benefit analysis to improve the flexibility and effectiveness of environmental administration.[10]

The Carter administration tried to balance these pressures while placing high priority on environmental protection. Carter drew heavily on the established environmental organizations for appointments and advice in furthering environmental goals. To some extent he "politicized" environmental administration by placing strongly committed environmentalists in key positions and attacking vested congressional interests whose projects the environmentalists opposed (especially large water projects). But at the same time Carter moved to establish economic review and oversight processes that went considerably beyond those of his predecessors; thus he laid the groundwork for much deeper intervention in regulatory decisionmaking in the Reagan administration.[11]

The Case for Presidential Intervention

Some critics of regulatory policy had long advocated presidential intervention to increase the political accountability of regulatory agencies. In an influential ar-

[8] See, e.g., Douglas M. Costle, "Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform," *Washington Law Review* 57 (1982): 409–32; and George C. Eads and Michael Fix, *Relief or Reform? Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984), chap. 3.

[9] See, e.g., James E. Anderson, "Economic Regulatory and Consumer Protection Policies," in Lowi and Stone, eds., *Nationalizing Government*, and James Q. Wilson, ed., *The Politics of Regulation* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

[10] See, e.g., Lester B. Lave, *The Strategy of Social Regulation: Decision Frameworks for Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), and Daniel Swartzman, Richard A. Liroff, and Kevin G. Croke, eds., *Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Regulations* (Washington, D.C.: Conservation Foundation, 1982).

[11] See Susan J. Tolchin and Martin Tolchin, *Dismantling America: The Rush to Deregulate* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1983), chap. 2; George C. Eads and Michael Fix, "Regulatory Policy,"

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ticle published in 1975, Lloyd Cutler and David Johnson, the former a leading proponent of stronger executive authority in both domestic and foreign affairs, argued that the concept of regulatory decisionmaking by independent, nonpartisan experts no longer served the country well.[12] Reviving an old debate, they stated bluntly that "regulatory agencies are deeply involved in the making of 'political' decisions in the highest sense of that term—choices between competing social and economic values and competing alternatives for government action—decisions delegated to them by politically accountable officials." Regulatory "failure," as Cutler and Johnson defined it, occurred "when an agency has not done what elected officials would have done had they exercised the power conferred on them by virtue of their ultimate political responsibility." They, therefore, suggested the need for "some mechanism allowing more frequent intervention in the regulatory process by politically accountable decisionmakers."[13] Although they saw Congress and the president as sharing this responsibility, they argued that the president was in a much better position to impose political accountability:

> If what we need is more flexible, coordinated and politically acceptable regulatory policymaking, it can be argued that the President should be given much more extensive power and responsibility to intervene in the regulatory process—whether he wants it or not. Even the critics of expanded presidential power would probably admit that the President is capable of acting more quickly than can the Congress in formulating and articulating national policy goals. In addition, the President and his immediate staff have an overview of government management—and a constitutional responsibility for executing all of the laws—that is not shared by a single regulatory agency, by any specialized congressional committee or by the Congress as a whole. The President is the only nationally elected officer, and thus, at least arguably, our most politically accountable official. He is uniquely situated to intervene (at least in a limited number of critical instances) in order to expedite, coordinate, and, if necessary, *reverse agency decisions.*[14]

Cutler and Johnson's proposal was aimed primarily at the independent regulatory commissions and included provisions to ensure congressional approval, public debate, and judicial review of the record. However, it added impetus to a movement to strengthen presidential leadership in the wake of the Watergate debacle. It also challenged the prevailing wisdom that new areas of "technical" regulation—such as the environment, health, and safety—were best handled by professional experts in the regulatory bureaucracy and impartial judges in the courts. As Cutler recently put it, "Regulatory rulemaking calls for 'political'

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in John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Experiment* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1982).

[12] Lloyd N. Cutler and David R. Johnson, "Regulation and the Political Process," *Yale Law Journal* 84 (1975): 1395–1418. See also Cutler, "To Form a Government," *Foreign Affairs* 59 (1980): 126–43.

[13] Cutler and Johnson, "Regulation and the Political Process," 1399.

[14] Ibid., 1410–11 (emphasis added).

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balancing and accountability as much as does enactment of the authorizing legislation itself."[15]

The pressures for regulatory reform and for presidential intervention in regulatory processes put environmentalists on the defensive. On the one hand, they were opposed to any regulatory reform or political intervention that might weaken the statutory mandates won in Congress; they wanted to see environmental administration professionalized and taken out of politics. At the same time, however, they were skeptical of new decisionmaking methodologies such as cost-benefit and risk-benefit analysis on grounds that they concealed subjective political biases that might weaken environmental commitments. The environmentalists looked to congressional committees and the courts to maintain pressure on the agencies to implement the laws, but opposed presidential intervention to impose cost-benefit criteria on decisionmaking. The Sierra Club ultimately brought suit against the Carter administration on grounds that political bargaining among the White House, the EPA, and regulated industries over sulfur emission standards represented an unconstitutional intervention and denial of due process in agency rulemaking.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals eventually upheld the executive power of the president to intervene in regulatory policymaking in this case. In her opinion, Judge Patricia Wald held that "we do not believe that Congress intended that the courts convert informal rulemaking into a rarefied technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations or the presence of Presidential power."[16] She reasoned:

> The authority of the president to control and supervise executive policymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking. Regulations such as those involved here demand a careful weighing of cost, environmental, and energy considerations. They also have implications for national economic policy. Our form of government simply could not function effectively or rationally if key executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the chief executive. . . .[17]

The *Sierra Club* decision has been extensively discussed in the legal literature. The point here is that it appeared to allow the president far more extensive powers to intervene in regulatory affairs than had been taken for granted before. Although President Reagan had launched his attack on environmental regulation before the decision was handed down, it appeared to many to legitimate his broad use of presidential powers to alter environmental policy.

Richard P. Nathan has also defended Reagan's "administrative presidency." Echoing Cutler, he supports broad political intervention in the administrative process: "The basic premise is that management tasks *can and should* be performed by partisans. This concept is not only appropriate, but necessary, to a

[15] Lloyd N. Cutler, "The Case for Presidential Intervention in Regulatory Rulemaking by the Executive Branch," *Tulane Law Review* 56 (1982): 835.

[16] *Sierra Club v. Costle*, 657 F. 2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 406–07.

[17] Ibid., 406.

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functioning democracy in a large and technologically advanced nation such as the United States." Nathan suggests that "*making government work better*" requires that "*politics penetrate* operations, that the values politicians are elected to advance are reflected in the execution of the laws, as well as in their enactment."[18] He supports Reagan's politicized administration as necessary to effective domestic policy management even though, in this case, the end result has been that "environmental policies of the prior fifteen years were substantially diluted."[19]

The Dangers of Presidential Control

The fundamental issue raised by Cutler and Johnson, the *Sierra Club* decision, and Nathan's review of the Reagan strategy is an old one: how can a balance be struck between the need for political accountability to elected officials and the need for skilled, professional, nonpartisan administration? In an overloaded regulatory state, the case for stronger presidential direction of the bureaucracy is an appealing one. As reformers have long pointed out, too many agencies have been "captured" by the clienteles they are supposed to be regulating. But the dangers of presidential "capture" of the agencies could be equally as great. As one critic put it, unfettered White House intervention could bring about a situation in which any decision "will be based almost entirely on a 'political' judgment about who should win and who should lose."[20] Another constitutional expert has warned, "The great danger from presidential intervention in rulemaking is that scientific and professional understanding—the facts—will be reduced to too small a role."[21]

The *Sierra Club* case raised two primary issues. One was whether presidential intervention in the substance of agency rulemaking violated the separation of powers, given the fact that Congress had delegated rulemaking authority to a specific administrator. The Circuit Court rejected this argument, as reflected in Judge Wald's opinion. The second issue was whether *ex parte* discussions among the president, agency officials, and regulated parties, which took place after the formal comment period had ended, violated the principles of due process embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act. Courts have generally required that all evidence that materially affects the outcome of agency decisions be placed in the record, that affected parties be given an opportunity to comment on such evidence, and that the full record be available for judicial review. In this case, the court relaxed these requirements for public disclosure of the content of presidential deliberations regarding the final agency decision. But it still held that the

[18] Richard P. Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), 7, 13 (emphasis in original).

[19] Ibid., 78.

[20] Alan B. Morrison, "Presidential Intervention in Informal Rulemaking: Striking the Proper Balance," *Tulane Law Review* 56 (1982): 892.

[21] Kenneth Culp Davis, "Presidential Control of Rulemaking," *Tulane Law Review* 56 (1982): 854.

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agency's decision "must have the requisite *factual support* in the rulemaking record, and under this particular statute the Administrator may not base the rule in whole or in part on any '*information or data*' which is not in the record, no matter what the source."[22] The decision does not give the president the right to impose arbitrary and capricious decisions or to exercise discretion not granted under the statute. Nor is there anything in the decision that allows a president to violate the statutory intent of Congress in administering regulatory policy.

Evaluating Presidential Intervention

The issue then is not *whether* a president may intervene in regulatory decision-making, but *how*, and *for what purpose*. Most would agree on the importance of reaching some balance between political accountability and expertise, politics and professionalism, reform and continuity, and presidential and congressional oversight. But how do we evaluate the particular balance struck in any one administration or field of policy? Two criteria are particularly important in evaluating such presidential interventions. The first is *legitimacy*—does the president's action serve to further the goals embodied in relevant statutes? Does the president have an electoral mandate or public support for the political resolution of the issues that he imposes? The case for political accountability only holds if these conditions are met. The second criterion is *technical rationality*—is the president's decision compatible with a reasonable interpretation of factual evidence in the record? Or, more broadly, does the pattern of presidential intervention permit skilled professionalism as well as political responsiveness in administration?

It is important to distinguish between the general merit of arguments for regulatory reform and presidential direction and the kind of policy change we observe in the Reagan administration. We try to do so by describing the administration's policy goals, the strategies used to pursue them, and the impact on environmental institutions and policies.

Reagan's Environmental Policy Agenda

Reagan's environmental policy goals were derived from his broader agenda for regulatory reform, and were described in some detail in the 1980 Republican platform. The platform reaffirmed the party's "long standing commitment to conservation and wise management of America's natural resources," and declared that a "healthy environment is essential to the present and future well-being of our people," and that a "government role is necessary" to ensure pollution is controlled and public health protected. However, it noted also that it was "imperative that environmental laws and regulations be reviewed, and where necessary, reformed to ensure that the benefits achieved justify the costs im-

[22] *Sierra Club v. Costle*, 657 F. 2d, 407 (emphasis in original).

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posed. Too often, current regulations are so rigid and narrow, that even individual innovations that improve the environment cannot be implemented." "We believe," it said, "that regulatory procedures must be reformed to expedite decisionmaking. . . . [And we] strongly affirm that environmental protection must not become a cover for a 'no-growth' policy and a shrinking economy."[23]

In the fall of 1980 Reagan appointed a transition task force on the environment to produce specific reform suggestions. Chaired by Dan Lufkin, a former head of Connecticut's Department of Environmental Protection, the task force also included two former EPA administrators, Russell Train and William Ruckelshaus. It produced a voluminous report calling for moderate reforms in line with the Republican platform. The report recommended reexamination of environmental laws passed in the previous decade, but did not advocate cutting programs on a wholesale basis. As Russell Peterson, a former Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) head under Presidents Nixon and Ford, described it, the report "sought to maintain the momentum of environmental protection while allowing for some easing of regulation and for economic incentives for pollution control."[24] The Lufkin report was largely ignored, however, and by late 1980 the president's environmental policy agenda was being shaped more by the views of James G. Watt and the conservative Heritage Foundation.[25]

Watt was an experienced and successful administrator prior to his appointment as secretary of the interior, but he held views dramatically at odds with the transition task force. He was reportedly recommended to the president by Joseph Coors, of Coors Brewing Company, and Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada. Coors was a leading contributor to the Reagan campaign and an important figure in conservative Republican politics, and Laxalt was chairman of the president's national campaign organization. Both were prominent representatives of the so-called Sagebrush Rebellion, a conservative western movement especially active on public lands issues. In contrast, the Lufkin task force was more closely identified with the Bush campaign and the moderate wing of the party. Watt was later appointed head of a new Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environment, and emerged as the administration's chief spokesman on energy and environmental issues. By turning to Watt and the policy recommendations of the Heritage Foundation, Reagan was abandoning a moderate Republican policy agenda and a campaign that had stressed coalition building for a far more aggressive, narrow, and ideological strategy. That decision had major implications for the direction of environmental policy initiatives in the first three years of his administration and for their legitimacy.

One of the most notable risks in such a political strategy was a tendency to

[23] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 19 July 1980, 2046.

[24] Russell W. Peterson, "Laissez-Faire Landscape," *New York Times Magazine*, 31 October 1982, 32.

[25] See especially Louis J. Cordia, "Environmental Protection Agency," and James E. Hinish, Jr., "Regulatory Reform: An Overview," in Charles L. Heatherly, ed., *Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1981).

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downplay experience (in substantive policy) and professionalism in the pursuit of ideologically-defined goals. Another was to assume that Congress and environmental groups had little claim to participate in decisions putting such an agenda into effect. Both risks were evident in the substance and tone of the Heritage study. Displaying little familiarity with environmental programs or support for their legislatively mandated goals, the EPA chapter in the report referred to the agency as a "morass of regulatory controls" and argued that it needed "proper administrative direction and not legislative remedy."[26] Numerous reports in the press indicated that the study was "widely used by Mr. Reagan's transition staff after his election."[27]

A Mandate for Change?

The election results on November 4 represented an impressive victory for Reagan over President Jimmy Carter. Reagan won nearly 44 million votes (50.7 percent) to Carter's 35.5 million (41.0 percent), with John Anderson capturing 5.7 million (6.6 percent). Carter received the lowest percentage of the popular vote of any incumbent Democratic president in U.S. history.[28] Reagan interpreted that vote as a mandate for conservative policy change and economic revitalization. Consequently he launched a thoroughgoing attack on economic and regulatory policies and, as part of that effort, attempted a radical alteration in environmental policies.

Reagan's margin over Carter and Republican gains in the Senate and House (in particular, Republican capture of the Senate for the first time since 1954) seemed to convince many political observers that the president did indeed receive a mandate for his policy agenda. As Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein noted, "the results of the 1980 election produced a clear and distinct change in the *political dialogue* and *the political agenda*, with both Democrats and Republicans talking about and focusing on the need to reduce public spending, balance the budget, and shore up our national defense. . . ."[29] Reagan was successful in seeking congressional approval for his economic policy, and the massive cutbacks in environmental programs—at least in the first year—in part because of the widely shared belief that such a mandate existed and thus legitimized his policy agenda. Nearly every study of the 1980 election, however, casts consider-

[26] Cordia, "Environmental Protection Agency."

[27] William E. Schmidt, "Denver Lawyer's Role in E.P.A. Decisions Is Focus of Inquiries by Congress," *New York Times*, 26 February 1983, 7. See also Peterson, "Laissez-Faire Landscape." In a general review of the administration's record after one year, the Heritage Foundation itself said that almost two-thirds of its recommendations had been adopted. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "Conservatives Bid Reagan Cut More," *New York Times*, 22 January 1983, 7.

[28] Gerald M. Pomper, "The Presidential Election," in Pomper, ed., *The Election of 1980* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1981).

[29] Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, "The Republican Surge in Congress," in Austin Ranney, ed., *The American Elections of 1980* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 300–301 (emphasis in original).

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able doubt on the existence of such a mandate and therefore on the legitimacy of the strategy used by the Reagan administration to put its agenda into effect.[30] A review of public opinion on environmental issues provides an even clearer indication that public support for environmental protection remained exceptionally strong, as even the Reagan administration recognized by late 1983.[31]

Nevertheless, convinced that he had a mandate for conservative policy change, the president set out to define new environmental policy priorities, and he selected James Watt at Interior and Anne Gorsuch at EPA to carry out his policies. In at least some respects, the president's environmental policy agenda reflected the Republican platform and the position of the Lufkin transition task force. Thus, in the first annual report of the Reagan CEQ, the guiding principles of the administration's policy were set out: regulatory reform, including extensive use of cost-benefit analysis in determining the value of environmental regulations; reliance as much as possible on the free market to allocate resources; and decentralization or environmental federalism, shifting responsibilities for environmental protection to state and local governments whenever feasible.[32]

The principles outlined in the council's report were not too far removed from the consensus among scholars that environmental policy had "moved from an era of commitment to environmental quality goals to a period of searching for efficient, economical, and politically feasible techniques and mechanisms for protecting the environment."[33] If the Reagan administration had tried to build on this emerging consensus, it might have accomplished more than it ultimately did and avoided many later embarrassments.

However, to fashion a new environmental reform coalition in Congress would have required considerable time and effort, as well as recognition that most of the existing environmental quality goals had broad, bipartisan support, even in the new Republican Senate. The president would have had to articulate a clear and compelling case for revising regulatory statutes and procedures without sacrificing basic environmental objectives. But a consensus-building strategy of this kind conflicted with the ideological fervor of a new administration determined to achieve quick results in economic deregulation and recovery. The supply-side tax and budget cut program took precedence over everything else by

[30] See, e.g., Everett Carll Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Spring 1981): 1–25; Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, *Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982); Pomper, "The Presidential Election"; William Schneider, "The November 4 Vote for President: What Did It Mean," in Ranney, ed., *The American Elections of 1980*; and Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, "Policy Directions and Presidential Leadership: Alternative Interpretations of the 1980 Presidential Election," *British Journal of Political Science* 12 (July 1982): 299–356.

[31] Robert Cameron Mitchell, "Public Opinion and Environmental Politics in the 1970s and 1980s," in Vig and Kraft, eds., *Environmental Policy in the 1980s*; Philip Shabecoff, "Ruckelshaus Says Administration Misread Mandate on Environment," *New York Times*, 27 July 1983.

[32] Council on Environmental Quality, *Environmental Quality 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), 2.

[33] Ingram and Mann, "Environmental Policy," 131.

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the time Reagan assumed office. In this context, environmental policy came to be seen as a derivative element in the economic recovery program, obviating the need for separate congressional legitimacy. Substantive policy change could then largely be pursued through an administrative strategy: What was not attained legislatively could be achieved through control of the bureaucracy. This approach would have the advantage of producing tangible results more quickly, allowing more direct presidential intervention in environmental regulation, and minimizing highly visible and potentially controversial proposals that would accompany requests to Congress to alter the basic environmental statutes.

The Administrative Strategy Under Reagan

The administrative strategy consisted of four interrelated components: personnel policies emphasizing the selection of loyal and ideologically committed policy officials; government reorganization intended to facilitate centralized White House control of policy change and to institute changes within departments and agencies that would help further the president's policy agenda; budgetary cutbacks justified largely by appeal to economic needs and governmental reform, not policy change; and centralization of regulatory oversight to implement the president's economic and regulatory relief goals. The general strategy has been discussed in several recent midterm assessments of the Reagan administration.[34] We examine it here as a case study of environmental policy change and regulatory reform.

Personnel Policies. According to Nathan, the "key ingredient" of Reagan's administrative strategy has been the appointment of loyal and committed policy officials willing to spearhead the conservative "revolution":

> Appointed policy officials in agency posts have penetrated administrative operations by grabbing hold of spending, regulatory and personnel decisions. From the beginning, these and other administrative tactics have been used aggressively by the Reagan administration.[35]

The major examples that Nathan used to illustrate the point included Anne Gorsuch and James Watt. Like others, they "successfully took on the bureaucracy to pursue the administration's policy goals."[36] The effect of such personnel policies at the EPA were particularly devastating: the agency suffered enormous budgetary cutbacks that necessitated sharp reductions in personnel. Many career

[34] See, e.g., Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency* and "The Reagan Presidency in Domestic Affairs," in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., *The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Palmer and Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Experiment*; and Hugh Heclo, "One Executive Branch or Many?" in Anthony King, ed., *Both Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, the Executive Branch, and Congress in the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983).

[35] Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency*, 69.

[36] Ibid., 78.

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officials, especially highly trained and experienced lawyers and other professionals, departed from the agency as morale declined. The numbers themselves are revealing. Combining full-time and part-time staff, employment at the EPA dropped from 14,269 on January 31, 1981 to 11,474 by November 1982. The staff at the agency headquarters dropped from 4,700 when the Reagan administration took office to perhaps as low as 2,500 by September 1982.[37] In March 1983, the Office of Personnel Management reported that 2,618 EPA positions had been eliminated since January 1981; 1,513 of them were "employees with full-time, permanent appointments."[38]

Yet the numbers do not reveal the full impact of this strategy. The Reagan environmental policy team was distinguished chiefly by its lack of federal experience and by its hostility toward EPA programs they were to administer. Both qualities were intentional. Nathan notes that six months before the 1980 presidential campaign got underway, a system was being developed for appointing persons to cabinet and subcabinet positions. Designed by Edwin Meese and E. Pendleton James, it was intended to provide centralized control of presidential appointments. The individuals were carefully selected and screened for their ideological purity and were briefed by the White House, rather than agency professional staff, to ensure that the presidential agenda would be faithfully executed.[39] Louis J. Cordia, formerly at the Heritage Foundation and later an official at the EPA, helped to screen EPA officials and prospective officials as a member of the Reagan transition team. His role surfaced in 1983 amidst press accounts of so-called "hit lists" of scientists found to be ideologically unacceptable to the administration.[40]

EPA and Interior Department officials were recruited largely from the private sector and from regulated industries, reflecting Reagan's determination to shift the balance of representation in executive agencies toward the business community. For example, Rita Lavelle, EPA assistant administrator for hazardous waste, was formerly a public relations officer for Aerojet-General; Kathleen Bennett, assistant administrator for air, noise and radiation, had been a lobbyist for the American Paper Institute; and Robert Perry, EPA general counsel, worked as a lawyer for the Exxon Corporation from 1969 to 1981.[41] The top EPA post was not filled until May 1981 when Anne Gorsuch, a Watt protégé, was confirmed as administrator. Gorsuch (later Burford) had been an attorney for the Colorado telephone company and a member of the Colorado legislature. She had no management experience, no experience in Washington, D.C., and no significant

[37] Philip Shabecoff, "Budget Office Is Said to Be Asking 17% Cutback in Funds for E.P.A.," *New York Times*, 13 December 1982; and "U.S. Environmental Agency Making Deep Staffing Cuts," *New York Times*, 3 January 1982.

[38] Dick Kirschten, "Administration Using Carter-Era Reform to Manipulate the Levers of Government," *National Journal*, 9 April 1983, 732–36.

[39] Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency*, 74–75. See also Kirschten, ibid.

[40] Stuart Taylor, Jr., "Ex-E.P.A. Aide Says He Drew Up 'Pro and Con' Lists on Personnel," *New York Times*, 17 March 1983, 12.

[41] *New York Times*, 21 June 1981, and 26 February 1983, 18.

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experience with or knowledge of environmental policy. She saw her job largely as improving administrative efficiency at EPA and implementing the administration's environmental deregulation agenda.[42]

While such a personnel strategy was understandably attractive to an incoming conservative administration, there were significant risks.[43] In one limited study of middle-level appointments in the first half of 1981, G. Calvin Mackenzie found that nearly sixty percent of the sub-Cabinet offices, nearly eighty percent of the independent agencies positions, and virtually all of the independent regulatory commission positions were staffed by people with no previous service in the executive branch. Noted Mackenzie, "You've got an especially dangerous situation with people so inexperienced."[44] Similarly, two career EPA officials voiced their complaints in a *New York Times* article: "Virtually none of the top managers have more than a few months experience in their areas of responsibility; many had no prior experience in government, and certainly none in the environmental field."[45] Thus it was not surprising that, especially early in their tenure, Gorsuch's management team distrusted the professional staff, the career staff grew suspicious of the new policy officials, and the agency's capacity to implement environmental policies declined sharply. Moreover, the press was replete with accounts of alleged political manipulation of scientific data and ideological screening of scientific advisory bodies. One result was the erosion of the credibility of environmental data analysis and policy analyses produced in the administration.[46]

Reorganization. Particularly in the first year of the administration, reorganization of agency offices became an integral part of the overall strategy. There were two separate aspects of this organizational strategy. The first has received more attention, and involved internal reorganization of offices within the EPA and Interior Department, and the virtual elimination of selected environmental offices within the Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, and the Executive Office. Justified on the basis of improved management and elimination of overlap and duplication of responsibilities, the organizational changes also can be viewed as a determined effort to downgrade those offices likely to challenge the president's policy agenda and to institutionalize his environmental and

[42] Richard N. L. Andrews, "Deregulation: The Failure at EPA," and J. Clarence Davies, "Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Administration," in Vig and Kraft, eds., *Environmental Policy in the 1980s.*

[43] Chester A. Newland, "The Reagan Presidency: Limited Government and Political Administration," *Public Administration Review* 43 (January/February, 1983): 1-21.

[44] Quoted in Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan's Appointees Reflect the Process, for Better or Worse," *New York Times*, 20 March 1983, 1.

[45] John Jones and Jack Smith, "Critics of E.P.A. Are Right," *New York Times*, 1 September 1982, 23. The authors' names are pseudonyms of EPA career professionals.

[46] Lawrence Mosher, "More Cuts in EPA Research Threaten Its Regulatory Goals, Critics Warn," *National Journal*, 10 April 1982, 635-39; and "Environmental Quality Council Trims Its Sails in Stormy Budget Weather," *National Journal*, 24 July 1982, 1306-07.

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natural resource policies. For example, soon after assuming office Gorsuch abolished the EPA's Office of Enforcement, then reestablished it with a much smaller staff, and later reorganized it once again. All this took place within the first twelve months of her tenure. In the spring of 1982, she replaced the two top officials, moved division chiefs around, and redefined the responsibilities of the office.[47] Presumably the changes help explain the eighty-four percent decline in the number of cases EPA referred to the Justice Department between June 1981 and July 1982.[48]

In the Interior Department, James Watt reorganized the Office of Surface Mining, reduced its field offices from thirty-seven to twenty, and replaced five regional offices with two technical service centers. The move was clearly intended to weaken enforcement of the federal strip-mining law, which was enacted over vigorous coal industry opposition in 1977. Watt also announced in early 1983 that his agenda for the next two years included further structural, strategic and personnel changes that would lock in the sweeping changes already made in the Department. "I will build an institutional memory that will be here for decades," he said. He was at work on codifying his policies to ensure that they penetrated to the level of the Department's operating manuals and directives as well as the rewriting of regulations.[49] In a parallel move shortly after taking office, Reagan fired the entire staff of the CEQ, some of whom had served since the Nixon and Ford administrations. New appointees were selected from the president's campaign organization, but the overall size of the staff was reduced by more than half.[50] To many, the personnel cuts meant that the CEQ simply could not be expected to perform its former functions of advising the president on environmental issues, monitoring the nation's environmental progress, and overseeing implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act.

The second component of the reorganization strategy was intended to centralize policy planning in the White House. Three policy staff organizations were created to do so: the cabinet councils, including the Council on Natural Resources and Environment chaired by Watt; an Office of Policy Development (OPD), formerly the Domestic Policy Staff in the Carter administration; and a newly created Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE).[51] Based on Nathan's interview data, the councils seem to have been active and operated effectively, in large part because officials shared strong ideological beliefs about policy directions.[52] Chester A. Newland's review of the three organizations reinforces

[47] *Washington Post*, 23 June 1982. See also Davies, "Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Administration."

[48] Howard Kurtz, "Since Reagan Took Office, EPA Enforcement Actions Have Fallen," *Washington Post*, 1 March 1983.

[49] Philip Shabecoff, "Nearing Complete Renovation of Interior Department Rules," *New York Times*, 23 January 1983.

[50] Davies, "Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Administration." See also Mosher, "Environmental Quality Council Trims Its Sails."

[51] Newland, "The Reagan Presidency," 5.

[52] Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency*, 73.

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that conclusion. For example, the Council on Natural Resources and Environment met twenty-six times in 1981 alone, and a total of thirty-one times by April 29, 1982. The OPE evidently allowed the Reagan White House to focus more on longer-term issues to help carry out the president's agenda than has been typical of recent presidencies, again in part because of the distinctive philosophy of government and ideological orientation of the Reagan administration.[53]

Budgetary Decisions. One of the most distinguishing features of the Reagan presidency is the extent to which the budgetary process was used to achieve goals of policy change. Committed to the goal of curtailing the growth of government by whatever means available, and possessed of a finely developed political skill in working with Congress—at least on budgetary issues—Reagan was exceptionally successful in pushing his budget proposals through Congress in his first year.[54] Massive cuts in environmental program budgets were subsumed into the general program of fiscal retrenchment, and OMB played a leading role in shaping those cuts to reinforce the president's policy change agenda. Few environmental programs escaped sharp cuts, and some of the retrenchment was so severe that long-lasting adverse effects are inevitable. For example, the EPA's research and development funds were cut by more than half, after accounting for inflation, between 1981 and 1984.[55] Yet even the Reagan administration had argued that more scientific research was necessary as a base for future EPA action.

Unlike other presidencies in which departmental and agency heads might be expected to protest such cuts, Reagan's policy leaders welcomed the prospect of reduced budgets. After the president signed the fiscal 1983 budget for the EPA, Gorsuch said she was pleased with the result: "This was the last act of a seven-act passion play. . . . We got essentially what we wanted."[56] At one point in late 1981, the OMB considered cutting funds for the EPA by fifty percent despite the nearly universal conclusion among environmental policy specialists that even with its previous budget the agency lacked the resources to implement the wide range of programs assigned to it.[57] Congress did not go along with all of the Reagan budget requests, but the figures nevertheless reveal the degree to which the budgetary strategy carried major implications for policy change.

The overall shift from the Carter to the Reagan administration is perhaps best captured in the spending total for all federal programs that deal with natural resources and environmental protection. In January 1981, Carter's final budget es-

[53] Newland, "The Reagan Presidency," 7, 11.

[54] Palmer and Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Experiment*; Hedrick Smith, "The President as Coalition Builder: Reagan's First Year," in Cronin, ed., *Rethinking the Presidency.*

[55] Mosher, "More Cuts in EPA Research Threaten Its Regulatory Goals," 635; Robert V. Bartlett "The Budgetary Process and Environmental Policy," in Vig and Kraft, eds., *Environmental Policy in the 1980s.*

[56] Philip Shabecoff, "E.P.A. Chief Claims Victory on Budget," *New York Times*, 13 October 1982, 20.

[57] Philip Shabecoff, "Funds and Staff for Protecting Environment May Be Halved," *New York Times*, 29 September 1981.

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timated that for fiscal 1984 the total spending authority would be $16.2 billion. Reagan proposed a fiscal 1984 budget of $8.9 billion, thirty-two percent less than obligated in 1980, without adjusting for inflation.[58] The figures can be viewed usefully from another angle. Although spending on environmental protection and natural resources programs had increased from 1.5 percent of the federal budget in 1970 to 2.4 percent in 1980, it fell back to an estimated 1.5 percent in 1983 and was projected to decrease to 1.2 percent in fiscal 1984. Under Reagan budget projections, by 1986 it would fall to 0.88 percent.[59] A fundamental reordering of policy priorities had been achieved through the budgetary process.

The extent of budget cutbacks varied from agency to agency, but a few figures suffice to illustrate the change and its impact. Reagan proposed a 1984 operating budget for the EPA of $948.6 million, which was down from the $1,039 million Congress approved in fiscal 1983, and seventy percent of the $1,346.8 million obligated to fiscal 1981, again without accounting for inflation. Correcting for inflation, Reagan's proposed fiscal 1984 operating budget for EPA (excluding the Superfund program) was $409.1 million, down from a peak budget in 1979 of $740 million (both in constant 1972 dollars), a forty-five percent decline.[60] By 1984, the EPA's budget represented no greater spending power than the agency had in 1972, although Congress had assigned it numerous additional responsibilities since the early 1970s.

OMB had hoped to cut the EPA's budget even more for 1984, but in June 1983, the administration finally backed down and accepted Ruckelshaus's recommendation to add another $165.5 milion to the original EPA budget. By late 1983 Ruckelshaus was less successful in raising the budget. He requested a fiscal 1985 budget of $1.35 billion, about the same amount that Congress appropriated in the last year of the Carter administration. However, the president requested only $1.21 billion.[61]

Regulatory Oversight. Consistent with the other efforts to bring central White House control over policy planning through the cabinet councils, OPD, and OPE, President Reagan gave special emphasis to expanding initiatives in both the Carter and Ford administrations to review regulatory proposals for cost and economic impact. The regulatory review staff was moved from the former Council on Wage and Price Stability to the OMB and put under the control of

[58] Bartlett, "The Budgetary Process and Environmental Policy."

[59] Calculated from Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 1984* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 5-43, 9-5, and previous budget documents.

[60] Bartlett, "The Budgetary Process and Environmental Policy." Amounts are deflated to 1972 dollars using implicit price deflators for federal government purchases of nondefense goods and services, as calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce.

[61] Cass Peterson, "EPA's Ruckelshaus to Get Half the Budget Increase He Sought," *Washington Post*, 27 January 1984. The 8.5 percent increase that Reagan requested for fiscal year 1985 would leave EPA's operating budget eleven percent below that of fiscal year 1981 in nominal terms, and about equivalent to its budget of ten years ago when discounted for inflation.

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a new Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and Vice President Bush's Task Force on Regulatory Relief. An executive order (12291) requiring quantitative cost-benefit analysis to be performed for *all* major regulations was the device used to limit regulatory growth and force explicit consideration of costs. Regulatory action was not even to be proposed unless an agency could demonstrate that potential benefits exceeded costs. Given the current state of the art in cost-benefit analysis, such a requirement has dramatic implications for environmental and health regulation.[62]

Among regulations selected for early review by the task force were those affecting the auto industry (air emission standards and lead content in gasoline), hazardous wastes, premanufacturing notice for new toxic chemicals, and industrial pretreatment of waste water discharged into public sewer systems. While ostensibly the new process of regulatory oversight would produce more efficient and effective solutions for these and other problems, the Reagan administration was more concerned with inhibiting the introduction of new regulations and in showing quick results to the business community. The name of the Bush task force (regulatory "relief," not "reform") symbolized this goal.

The procedures embodied in Reagan's executive order differed substantially from orders of Presidents Ford and Carter. OIRA has broad powers to review rules *before* they are issued and to delay their publication in the *Federal Register.* This may be tantamount to dropping proposed regulations into the proverbial "black hole" by delaying them indefinitely.[63] It is also an open invitation for *ex parte* industry lobbying before any formal comment period. There is ample evidence that OMB has served as a conduit for business attacks on regulation and has directly attempted to influence agency rulemaking. For example, John E. Daniel, former EPA chief of staff under Gorsuch, testified before a congressional investigative committee in the fall of 1983 that OMB tried to dictate regulations to EPA, urged that cost factors be considered in setting health rules when the Clean Air Act prohibited their use, threatened reprisals against the agency, and showed proposed rules changes to industry officials before they were made public.[64]

Most importantly, the entire process is closed to the public and there is no administrative record. This is a far cry from the carefully crafted guidelines suggested for presidential intervention by Cutler and others.[65] Kenneth Culp Davis has predicted that, without correction, the whole system will ultimately fail for two reasons:

> (1) Public support for the system will be withdrawn and opposition will develop, because needless secrecy will impair accountability. (2) Changes made by the President or his representatives in agencies' final rules will be often invalidated by reviewing

[62] Swartzman, Liroff and Croke, eds., *Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Regulations.*

[63] Tolchin and Tolchin, chap. 3.

[64] "Ex-E.P.A. Aide Says Budget Office Put Case for Industry," *New York Times*, 28 September 1983.

[65] Cutler, "The Case for Presidential Intervention," 847–48.

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courts because of failure to include in the rulemaking records facts and ideas of central relevance to the rules.[66]

Whether this turns out to be the case or not, it is questionable whether OIRA has the resources to conduct credible cost-benefit analyses. Several studies cast doubt on the quality of agency submissions, on the adequacy of OIRA's staff, on the cost of full regulatory reviews, and on the use made of economic data.[67] Since regulatory analyses are not published, it is impossible to judge whether they meet professional standards. But at least one OMB official has stated that much of the economic analysis is not taken seriously and has been used chiefly to support decisions made for other reasons: "We're not doing heavy analysis. The economic analysis is just window dressing for the executive order."[68] If such a perception is confirmed, it will set the legitimate use of cost-benefit analysis back for a long time. It will be difficult to achieve genuine regulatory reform in this climate.

Constraints on Presidential Intervention

As is evident from the previous discussion, President Reagan's "intervention" in regulatory policymaking went much beyond that of previous administrations. A comprehensive political-administrative strategy was followed that resulted in substantial change across the entire field of environmental policy. To what extent did the usual constraints on presidential policymaking limit the effectiveness of this strategy? Were Congress, the courts, interest groups, and the media able to frustrate Reagan's initiatives as most of the presidency literature would suggest? The answer is mixed, but on the whole negative.

Congress had some notable successes in blocking and embarrassing the president. None of the administration proposals for amending the major environmental laws was enacted, and a House contempt citation of Anne Gorsuch and subsequent investigations of the scandals in EPA succeeded in driving the entire EPA leadership from office (although only Rita Lavelle was eventually convicted for perjury and obstruction of Congress). Congress also halted James Watt's plans for mineral and petroleum exploration in wilderness areas, and restricted

[66] Davis, "Presidential Control of Rulemaking," 862.

[67] See, e.g., Eads and Fix, "Regulatory Policy" and *Relief or Reform?*, chap. 6; W. Kip Viscusi, "Presidential Oversight: Controlling the Regulators," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 2 (Winter, 1983): 157–73; V. K. Smith, ed., *Environmental Policy Under Reagan's Executive Order: The Role of Benefit-Cost Analysis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); and General Accounting Office, "Improved Quality, Adequate Resources, and Consistent Oversight Needed If Regulatory Analysis Is to Help Control Costs of Regulations" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2 November 1982).

[68] Quoted in Tolchin and Tolchin, *Dismantling America*, 74. See similar statements by OMB officials quoted in Jonathan Lash, Katherine Gilman, and David Sheridan, *A Season of Spoils: The Reagan Administration's Attack on the Environment* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 19–26. For a defense of the administration's actions under the executive order, see Christopher C. DeMuth, "A Strategy for Regulatory Reform," *Regulation* 8 (March/April, 1984): 25–30.

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oil lease sales in some fragile parts of the outer continental shelf (OCS). Nevertheless, Congress was not able to prevent most of the organizational, regulatory, and enforcement changes that Watt, Gorsuch, and others carried out. Nor, despite numerous legislative and oversight hearings, have any new safeguards been enacted against such abuses in the future. Most important, Congress proved incapable of resisting large budget and personnel cutbacks within the framework of the new budget reconciliation process. The most effective veto powers of Congress – to refuse new legislation and budget appropriations – were largely irrelevant in a cutback administration such as this. Indeed, the divisions and stalemate on the Hill precluded constructive reform and largely reinforced the president's administrative strategy.

What about the courts? Have they proven to be an effective alternative avenue for challenging administrative actions? Much has been made of the fact that many of Watt's coal, mineral, and oil leasing programs have been tied up in court, and that the Interior Department alone faced some 4000 lawsuits by late 1983.[69] Although such litigation has slowed the implementation of new rules and regulations, it is not yet clear that it will prevent the achievement of the administration's major deregulatory goals.

First of all, as Lettie Wenner has shown, the principal impact of litigation has been to delay administrative action action rather than to prevent it.[70] When the courts find agency decisions deficient, they normally remand them for further consideration by the same administrators, often resulting in modified proposals to achieve the same regulatory objectives. Second, the Supreme Court has shown a marked tendency in recent years to defer to the discretion of administrative agencies and has greatly restricted the authority of the lower courts to challenge agency rulemaking procedures.[71] Third, while the *Sierra Club v. Costle* decision does not give the president carte blanche to impose regulatory decisions unsupported by evidence, it would appear to place few limitations on his power to block new regulations that are not in conformity with his program. It will be difficult to sue the president on procedural grounds when he has taken no action. Although the president backed off his broader claims to executive privilege to withhold EPA documents from Congress following the contempt citation of Gorsuch, there seem to be no effective judicial constraints on negotiations between the president or OMB and regulated parties. Finally, it must be kept in mind that the government has won over sixty percent of the environmental cases to which it has been a party over the past decade, and this does *not* appear to have changed in the Reagan administration.[72] For every case that has gone against the administration, it is easy to find one in which it has prevailed.

[69] Philip Shabecoff, "Will William Clark Pick Up Where James Watt Leapt Off?" *New York Times*, 6 November 1983.

[70] Wenner, *Environmental Decade in Court*, and "Judicial Oversight of Environmental Deregulation," in Vig and Kraft, *Environmental Policy in the 1980s*.

[71] See Norman J. Vig, "The Courts: Judicial Review and Risk Assessment," in Susan G. Hadden, ed., *Risk Analysis, Institutions, and Public Policy* (New York: Associated Faculty Press, 1984).

[72] Wenner, "Judicial Oversight of Environmental Deregulation."

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Thus, for example, while environmentalists and state governments won temporary injunctions against offshore oil lease sales off the California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey coasts,[73] the courts have upheld Watt's general OCS leasing program, and have recently thrown out the Coastal Zone Management Act as the states' last legal impediment.[74] Similarly, although the courts have found Interior in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in permitting oil and gas development in wilderness study areas, and enjoined several coal lease sales,[75] they have upheld most leasing procedures, as well as delegation of surface mining controls to states even though state rules may not be as "stringent" as federal regulations issued under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.[76] At the EPA, lawsuits brought by environmentalists have forced the agency to issue legislatively mandated regulations for hazardous pollutants under the Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability (Superfund) Act. Other suits have made EPA issue industrial pretreatment standards required by the Clean Water Act.[77] But judges could not force the agency to write adequate regulations, and have subsequently had to remand many of them.[78] Courts have also upheld EPA approval of state implementation plan revisions that allow higher sulfur dioxide emissions in several states,[79] and have upheld controversial water pollution permits and so-called sweetheart settlements with toxic polluters.[80] Finally, in a unanimous and far-reaching decision handed down in June 1984, the Supreme Court upheld extension of the air pollution "bubble" policy to nonattainment—noncomplying—areas, calling EPA's 1981 interpretation of the Clean Air Act "a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests" that is "entitled to deference."[81]

Litigation is only one form of interest group activity. The environmentalists have probably been more effective in their appeals to Congress and public opinion. They have succeeded in their primary goals of keeping the major en-

[73] *California v. Watt*, 16 ERC 1729 (1981); *Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt*, 18 ERC 1904 (1983); *Kean v. Watt*, 18 ERC 1921 (1982).

[74] *California v. Watt*, 19 ERC 1281 (1983); *Secretary of Interior v. California*, 20 ERC 1201 (1984).

[75] *Sierra Club v. Peterson*, 19 ERC 1705 (1983); *National Wildlife Federation v. Watt*, 19 ERC 1959 (1983).

[76] *Sierra Club v. Watt*, 18 ERC 1565 (1982); *Citizens for Responsible Resource Development v. Watt*, 20 ERC 2097 (1984).

[77] *Sierra Club v. Gorsuch*, 18 ERC 1549 (1982); *New York v. Gorsuch*, 18 ERC 1575 (1983); *Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch*, 19 ERC 1410 (1983); *Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch*, 17 ERC 1092 (1982); *Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch*, 17 ERC 2013 (1982).

[78] *National Association of Metal Finishers v. EPA*, 19 ERC 1785 (1983); *Sierra Club v. EPA*, 19 ERC 1897 (1983).

[79] *Connecticut v. EPA*, 18 ERC 1417 (1982); *New York v. EPA*, 19 ERC 1662 (1983); *New York v. Administrator, EPA*, 19 ERC 1367 (1983).

[80] *Montgomery Environmental Coalition, Inc., v. EPA*, 19 ERC 1169 (1983); *Webb v. EPA*, 19 ERC 1398 (1983); *U.S. v. Seymour Recycling Corp.*, 18 ERC 1944 (1982).

[81] *Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC*, No. 82-1005. See Linda Greenhouse, "High Court Upholds Reagan on Air Pollution," *New York Times*, 26 June 1984.

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vironmental statutes intact and forcing Reagan's initial appointees from office. But they were almost totally excluded from administrative decisionmaking under Gorsuch and Watt. Although environmentalists are now consulted, their influence remains far below what it was in the Carter administration. Economic interests, in contrast, have had continuous access to the president, OMB, and the operating agencies. Their direct involvement and support has influenced all environmental and regulatory decisionmaking, clearly furthering the administrative strategy.[82] Likewise, state and local governments seeking greater control over environmental policy have encouraged devolution of responsibilities, another major administrative goal. They have not, however, succeeded in preventing large cuts in federal grants for state program implementation.

Finally, the media played a significant role in discrediting Reagan's early environmental policies, but may not have hurt him in the long run. The press dramatized the Gorsuch-Lavelle scandal for three months, and had a rare field day with Watt's pronouncements. Newspapers and magazines also printed many opinion polls and commentaries indicating that the administration was out of touch with public sentiment on environmental issues. By focusing primarily on the personal and the dramatic, however, they inevitably missed much of the routine decisionmaking in the agencies. They also offered the president opportunities to defend his policies and criticize the environmentalists. Although Reagan has not succeeded in changing public opinion on the need for strict environmental protection—especially against new toxic waste hazards—he has had considerable success in deflecting blame from the White House. Indeed, Reagan's skillful handling of the Burford and Watt "resignations" may even have gained him sympathy in the face of *their* shortcomings.[83]

Nevertheless, environmental policy had become an extremely sensitive issue for the president by 1983, and he has taken various steps to limit the political damage that might impede his reelection. The appointments of Ruckelshaus and William Clark (the latter to replace Watt) were carefully calculated to restore credibility to EPA and a sense of fairness and moderation at the Interior Department. The change in style was unmistakeable by the end of 1983: The new agency heads held well-publicized meetings with representatives of environmental groups for the first time in three years and adopted a far more conciliatory posture before Congress.[84] Ruckelshaus brought a competent and experienced team

[82] Tolchin and Tolchin, *Dismantling America*; "Ex-E.P.A. Aide Says Budget Office Put Case for Industry," *New York Times*.

[83] Although polls during 1983 showed that a majority of the public did not trust Reagan administration *officials* on environmental policy, a CBS-*New York Times* poll in April found that by a margin of forty-eight percent to thirty-eight percent the public still trusted Reagan himself to make the right decisions on the environment. League of Conservation newsletter, October 1983. Cf. Barry Sussman, "Poll Says Most Think Reagan Prefers to Protect Polluters," *Washington Post*, 5 March 1983.

[84] Cass Peterson, "Ruckelshaus Rocks No Boats at EPA," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 12 December 1983; and Joseph A. Davis, "Ruckelshaus Team Moving Into Place at EPA," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 12 November 1983, 2391.

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of administrators and scientists back to EPA, and reversed several of Burford's earlier decisions. Clark dismissed three of Watt's top lieutenants and indicated that he would review Interior policy on coal-leasing, offshore oil sales, and national park development. The report of the congressionally-mandated Linowes commission on coal sale practices will no doubt result in revised procedures. Thus by 1984 the administration seemed to have recognized the need for some substantive as well as stylistic changes.[85] However, Ruckelshaus continued to be stymied by OMB and the White House: he was unable to persuade the president to restore EPA's budget to nominal pre-1981 levels, or to propose a long-awaited administration strategy for control of acid rain.[86] It therefore appeared that no major policy initiative would be taken before the election, and that the massive federal deficit would preclude restoration of environmental programs for the indefinite future. Like most other domestic policies, environmental policy had been rendered hostage to the fiscal crisis produced in large part by the 1981 tax reductions.

Conclusions

On one level, our analysis of Reagan's environmental policies leads to an unavoidable conclusion: The president has gotten most of what he wanted. Despite widespread public and congressional opposition, the administration has succeeded in reducing the size, scope, and effectiveness of environmental agencies. The administrative strategy allowed substantial policy change at the agency level by altering priorities, capabilities, and procedures. Relatively few new regulations have been issued, and existing ones have been reinterpreted or revised to reduce their impact on industry. The share of the federal budget devoted to environmental and natural resource programs has been cut by half in three years. EPA staffing has been reduced by more than twenty percent. Although the major environmental statutes have not yet been revised, many of their provisions can no longer be effectively implemented, and Congress may now find it difficult to resist amendments to bring them into line with the *fait accompli*.

The Reagan strategy has circumvented other institutional constraints. Environmental policies, along with many others, have been forced into conformity with the president's economic program. Greater presidential control over the domestic policy agenda had been advocated, in one way or another, by students of the presidency for a long time. As Nathan and others have argued, Reagan has achieved greater success in this regard than any recent president. Indeed, those who had come to disparage the power of the presidency must now revise their theories in light of Reagan's domination.

[85] David Hoffman, "Reagan is Trying to Clean Up His Environmental Image," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 9 January 1984.

[86] Cass Peterson, "EPA's Ruckelshaus To Get Half the Budget Increase He Sought"; Philip Shabecoff, "Head of E.P.A. Defends Reagan Plan for Further Acid Rain Study," *New York Times*, 27 January 1984.

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Unfortunately, much of the recent presidency literature has implicitly assumed that anything that strengthens the Oval Office is conducive to better government.[87] The uninspired and often ineffectual presidencies of Ford and Carter, together with weakened and dispersed leadership in Congress, greatly strengthened this tendency by the late 1970s.[88] Lloyd Cutler, also one of Carter's top legal advisers, went so far as to suggest a series of constitutional amendments that would establish a quasi-parliamentary system.[89] He also supported much greater presidential intervention in regulatory decisionmaking, albeit with various safeguards to ensure congressional and judicial accountability.

We suggest the need for two other criteria in evaluating presidential interventions to achieve policy change: legitimacy and technical rationality. The first is necessary to ensure meaningful accountability, the second to preserve professional competence and sound policy analysis. In our view, which we hope is sensitive to fundamental democratic principles as well as the requisites for efficient public administration, President Reagan's administrative strategy for reversing environmental policy commitments fails to meet either standard and, therefore, cannot be considered a desirable precedent for stronger executive leadership.

On this level, President Reagan's radical policy departures must be judged a failure. Democratic accountability entails more than winning the highest elective office. Precisely because we do *not* have a parliamentary system, a partisan majority or mandate is not a sufficient basis to govern. We have three branches of government *sharing* powers, as Neustadt pointed out long ago, and for this reason the president must govern by persuasion.[90] Legitimation of policy change—especially radical policy reversal—thus requires broad public approval and the consent of Congress. Reagan had neither for his environmental policy and regulatory changes. He could not persuade members of his own party, let alone the opposition, to support Gorsuch or Watt, and many Republicans ultimately called for their removal. In Watt's case, ironically, the Senate threatened to pass a resolution that was the functional equivalent of a parliamentary vote of no confidence—indicating how out of balance the system had become.

Reagan's regulatory review process—which presumably has guided most agency rulemaking—fares poorly on the criteria of both legitimacy and technical rationality. It has no statutory foundation, the House of Representatives having rejected the administration's regulatory reform bill. Even if regulatory intervention can be defended under the executive powers clause of the constitution (as Carter's was in the *Sierra Club* decision), Reagan's OMB-OIRA process violates all norms of openness, fairness, and accountability to the public. It is doubtful

[87] An exception is Heclo and Salamon, *The Illusion of Presidential Government.*

[88] See, e.g., James L. Sundquist, "Congress, the President, and the Crisis of Competence in Government," in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981); and Charles O. Jones, "Congress and the Presidency," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981).

[89] Cutler, "To Form a Government."

[90] Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (1960 edition).

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that it can be reconciled with the basic premises of the Administrative Procedure Act, which applies to all executive agencies. Finally, we have not found any published evidence to corroborate the claim that regulatory review and revision is grounded in credible cost-benefit analysis. Certainly the massive budget and personnel cutbacks of 1981 were made without any real assessment of their impact on program implementation or environmental quality.

The politicization of the administration, the loss of thousands of skilled personnel, and the reduction by half or more in the research budgets of EPA and other agencies have all undermined the technical and analytical capacities necessary to improve implementation of environmental programs. The administration's early assertions that policy would be based on better scientific evidence and that more efficient management would allow the environmental agencies to "do more with less" are belied by the record. The professional competence of the EPA, CEQ, and parts of the Interior Department has been severely damaged, despite recent efforts to restore the credibility of these agencies. Treating the career civil service as the enemy is not the way to achieve either political accountability or lasting regulatory reform. Reagan's administration may regulate less, but not better.

In summary, whatever the "success" of Reagan's administrative strategy as an exercise in presidential power politics, it does not provide a viable answer to the widely perceived need for more coherent and politically responsible leadership in Washington. Our review of environmental policymaking indicates that the balance between political control and expert administration has tilted so far toward the former that the legitimacy and effectiveness of much decisionmaking has been jeopardized. It also suggests that the traditional institutional constraints on executive power are less confining than posited in much of the literature, perhaps because it is easier to carry out a negative agenda than a positive one. But policymaking by ideological partisans that ignores congressional intent, judicial standards, and public preferences is not likely to strengthen the presidency in the long run. Proponents of a strong presidency must pay greater attention to the policy consequences of their prescriptions in light of the Reagan experience.*

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Health-Policy Innovation and International Assistance in Central America

THOMAS JOHN BOSSERT

For over a decade, international health activities have emphasized primary health care (PHC) as a priority policy for health care delivery in the Third World. During the 1970s, a general consensus on the central goals and activities of this policy emerged in international health meetings.[1] PHC, a policy model designed to provide relatively low-cost services first in underserved rural areas and then in marginal urban areas, involves training auxiliary health workers and village volunteers to promote preventive health activities related to sanitation, water purification, nutrition, and maternal and child health. These health workers and volunteers learn to perform simple curative procedures and to identify cases for referral to more skilled health professionals. The PHC model also encourages communities to participate actively in the selection of those to be trained, the establishment of local health priorities, and the provision of volunteer labor and donated local materials. In addition to this core of activities, broader social and economic changes are also deemed necessary to achieve health goals. Yet specific program activity for promoting these changes has not been as universally accepted by health experts as the model just described.

[1] See World Health Organization (WHO), *Declaration of Alma Ata* (Geneva: WHO, 1978); V. Djukanovic and E. P. Mach, *Alternative Approaches to Meeting Basic Health Needs in Developing Countries* (Geneva: UNICEF/WHO, 1975); World Bank, *Health Sector Policy Paper* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980); Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), *Extension of Health Service Coverage: Strategies of Primary Care and Community Participation* (Washington, D.C.: PAHO, 1978).

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This general consensus among international public health officials does not mean there is no debate over elements of the model. Considerable attention has focused on how best to train and motivate different levels of health workers and how to determine the most effective mix of curative and preventive activities.[2] More recently, debate has emerged on evaluating costs and on developing different strategies for financing PHC programs.[3] Nevertheless, these debates, by and large, continue within the accepted outlines of the model. Indeed, they occur within a fairly narrow range of consensual program goals and accepted activities. Furthermore, international agencies like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and other bilateral agencies, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), as well as the international development banks—the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)—have all shifted their health activities toward the promotion of PHC programs.[4] In fact, it has become increasingly difficult to find international sources of funding and technical assistance that do not fit under the rubric of PHC policy.

However, in the Third World countries themselves, it is less clear that this consensus on goals and activities has developed. While public documents presented in international forums, health plans, and speeches of government officials now suggest a formal endorsement of PHC, the gap between official statements in international arenas and the actual implementation of PHC programs is great. PHC conflicts with other, more curatively oriented and long-entrenched priorities, epitomized by urban hospitals and medical school expansion. Evidence to date suggests only minor shifts of budgets, personnel, and facilities into PHC activities, even in countries that have made PHC the cornerstone of their health plans.[5]

[2] See N.R.E. Fendall, "Auxiliaries of Primary Medical Care," *Bulletin of New York Academy of Medicine* 48 (1972); PAHO, *Medical Auxiliaries* (Washington, DC: PAHO, 1973); WHO, *Promotion of National Health Services* (Geneva: WHO, 1975); A. Parker, "Health Technology and Primary Health Care," *Social Science and Medicine* 12 (1978): 29–41; Julia A. Walsh and Kenneth S. Warren, "Selective Primary Health Care: An Interim Strategy for Disease Control in Developing Countries," *New England Journal of Medicine* 301 (1979): 967–74; and Davidson R. Gwatkin, Janet R. Wilcox, and Joe D. Wray, *Can Health and Nutrition Interventions Make a Difference*? (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1980).

[3] Dieter K. Zschock, *Health Care Financing in Developing Countries* (Washington, D.C.: American Public Health Association, 1979); Stephen C. Joseph and Sharon Stanton Russell, "Is Primary Care the Wave of the Future?" *Social Science and Medicine* 14C (1980): 137–144; and A. Mead Over, Jr., "Five Primary Health Care Projects in the Sahel and the Issue of Recurrent Costs," in *Senegal: The Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project*, USAID Project Impact Evaluation Report, No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1980), app. E, 1–11.

[4] Some international agencies have demonstrated greater commitment to PHC than others. The banks have been least able to shift health resources away from hospital and large-scale sanitation projects, as noted in the case studies below.

[5] See Joseph and Russell, "Is Primary Care the Wave of the Future?"; and Thomas Bossert, "The Role of Government and Donor Support in Financing Primary Health Care: Case Studies from Central America" (Paper presented at the National Council for International Health Conference, Washington, D.C., June 1982).

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Faced with the reluctance of some national governments to commit national resources to PHC policies, international agencies often find themselves in the position of attempting to cajole national governments to change their priorities so as to adopt, implement, and expand PHC programs. International agencies have adopted different strategies to encourage national governments to increase their commitment to PHC. This article will define two general strategies of international agencies, discuss their relative merits in light of experience in Central America, and suggest conditions at the national and international levels that constrain the choice of strategies.

Implementation Strategies: Integration versus Concentration

As advocates of a particular model of health care delivery, international agencies have had to consider how best to promote this model. Because they rely heavily on national institutions to do the particular activities involved in implementing PHC policy, their actual influence over national governments is limited. Their central tools of influence are control of funds and technical expertise. However, the role of international organizations is usually limited by the low level of funding they provide relative to total national health budgets and by the anticipated temporary nature of their involvement in health activities. One exception is PAHO, which maintains country offices on a permanent basis with a continuing responsibility for advising government health officials. But no international agency, of course, has any statutory authority to impose its own health care model.

Within this context of limited influence, international agencies have adopted two general strategies to promote PHC: an *integrated* approach that emphasizes health planning, institution building, and cooperation in a holistic attempt to bring all institutions involved in health activities into the process of promoting PHC; and a *concentrated* approach that focuses attention on specific projects, a limited range of activities and geographic target areas, and the creation of new bureaucratic implementing units or the concentration on restricted units of the existing bureaucracy. As presented here, these approaches are ideal types and often agencies adopt elements of each or both; however, generally one or the other is the dominant approach an agency utilizes in each country.[6]

The integrated approach has a venerable history in both the multilateral health agencies (WHO and its regional office, PAHO), and in bilateral aid agencies like USAID, which during the 1960s and early 1970s promoted health planning activities and training in many programs in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World.[7] In related activities, there was concern for "institution-building"

[6] This distinction replicates on a smaller scale the larger development debate of the 1960s. See, for example, Albert O. Hirshman, *A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

[7] Raúl Vargas, "Health Policies in Latin America," *Social Science and Medicine* 13C (1979): 69–74; Family Health Care, Inc., *Planning for Health and Development: A Strategic Perspective for Tech-*

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in the ministries of health and in health education facilities.[8] Attention here focused on training and administrative skills. As PHC became the dominant international health approach in the 1970s, concern with the multi-sectoral influences on health in some cases broadened the focus of international agencies. The result was increased emphasis on the need for cooperation not only within an institution like the ministry of health, but among all institutions concerned with activities related to health—especially the ministries of planning, education, and agriculture.[9]

The integrated approach is based on rationalistic assumptions. It sees health as a holistic problem that requires major coordinated activities whose impact depends on the smooth interaction of all essential component parts. Advances in only one small area would be inhibited unless the whole machinery of the health and related bureaucracies also advanced. Planning, programming, and coordination are the central elements of the strategy, along with relatively high levels of technical education.

By contrast, the concentrated strategy emphasizes simplicity, limited goals, restricted activities, and few institutions. It focuses resources on narrow areas, specific activities, and single organizations. It is project-oriented rather than concerned with institution-building and planning. While not denying the rationality of the integrated approach, advocates of the concentrated strategy point to bureaucratic and bargaining constraints that restrict "rationality." This approach has received considerable support from the growing implementation literature in the U.S.[10]

Implementation studies in the U.S. focus attention on the strategies adopted by the initiators of new polices (usually the U.S. federal government) to cajole other institutions (such as state and local governments, community groups,

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nical Cooperation, report prepared for USAID, (Washington, D.C.: Family Health Care, Inc., 1979); and Holly R. Caldwell and David W. Dunlop, "An Empirical Study of Health Planning in Latin America and Africa," *Social Science and Medicine* 13C (1979): 75–86.

[8] See John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin, eds., *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); and D. Woods Thomas, et al., eds., *Institution Building: A Model for Applied Social Change* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1973).

[9] See Family Health Care Inc., *Planning for Health and Development*; Bruce F. Johnston and Anthony Meyer, "Nutrition, Health, and Population in Strategies for Rural Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 26 (1977): 1–22; James E. Austin and F. James Levinson, "Population and Nutrition: A Case for Integration," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Health and Society* 52, (1974): 169–84; Hector Correa, *Population, Health, Nutrition and Development* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1975); J. Fiedler, H. Caldwell, C. Campbell, and D. Dunlop, "The Dynamics of Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: A Review of the Relationship between Health, Nutrition, Education, and Population Change," (Paper presented at the African Studies Association Meeting, Baltimore, Md., November 1978); and Charles Hughes and John Hunter, "Disease and Development in Africa," *Social Science and Medicine* 3 (1970): 443–93.

[10] Ironically, this process is a second generation cross-fertilization. Early U.S. implementation studies initially drew on foreign aid examples for insights into federal-city relations. See Jeffrey L. Pressman, *Federal Programs and City Politics: The Dynamics of the Aid Process in Oakland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

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professional associations, service providers, and the like) to implement new programs. The federal government, like international assistance agencies, mainly provides funds, technical assistance, and general guidelines. Usually the federal government relies on other governmental and private institutions to provide personnel, facilities, and organization to implement the policies, just as international agencies must rely on national governments and sometimes on private institutions to implement aid programs.

While the federal government has statutory legal powers that international agencies lack in their relations with sovereign nations, this legal leverage may not be the most important means of cajoling other levels of government to implement programs. To examine the dynamics of implementing federal programs, U.S. researchers have found models of bargaining and organizational behavior useful to describe how actors at different levels negotiate with each other during the implementation process. This negotiation results in an actual implementation pattern that usually varies significantly from the pattern one could expect from the articulated goals and activities of the program initiators. Surprisingly, this variation between goals and actual implementation may occur even if all actors – federal, state, local and private – reach an early consensus on goals, priorities and activities.

The literature on implementation in the U.S. has tended to emphasize this disparity between goals and achievements, suggesting the extreme difficulty of the implementation process. Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, in their study of economic development projects in Oakland, California, emphasized the constraints that led implementing institutions to fail to cooperate on essential activities necessary to achievement of agreed-upon goals.[11] They warned against what they called the "multiplicity of decision points" and the "complexity of joint actions" that allow different institutional actors, pursuing several goals and projects simultaneously, to exercise vetoes on the implementation of an ambitious project. They suggest: "Be Simple! Be Direct!"

Drawing on this literature, an emerging field of policy analysis in the Third World has also emphasized the difficulties of implementation. In particular, a series of case studies edited by Merilee S. Grindle and a policy paper for the World Bank edited by Peter Knight have also stressed the importance of simplicity, narrow goals, and limiting the number and types of implementing agencies.[12] Milton J. Esman and John D. Montgomery in the Knight paper and Peter S. Cleaves in the Grindle book have also suggested taking account of an additional problem not addressed in the U.S. literature – the weakness of the government in general. They argue that implementation is made even more difficult because governments in many Third World countries are not sufficiently in

[11] Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

[12] Merilee S. Grindle, ed., *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Peter T. Knight, ed., *Implementing Programs of Human Development*, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 403 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980).

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command of resources and sufficiently legitimized to be able to enforce policy decisions.

In recognition of these constraints on implementation, the concentrated approach appears now to be the dominant strategy in UNICEF, IDB, and USAID. In the promotion of PHC, the strategy has meant focusing on specific projects such as training low-level health workers, programs of village potable water and sanitation activities, and building health posts. Often specific geographic regions are targeted for project activities, while other regions are left out.

In order to evaluate these two approaches I will examine two countries in which they were applied.[13] In Guatemala, the concentrated approach was promoted by USAID, UNICEF, and IDB; until recently, no integrated approach was attempted. By contrast, Honduras initiated its PHC programs using the integrated approach of PAHO.

Central American Cases: Guatemala and Honduras

Guatemala was the first country in Central America to begin a PHC policy. In 1971 it began to train middle-level paid health workers (called Rural Health Technicians, *Técnicos en Salud Rural* [TSR]) in simple preventive and curative health activities and in community organizing. This program was funded by USAID and was followed by a separate initiative, funded by UNICEF, that trained lower-level health promoters who were volunteers from their villages.

The Guatemala program began before USAID as a whole had a clearly defined PHC policy. It had a new mandate from Congress (Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967) to promote activities that directly reached the "poorest of the poor." This mandate was accompanied by increasing pressure to demonstrate the effectiveness of USAID's projects. These vague goals were easily met by the proposal from a Guatemalan private physician, Alberto Viau, the father of the TSR idea, who enlisted the support of his friend, E. Croft Long, a recently appointed USAID health official in the Guatemalan mission.[14] Viau and Long promoted the TSR idea both in USAID and in the Guatemalan government. The policy was attractive to both. For USAID, TSR fit the vague general goals of reaching the "poorest of the poor," while at the same time it was a specific program that satisfied USAID's increasing responsibility to demonstrate to Congress its ability to achieve clearly stated objectives. USAID in general was responding to two mandates—a vague target group (the "poorest of the poor") but demonstration of specific achievements—by moving increasingly from "program" loans for general revenue in broad social areas like education, transporta-

[13] These case studies are part of a larger project of comparative health policy analysis based on two years of field research in Central America (1978–80). See Thomas Bossert, *The State and International Agencies in Central America: Comparative Health Policy Making* (in progress).

[14] See E. Croft Long and Alberto Viau D., "Health Care Extension Using Medical Auxiliaries in Guatemala," *The Lancet*, 7848 (26 January 1974): 127–130; Diedre Strachen, "Marketing an Unpopular Idea," Harvard Business School Case Studies (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1977).

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tion and health, toward "project" loans for specifically defined activities to reach clearly defined objectives.[15]

The TSR program was primarily a training project that recruited faculty and students for two years of training in wide-ranging community-level activities. The training program was administered by a single new department of the Ministry of Health responsible directly to the minister. As such, it was not accountable to the rest of the ministry and did not coordinate its activities with the other departments that would be responsible for the TSRs once they finished training and began working in their villages. Despite the expectation that their work would be integrated into other ministry activities, in practice the TSRs were left with no clearly defined relationship with other public health employees or with the newly trained village volunteers of the UNICEF health promoters program.

The UNICEF program was an innovative one for that organization. Like USAID, UNICEF was searching for new, but at the time undefined, programs. But UNICEF, unlike USAID, historically had a narrowly defined mandate to promote activities to assist children, primarily by small-scale projects reaching the village level.[16] UNICEF had been supporting malaria eradication programs, but in the late 1960s it was reevaluating the effectiveness of these programs and was seeking alternatives. The village health promoter program was, like the TSRs, the idea of an innovative bi-national pair of advocates—Germán Arambarú of the Ministry of Health, and Rolando Quirós, the regional representative of UNICEF. Again, the program received approval by both the donor agency and the government of Guatemala, and again, it was basically a training program implemented by a single department with little coordination with other departments of the ministry.

The Inter-American Development Bank also was interested in new approaches to improving health in Latin America. Its earlier emphasis on hospital construction and large water and sewer projects was, as with USAID, giving way to a search for more appropriate means of reaching poor rural populations. The IDB, however, was limited in its organizational patterns and goals mainly to providing funds for construction of facilities. Its contribution to PHC, then, was largely limited to funding construction of health posts in many rural villages.

During the 1970s, Guatemala was relatively successful in placing PHC workers and facilities in the countryside. In many areas, village programs appear to have been quite successful. However, one severely negative result of these three separate programs was a continuing and growing fragmentation of health activities in Guatemala. Most other programs in the ministry were vertically administered by separate disease-specific departments, and these programs only added to the cumbersome bureaucracy. A worse problem, however, was that the TSRs and village promoters were trained with the explicit expectation that they would subse-

[15] See Judith Tendler, *Inside Foreign Aid* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

[16] See Thomas George Weiss, *International Bureaucracy* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1975), 127-48; and Djukanovic and Mach, *Alternative Approaches.*

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quently integrate their activities with each other and with the rest of the ministry's officials at local and regional levels. That this integration was never achieved was recognized by a ministry conference ten years after the program began. The conference still found it necessary to address the problem of defining the correct "location" (*ubicación*) and specific tasks of the TSR in the administrative structure of the ministry.[17]

By 1978, PAHO had begun an initiative in health planning and programming with one key official in the ministry. This program aimed at integrating all ministry activities among the technical and implementing departments. It involved an emphasis on yearly programming with general planned guidelines. In spite of some indications of progress during the first two years, it appeared to be facing insurmountable obstacles within and outside the ministry. By 1982 the innovating official had been replaced.

In contrast to the "concentrated" strategy of USAID and UNICEF that dominated foreign assistance in Guatemala, the major initiating strategy for PHC in Honduras was PAHO's "integrated" approach. Honduras began PHC policies in 1973 after a progressive military government under General Osvaldo López Arellano initiated a series of moderate reforms and demonstrated a strong commitment to national planning. The López Arellano regime brought in a new team of public health officials who had a general consensus on PHC goals and who conformed to the National Planning Agency's mandate to develop planning and programming capacity in the ministry. The new team turned to PAHO for assistance in designing their new PHC policy. At this time, PAHO was also looking for a new approach to health planning, rejecting as too rigid their earlier model (the PAHO-CENDES method) of health planning. This method, developed by PAHO and the Center for Development Studies (Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo-CENDES) at the Central University of Venezuela, involved a highly technical cost-benefit approach which was incomprehensible to most untrained officials, could not account for institutional inflexibilities, and was difficult to apply in countries with unreliable health statistics. Both PAHO and the Honduran officials worked together in a variety of collaborative workshops and related activities throughout the country to develop a holistic plan involving officials from all ministry departments (and at all hierarchical levels) in planning and programming activities. What emerged was a well-integrated plan that had been developed with the participation of most health officials. The implementers of the plan had been "on board" (that is, committed) from the beginning and had shaped the plan with their own interests and expectations. Vague goals had been transformed into specific tasks, roles, and responsibilities that were well integrated.

UNICEF was also a participant in this PHC process. However, in contrast to its experience in Guatemala, UNICEF's concentrated strategy of training village promoters was designed and implemented as part of an interlocking administra-

[17] "Taller sobre Ubicación y Funciones del Técnico en Salud Rural," November 1978, (Guatemala City, Mimeographed).

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tive structure and not an isolated, fragmented activity. USAID's offers to assist were initially rejected, largely due to resentment over USAID's earlier clumsy efforts to promote family planning through a privileged program administered by a relatively independent bureaucracy within the ministry. Later, USAID did contribute to the training of auxiliary nurses who were an important part of the PHC program, but its contribution was likewise integrated into the already established auxiliary nurses training program.

IDB contributed to the PHC policy in Honduras, much as it did in Guatemala, by providing funds for construction of health posts. However, IDB somewhat undermined the PHC approach by funding major hospital construction—including a large teaching hospital in the capital city. This construction would later place considerable demands on the recurrent costs budget of the ministry.

Initial implementation of the Honduran policy was surprisingly smooth. Training and supervision programs were well designed, community participation was high, and supply and logistic problems, while present, were manageable. Phased expansion from selected regions to the whole country occurred on schedule. It was a model program that PAHO used to illustrate its organizational effectiveness and the utility of PHC in general.

However, by 1978, after two coups had considerably altered the political environment in Honduras (such as restrictions on all earlier reforms, including those in health, and the removal of most of the innovative team in the Ministry of Health) signs of decay appeared in implementation.[18] Logistics and supply, never completely efficient, became a major bottleneck. Radical variation in program activities from region to region became apparent. Community participation began to decline. Ministry priorities appeared to shift back toward hospital construction and curative activities and to deemphasize planning and programming. In this new political environment, USAID assumed a more prominent role by initiating a new large health-sector loan again targeted toward concentrated activities, this time in the management of logistics and supply and in clean water and sanitation projects.

Conditions and Constraints on Foreign Assistance Strategies

To the dismay, perhaps, of policymakers, the conclusion of this review of experiences in Guatemala and Honduras suggests that neither implementation strategy is fully effective. I have found that both the "concentrated" and "integrated" approaches suffer from major drawbacks. The concentrated approach does target funds to particular tasks and administrative units so that they are likely to be relatively effective in reaching specific task goals. However, these targeted activities often depend on coordination with other administrative units whose programs may not have benefited from the new injection of funds and expertise and whose activities have not been developed to account for the new programs. Successfully trained workers will not reach the larger goals of im-

[18] Interviews with USAID evaluation team, April 1980.

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proving community health unless the rest of the ministry will be able to support their activities.

By contrast, the integrative strategy may indeed program and plan the activities of the whole ministry in such a way as to involve most implementors in the establishment of realistic, specific goals and the coordination of activities that are interdependent. The integrative approach, however, may disintegrate over time as consensus erodes and as the policy environment changes. The integrative approach also appears to be less capable of targeting funds and expertise on bottlenecks as they arise.

Both approaches appear to have benefits and flaws. Neither should be considered the only model for all foreign assistance. Perhaps both should be adopted in sequence, as they appear to have been in both Guatemala and Honduras, as PAHO has attempted to integrate USAID's TSR's in Guatemala and USAID has attempted to break management bottlenecks that PAHO could not overcome in Honduras. An alternative would be for agencies to cooperate, simultaneously adopting both strategies.

It would appear, however, that there are conditions and constraints that lead agencies and recipient nations to favor one strategy over another. Choice of strategy is not purely voluntary. The conditions and constraints are likely to be the result of three factors: the organizational goals and structures of the donor and recipient agencies; the changes in the policy environments of both donors and recipients; and the character of bargaining between the donor and recipient agencies. In this section I will briefly outline the conditions and constraints on strategy that are suggested by the two case studies.

There were a variety of institutional constraints on the international agencies that appeared to have encouraged the adoption of the concentrated strategy in USAID, UNICEF, and IDB, but not in PAHO. Since the late 1960s, Congress has held USAID more directly accountable for its activities.[19] This change in the "home" policy environment of USAID forced the agency to adopt specific programs that appear to be more easily evaluated. Integrative policies are exceedingly difficult to evaluate. Planning has no clearly defined set of outputs that can be shown to Congress. Furthermore, as USAID's funds began to dwindle, there was increasing pressure to concentrate scarce resources in clearly defined activities where they might have a better chance of having an impact than allowing resources to be spread so thin as to have no significant effect.

UNICEF always had a preference for concentrated strategies.[20] The institutional goals of UNICEF are explicitly narrow. Their activities are to be targeted on immediate improvement in well-being of children. Their goals are not integrative, but rather restrictive. The institutional routines in UNICEF have also established commitment to small-scale, village-level projects and not toward institu-

[19] See Tendler, *Inside Foreign Aid*; and Strachen, "Marketing an Unpopular Idea."

[20] While others correctly suggest that UNICEF has considerable flexibility in its activities—involving education, health, and agricultural programs—most of their programs are narrowly targeted to village level activities and training. See Weiss, *International Bureaucracy*.

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tional development of implementing agencies. By mandate and institutional routine, UNICEF preferred concentrated strategies. IDB, similarly, has rather narrow goals. Although IDB has supported some integrated activities by granting small portions of its loans to support PAHO administered programs, it lends funds primarily for construction activities.[21] Institutional routines (such as lack of implementing staff, the strict accounting requirements, the banking preference for assets, and the like) of international banks tend to favor continuing the current concentrated strategy.

By contrast, PAHO appears to have been able to adopt an integrative strategy, in part because its broad health mandate and lack of pressure for accountability in its policy environment reinforced its established routines in planning and technical assistance. PAHO, indeed, would find its difficult to adapt its organizational routines to a concentrated strategy. It provides technical assistance, primarily in the form of personnel, and not major project funding. While personnel may be concentrated on specific tasks, such a focus is limited by the availability of specialists. Usually PAHO missions are multidisciplinary and not concentrated in one health area.

To conclude, for institutions with narrow goals and restricted institutional routines, and for home policy environments that hold them accountable for the achievement of clearly defined goals, the concentrated approach has considerable advantages. It appears to be the "easiest" to implement with demonstrable results.

Of course, conditions of the donors are not the only determinant of the type of implementation strategy. Conditions and constraints in the recipient country may also favor a concentrated or integrated strategy. Indeed, as indicated above, those who argue in favor of a concentrated strategy suggest that especially in weak Third World countries conditions are particularly unfavorable for an integrated approach. Among these are: the general weakness of the government vis-à-vis other institutions in society; the inefficiencies and internal corruption of the bureaucracy; poor systems of logistics, supply and communications; and the low levels of human resources and general education. All these conspire to make rational choice, cooperation, and efficient interrelation of goods, services, and information extremely difficult. The exceptional case is when integration is even moderately successful.

Honduras, especially during the López Arellano period, was just such an exception. Contrasting the experience of this period to those that followed and to Guatemala's experience might suggest recipient country conditions that are likely to be a conducive environment for an integrated approach. There were several characteristics of the López Arellano period in Honduras that were relatively unusual in Third World countries. First, the military regime began with a strong commitment to moderate progressive reforms in agriculture, social programs, and labor and peasant organization. This commitment was buttressed

[21] Interviews with IDB officials. See also Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), *Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: IDB, 1979).

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with a much greater emphasis on national planning through a more powerful National Planning Agency. In this environment, health planning and a significant commitment of health ministry resources to a major reform like PHC was not only facilitated but encouraged, especially by the National Planning Agency. By contrast, subsequent Honduran regimes (as well as in the Guatemalan regime throughout the 1970s) have not shown a similar commitment to reform and have reduced the role of the National Planning Agency.

A second characteristic of the López Arellano period was the creation of a new and cohesive leadership team, drawn largely from the public-health oriented Department of Preventive Medicine of the Medical School of the National Autonomous University of Honduras. This cohesive team developed an early consensus, making PHC the priority ministry activity. They also developed a favorable orientation toward PAHO, in sharp contrast to their hostility to USAID, whose vigorous advocacy of an institutionally privileged family planning program had alienated their nationalistic sentiments. These conditions left the team predisposed to be favorable to PHC and open to the one international agency that was oriented toward the integrated approach. Subsequent Honduran regimes progressively dismantled the team and turned increasingly toward USAID for the funding of concentrated PHC activities. In Guatemala, USAID and UNICEF began their concentrated PHC strategy with individuals, rather than with cohesive teams, as the major linkage between international agencies and the national government. This individual focus would have made integration exceedingly difficult in the fragmented and competitive bureaucratic environment in Guatemala. The recent attempt by PAHO to promote integration in Guatemala has also relied on one individual, who nevertheless attempted to forge a new team within the ministry, using the integrated approach as a vehicle for consensus-building. As stated above, this program was unable to thrive in the increasingly repressive political environment in Guatemala after 1980.

The final characteristic of Honduras under López Arellano was a broad enthusiastic consensus within the Ministry of Health to pursue PHC and planning activities. Officials at all levels appear to have energetically committed themselves to the new reforms. There was a boisterous sense of renewal, a feeling that this reform, as well as others initiated at the same time in other sectors, could succeed. This enthusiasm spread beyond the ministry bureaucracy into the communities, which quickly created community health committees, selected volunteers, donated labor, and petitioned government officials for supplies and training.

This enthusiastic consensus on PHC lasted through the initial few years, but declined as the regime changed, bringing a stifling of other reforms and the dismantling of the ministry team. As IDB construction of regional hospitals, which had been postponed initially in favor of PHC health posts, began in earnest, the ministry shifted its priorities back to curative services. Persistence of supply and logistics problems, initially viewed as surmountable by cooperative action, contributed to the perception that cooperation among agencies alone could not suc-

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ceed. The administrative constraints that Pressman and Wildavsky observed in Oakland began to emerge over time in Honduras, sapping the original consensual enthusiasm, undermining cooperation, and allowing the separate pursuit of other conflicting goals.

Bargaining Between Donor and Recipient

Adopting the bargaining approach of the implementation literature allows the discussion of one further element that differentiates the implementation strategies that have been examined—the degree of control donors have over recipients.[22]

The concentrated strategy, in bargaining terms, enhances the degree of control of the donor over the implementation of the policy. It narrows the immediate goals and tasks to be achieved by the policy and requires specific consensuses on these goals and tasks—usually established in contract form. The number and range of implementing institutions is usually limited, reducing the institutional "veto points" that could inhibit initial consensus and eventual implementation. Thus, the donor can more easily develop consensus and hold the few implementing units accountable for specific well-defined tasks. At initial stages in the development of a policy, this strategy may not mean that the donor has an established rigid model to impose on the recipient (for instance, before the adoption of the TSR in Guatemala there was no USAID model). However, once the consensus on specific tasks is reached, the donor can then significantly control the recipient's process of implementation.

By contrast, the integrative strategy weakens the power of the donor and makes compromise essential. It is unlikely that specific donor goals can be imposed on a wide variety of recipient country institutions. Broad consensus often gives way to struggles over immediate goals and specific tasks. Donors must be able to compromise and allow their ideas and interests to evolve in the process of integrating the interests of many different actors. As has been argued above, PAHO's wide goals and its lack of specific accountability has given it the flexibility to be able to compromise in the manner associated with an integrated strategy.

USAID and UNICEF have increasingly committed themselves over the last decade to a specific model of PHC. As this model became an institutional doctrine, it was exceedingly difficult for USAID and UNICEF to compromise with national actors, thus further reducing the potential for an integrated strategy. Increasingly the donors are perceived as inflexibly imposing their will on recipient nations. There is considerable danger in programs and institutions becoming too closely identified with international goals and international funding, especially

[22] This perspective is common to U.S. implementation studies. For an insightful and more complex use of the approach see Robert T. Nakamura, "Strategies for Defining Policy During Implementation," *Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management* 1 (1981): 113–33.

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if international agencies are perceived as exercising leverage over national policy. A nationalistic backlash against the foreign political pressure can not only sabotage the specific implementation of foreign sponsored programs but also weaken the bureaucratic units charged with those programs. The Honduran experience with USAID family planning shows how vulnerable a relatively independent bureaucracy can be. With few officials in the rest of the ministry involved with the foreign-funded program, it was not difficult simply to dismantle the entire family-planning bureaucracy.

By contrast, the integrated approach is designed to weaken the apparent leverage of foreign donors and to require that they compromise to some extent with potential opponents. This compromise enforces some cooptation of potential opponents, making it more difficult for them to challenge the legitimacy of foreign supported programs. Although both family planning and PHC relied almost entirely on foreign funding, none of the main political actors in Honduras viewed PHC (the result of an integrated approach) as an "imperialistic" imposition like family planning that had been implemented by the concentrated approach. Indeed, they expressed nationalistic pride in the program.

Conclusion

In recent years, the concentrated strategy to promote PHC policies has become dominant in most health-related international agencies, with the continuing exception of WHO and PAHO. This article has suggested that such an emphasis has considerable merits, as seen in Guatemala, but that the alternative integrative approach should not be abandoned. The central advantages of the integrated approach are that it avoids administrative fragmentation and that it requires greater compromise between donor and recipient and among implementing institutions within the recipient nation. This compromise, with its cooptation of support from potential opponents and the integration of PHC activities into supply, logistics and referral networks of the ministries of health, could have long-term advantages.

It is likely, however, that such an approach is effective only under certain recipient-country conditions.[23] The Honduran case suggests that progressive regimes with a unified team of health officials committed to a consensual program of PHC is a conducive environment for an integrated approach. Had a concentrated approach alone been attempted, the Honduran program might have been more fragmented, isolated, and threatened by subsequent regimes. Rather, the subsequent less progressive regimes continued the program and, with USAID's assistance, concentrated on unblocking several implementation bottlenecks that had emerged. Once the regime changed and the high-level consensus on PHC eroded, USAID's concentrated approach appeared to be more appropriate, as it had been in Guatemala's similarly regressive regime. It may be that such a se-

[23] See Thomas John Bossert, "Can We Return to the Regime for Comparative Policy Analysis? or, The State and Health Policy in Central America," *Comparative Politics* 15 (1983): 419–41.

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quence from integrated to concentrated approaches is the more appropriate strategy for international agency assistance. This sequence would allow agencies to take advantage of conditions conducive to an integrated approach while being able to later adopt a concentrated approach when these initial conditions change.

Rather than adopting the now-dominant concentrated approach as a universal strategy, international agencies should be flexible enough to adopt alternate strategies in appropriate sequences when recipient country conditions allow. Unfortunately, "home" policy environments for most international agencies are not particularly conducive to this kind of flexibility. Health policymakers at both the national and international levels may have to choose the appropriate international agency on the basis of the fit between the agency and the regime characteristics in order to achieve the most compatible implementation strategy.

This conclusion suggests that implementation is even more complex than Pressman and Wildavsky and other advocates of the concentrated approach would argue. There are no simple and direct answers to achieving successful implementation of social programs. Sometimes the prescriptions work and sometimes they do not. We need to search for the conditions under which each prescription performs optimally. Defining and describing these conditions itself is a complex task; this is the next major phase of research in implementation studies. We need to know when it is more appropriate and effective to be "simple and direct" and when to be "cooperative and integrative."*

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Municipal vs. National Election Voter Turnout: Europe and the United States

ROBERT L. MORLAN

Movements for territorial reorganization of local government have been widespread and remarkably successful in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. These movements have invariably stressed potential improvement of citizen participation as one of the central goals, in tandem with the objective of achieving greater administrative efficiency and economy. The argument is made that the establishment of larger and more viable local units that render more extensive and higher quality public services under a system affording them greater autonomy will cause citizens to look on these local governments as more important and thus to participate more actively in their politics.

Others, who share the assumption that greater citizen participation is a social value to be maximized, take a quite different tack toward its accomplishment. Bigness in government, they argue, is generally evil and is more likely to result in alienation than in greater involvement. Change therefore should be in the direction of decentralizing large-scale government as much as possible to the neighborhood or some other small-population unit level. In general, such advocates believe that it is at the local level, where both issues and office holders are closer to the people, where public interest in governmental affairs should be keenest and where the popular will can most accurately be given effect.

While the two positions are of course not totally at odds with each other, controversy along these lines, with both groups claiming to speak for a strengthening of local government and for more adequate popular control, has recently been

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prevalent, particularly in the Western democracies. Proponents of amalgamation of municipalities have brought about radical restructuring in such countries as Belgium, Great Britain, West Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, while structural change has remained minimal or non-existent in France, Italy, Switzerland, Finland, and (with the exception of certain metropolitan region developments) Canada and the United States.

The act of voting in elections is by no means the only significant aspect of political participation, which may also include such things as attempting to influence the actions of public officials and governments, working in or making contributions to campaigns, and attending political meetings. But as a basic political act, voting is a logical point of departure in the examination of these and related arguments. Does the public in various democracies show a higher voter turnout in local government than in national elections? Is the voting participation rate highest in the smaller communities, compared to the larger cities? Are the patterns similar or different among the Western nations, which generally share broad common political attitudes and goals? Does turnout tend to increase or decrease following nationwide amalgamations? What factors appear to influence voter turnout in municipal elections most significantly?

Studies of voting behavior, both within individual countries and to a lesser extent on a cross-national basis, have been numerous and varied. Almost all such studies, however, have been based exclusively on voting statistics for national elections, or in a few instances for states in federal systems. When data from local elections have been used, it has usually been in comparisons of behavior in national elections as evidenced in a sample of municipalities compared to aggregate national behavior or to other samples of varying population size municipalities.[1] Virtually no cross-national studies utilize data on elections to local offices in contrast to those for national offices, no doubt in large part because of the relative inaccessibility of local election statistics.

[1] See, the example, the following: David Butler, Howard R. Penniman, and Austin Ranney, eds., *Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981); Angus Campbell, et al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); Karl Dittrich and Lars Norby Johansen, "Voting Turnout in Europe: Myths and Realities," manuscript for H. Daalder with P. Mair, eds., Working Papers on Recent Changes in European Party Systems (1980); Erwin Faul, ed., *Wahlen und Wähler in Westdeutschland* (Villingen: Ring-Verlag, 1960); Alain Lancelot, *L'Abstentionnisme Electorale en France* (Paris: Armond Colin, 1968); Roland J. Liebert, *Disintegration and Political Action: The Changing Functions of City Governments in America* (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Lester W. Milbrath and M. Lal Goel, *Political Participation*, 2d ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977); Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Development Relationships," *American Political Science Review* 63 (1969): 361–78, 808–32; Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Parties, Elections, and Political Behavior in the Northern Countries," in O. Stammer, ed., *Politische Forschung* (Köln-Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960), 120–25; Richard Rose, ed., *Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980); Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Social Equality and Political Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); and Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

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A widely shared assumption of writers on the subject is that voter turnout is uniformly higher in national than in local elections. But there is no agreement as to whether turnout is generally higher in small towns or large cities—or more broadly, in rural compared to urban areas. Again, most studies that do touch on this question deal with turnout in local areas for national elections, which may be very different from turnout for local government elections. Moreover, the problem at issue—behavior in local compared to national politics—is quite different.

Sidney Verba and Norman Nie have summarized two possible alternative models relative to urban-rural participation differences. One is the mobilization model (advanced especially by Lester Milbrath), which assumes that there should be the most political activity in urban areas because people at or near the centers of population concentration have a higher rate of social interaction. Because they are subjected to more stimuli (communications, education, social conflicts), they are more likely to develop the beliefs, attitudes, and traits that facilitate participation. Second is the decline-of-community model, which posits the proposition that the larger the community the more impersonal, remote, and complicated it becomes. The corollary to this model is that people in small communities have a stronger sense of political effectiveness, can see results more quickly, know whom to contact, and can form action groups more easily.[2] Verba and Nie's investigations supported the second model.

Existing studies, using national election data and examining different countries, come to conflicting conclusions. Several find higher turnout in smaller communities,[3] while others find no substantial differences.[4] Traditions vary from one national culture to another, and factors other than urban-rural distinctions appear to be dominant, at least in developed countries. Moreover, these various factors interact with each other. The most important of these, other than legal barriers or encouragements such as registration requirements or stipulation of

[2] Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*, 231. The Milbrath argument is set forth in Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 110–14, 128–30.

[3] Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," *American Political Science Review* 61 (1965): 7–28; Jean Charlot and Monica Charlot, "Politisation et Dépolitisation en Grande Bretagne," *Revue Française de Science Politique* 11 (1961), 609–41; Faul, *Wahlen und Wähler in Westdeutschland*; Mark Kesselman, "French Local Politics: A Statistical Examination of Grass Roots Consensus," *American Political Science Review* 60 (1966): 963–73; Lancelot, *L'Abstentionnisme Electorale en France*; Bradley M. Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan," *American Political Science Review* 67 (1973): 433–52; and Sidney Tarrow, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Involvement: The Case of France," *American Political Science Review* 65 (1971): 341–57.

[4] Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, *Size and Democracy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973); M. Lal Goel, *Political Participation in a Developing Nation—India* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1975); Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," *American Political Science Review* 61 (1967): 72–79; Deane Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 61 (1967): 1002–1009; and Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships."

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compulsory voting, seems to be the closeness of identification between political party systems and the principal social cleavages of the society.[5] This is directly reflected in levels of party efforts to mobilize the electorate.

Data and Methodology

Since the issues and controversies have been generally similar in Western Europe and North America, cross-national comparisons of voter turnout patterns specifically with reference to municipal elections may help shed light on questions of local contrasted with national voting behavior, as well as on controversies over local autonomy and the merits of local government reorganization. Ultimately, such comparisons may help provide a sounder base for generalizations. In embarking on such studies, however, one treads upon almost unexplored ground and encounters a host of obstacles. Analyses of voter turnout in local elections within individual countries are rare, and even the basic statistics on local election results are frequently extremely difficult, if not impossible, to secure. Few countries have central reporting on local elections, nor are such reports available, even from most state governments within the Swiss and United States federal systems. Seeking data from thousands, or in several instances tens of thousands, of municipal clerks is not realistically feasible. Where general statistics are available, breakdowns of the vote by population size categories of municipalities are uncommon. Those that exist may or may not be precisely comparable to others.

However, reasonably comparable data for elections from 1956 through 1979 are developed here for six West European nations (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), plus nine of the ten West German states (not counting the special status city-state of West Berlin). Most of those states are large enough to be somewhat comparable with smaller countries, and municipal election reports in West Germany are in fair degree available from the state governments. Only very limited information can be secured on Swiss municipalities. Municipal elections data were not available from Britain, France, Austria, Turkey, and the West German state of Hesse. Belgium and Luxembourg have compulsory voting, as do some of the Austrian states, so turnout figures in those countries are not comparable to others. Essentially the same limitation applies to Italy, where voting is not technically compulsory but where the Constitution makes voting a civic obligation and failure to vote is made a matter of public record; Spain, Portugal, and Greece have only recently returned to democratic institutions.

The data from West European countries used in this report have been pieced together from the publications of national and state bureaus of statistics, minis-

[5] Ivor Crewe, "Electoral Participation," in Butler, Penniman and Ranney, eds., *Democracy at the Polls*, 216–63; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partisan, Legal, and Socio-Economic Influences," in Rose, ed., *Electoral Participation*, 5–34; and Verba, Nie, and Kim, *Participation and Political Equality*.

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tries of internal affairs, state administrations in the federal systems, extensive correspondence with officials of such agencies and of national associations of municipalities, occasional personal interviews, and information gleaned from elections data archives at political science or political sociology research institutes at universities in several countries.[6] These data are comparable with only minor qualifications that are explained in appropriate notes. Percentages of voter turnout are percentages of voting-age population. Such a figure is more useful than the "percentage of registered voters" often used in the United States, and in all other countries studied there is in any case an automatic placement of all persons on the eligible voter lists when they reach the requisite age.

The limited data used for the United States require special explanation. No national statistics on municipal elections are reported, and few states compile such information concerning their own municipalities. Among the many voting participation studies, only a few have emphasized the municipal level. Even those usually deal with aspects of voting behavior in a selected sample of cities or a number of cities in one area; they rarely focus on turnout. The principal applicable studies for the present purpose are the pioneering survey in 1962 by Eugene C. Lee, in cooperation with the International City Management Association (ICMA), a similar ICMA supported study in 1975 by Albert K. Karnig and B. Oliver Walter, and the more detailed analytical article on turnout, based on Lee's 1962 data, published in 1968 by Lee and Robert R. Alford.[7] Municipal turnout data used here are therefore drawn from these 1962 and 1975 surveys, which secured a very high response rate to questionnaires but covered only the cities above 25,000 population. The figures for presidential elections, deemed most similar in impact to parliamentary elections in the other countries, are those reported in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States.*

Numerous variables may affect the level of voter turnout in every country in any given election, and it is of course rarely possible to isolate individual variables to the extent one would wish.[8] The nature of the data presently obtainable in this field does not permit significant cross-tabulations. The data do, however, provide a basic comparative picture not heretofore available in any form, a foundation for some preliminary judgments, and an indication of directions for needed further research.

[6] I am especially indebted to colleagues at the universities of Odense in Denmark, Helsinki in Finland, Leiden in the Netherlands, and both Bergen and Oslo in Norway.

[7] Eugene C. Lee, "City Elections: A Statistical Profile," in *The Municipal Yearbook: 1963* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1963), 74–84; Albert K. Karnig and B. Oliver Walter, "Municipal Elections: Registration, Incumbent Success, and Voter Participation," in *The Municipal Yearbook: 1977* (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1977), 65–72; Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," *American Political Science Review* 62 (1968): 796–813.

[8] Analysis of common hypotheses to explain variations in turnout is offered in Dittrich and Johansen, "Voting Turnout in Europe: Myths and Realities." See also Crewe, "Electoral Participation," 239–261; Powell, "Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies," 8.

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TABLE 1

Voter Turnout in National Elections Compared to Municipal Elections: 1956–1979 Averages

	Percent of Eligible Voters		
Country	*National*	*Municipal*	*Notes*
Denmark	87.1	72.8	Municipal average 1970–79. (National average for 1970–79 was 87.7.)
Finland	79.7	75.3	
Ireland	74.5	59.8	
Netherlands	83.5	70.0	1970–1979, because of compulsory voting before 1970.
Norway	81.5	74.5	
Sweden	86.4	85.9	
Switzerland	59.6	-	Municipal data not available.
United States	59.1	31.0	Municipal figure is average of turnout percentages reported for cities over 25,000 in surveys conducted in 1962 and 1975 by ICMA.
West Germany:			
Baden-Württemberg	86.4	67.1	
Bavaria	87.6	78.2	
Bremen	88.4	76.9	
Hamburg	89.2	75.0	
Lower Saxony	89.2	80.1	
North Rhine-Westphalia	89.1	76.0	
Rhineland-Palatinate	89.1	79.8	
Saarland	90.2	82.4	
Schleswig-Holstein	88.2	74.3	

National versus Municipal Elections

The pattern familiar in the United States of average turnout in municipal elections being lower than that in national elections holds true in the case of every West European country and every one of the West German states studied, although the differentials are smaller. At least as measured by voting turnout, it does not appear to be true in any one of these countries that citizens are most interested and involved in the governments "closest to home."[9] Table 1 displays the range of these differences, the greatest being in the United States (28.1 per-

[9] Mark Kesselman's survey of 1,978 French communes, however, indicated that turnout was 3 percent higher in the 1959 communal elections than in the 1958 parliamentary elections, despite the relative lack of autonomy in French local government. Kesselman, "French Local Politics: A Statistical Examination of Grass Roots Consensus"; Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan," 448–52, found relatively higher turnout also in certain Japanese municipal elections.

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centage points) and the least in Sweden (0.5 percentage point).[10] Municipal elections in Sweden traditionally have been highly politicized as contests between the national parties, in part because until the recent abolition of the first chamber of the national parliament, selection to that body depended on the outcome of the municipal elections. At about the time of abolition of the chamber, the country also moved to holding municipal elections at the same time as the parliamentary elections. In the United States, a heavy percentage of local elections have little or no direct tie to national politics. In no country or state other than the United States did the differential exceed 20 percent, and in only one other case did it exceed 15 percent. In six instances, it was less than 10 percent.

In the West European countries and states, national and local politics tend to be very intimately intertwined, and elections are less likely than in the United States to be perceived as embodying distinctively separate concerns and power relationships. This is true despite the fact that in most countries municipal elections are held at different times than national elections. The studies by Lee, Karnig and Walter, and Alford and Lee in the United States showed turnout to be much higher when municipal elections were held concurrently with national or state elections than independently, a finding that confirms the effect of intertwining. No cross-national comparisons are possible, because only in Sweden since the 1970s have there been concurrent elections, and the Swedish turnout is already at an approximate maximum of potential. In any case, the West European countries, with the exception of Switzerland, manage to maintain a considerably higher turnout with independent elections than does the United States, even in those areas where concurrent elections are utilized. In general, contrary to any assumption that local political interest is primary, it appears that the countries in which the highest municipal turnout occurs are those in which local elections are the most nationally politicized, in terms of both issues and party activity.

The previously mentioned study by Karnig and Walter showed that turnout in the United States was consistently higher in cities using partisan local elections than in those with nonpartisan elections (36 percent versus 27 percent in 1975). All elections in the West European countries and states are partisan, generally involving the same parties as in national elections. Since local power is considered an important base and local elections are usually seen as indicating trends for upcoming national contests, the parties are normally very active in mobilizing the electorate. In most cases, they are quite strongly organized and fairly well financed at the municipal level. Virtually all West European local governments use some form of proportional representation, in contrast to the United States. This characteristic may contribute to higher turnout because of a more prevalent feeling that one's vote is more likely to count significantly in the outcomes. All are multiparty systems except Ireland and West Germany,

[10] The tables are compiled from publications, correspondence, and interviews from national and state bureaus of statistics, ministries of internal affairs, associations of municipalities, and university political research institutes.

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which have two or three dominant parties. The multiparty countries also show a considerable range of turnout, however, from Switzerland to Sweden, and one must conclude that this is not in itself a major factor.

In two of the three federal systems examined, Switzerland and the United States, where local government is supposed to have especially high status, the turnout rates at all levels are by far the lowest of all. Swiss national-election turnout, in fact, shows a staggering decline from an average of approximately 70 percent in the 1940s and 1950s to 48.5 percent in 1979. West Germany does not show the same pattern, but West German federalism operates somewhat differently, with policymaking more centralized, and local campaigns and elections more integrated with national politics.

Does the old saying that "familiarity breeds contempt" apply to elections? There is some evidence that it does.[11] Both the United States and Switzerland ask voters to go to the polls with vastly greater frequency than do most other countries, largely because of the extensive use of the initiative and the referendum at all levels in Switzerland and the multiple levels of government in the United States (coupled with initiative and referendum usage in a number of states).[12]

It seems probable that low turnout may occur especially in countries with a long and fairly stable history of democratic elections, and where a large segment of the populace does not perceive election outcomes to be extremely crucial. Despite campaign rhetoric, they do not believe that post-election change will be great or that a loss for their preferred parties or candidates will be an unmitigated disaster. Certainly this is the case in Switzerland, where personnel may be shuffled but governing coalitions remain virtually all-inclusive, and almost equally so in large areas of the United States for different reasons.[13] It is also frequently true in the Netherlands, where complex coalitions are the norm and where turnout plummeted roughly 25 percentage points in elections that followed the termination of compulsory voting in 1970. For whatever reasons, often including sharper ideological cleavages and close ties between national and local politics, election outcomes may be perceived as being of relatively critical importance in all the higher turnout nations and states.

[11] See Crewe, "Electoral Participation," 230–32, 262.

[12] For example, in one Swiss Canton, Solothurn, citizens were expected to vote on 109 occasions from 1956 through 1979, commonly with several issues presented at each election. In the much larger population canton of Zurich, the comparable figure was 124.

[13] Powell, "Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies," drawing upon Przeworski (Adam Przeworski, "Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay?" *American Political Science Review* 69 [1975]: 49–67), remarked concerning the low Swiss turnout: "The most likely explanation is . . . the deliberate demobilization of party competition by the major national parties themselves. Since the late 1930s the four major parties, each linked to a cleavage group, have guaranteed themselves roughly equal place in the shared collective national executive (which has a rotating chairmanship). Unless a new party should suddenly break into the big four, the party electoral outcomes at the national level are virtually meaningless . . . there is little incentive for the voters to go to the polls, or for the major parties to try to mobilize them" (p. 17). Such data as are available on municipal election turnout do not indicate a higher average at that level.

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Over the approximately six elections in the period of twenty-three years studied, one striking characteristic is the high degree of stability, as may be noted from Figures 1 and 2. There is no consistent trend of change in voting turnout in the West European municipalities. This confirms the findings of earlier studies based on national elections.[14] There are of course occasional fluctuations from one election to another, as for example when the advent of television coupled with an almost concurrent sensational cabinet crisis in Norway increased the 1963 turnout for that one election, or when the Danish turnout in 1974 dropped (also temporarily) in the immediate aftermath of a massive consolidation of municipalities. But there is no general pattern of either increasing or declining turnout, except in the special case of Sweden, where the increase in recent elections apparently resulted from a change to holding municipal and national elections at the same time and the facilitating of absentee voting.

Voter Turnout and Community Size

Is it true, as proponents of decentralization and "neighborhood government" have contended, that voters in the smaller communities have a better record of voting participation than those in the larger cities? Experience in the West European countries and West German states studied indicates that this may be the case, although there are some exceptions and the degree of difference is quite variable from country to country. Unfortunately, the only data available for the United States do not tell anything about municipalities below 25,000 population and are for only two election years that are separated by a thirteen-year interval. But those figures are nonetheless included as providing at least a bit of comparative information. No significant differences are evident among these above 25,000 in population categories. The overall picture for those countries and states from which a reasonable amount of data can be secured is set forth in Table 2. Figures are of course for nations or states as a whole, and in their interpretation the caution voiced by Verba, Nie, and Jae-On Kim to the effect that there may be behavioral differences between a small and relatively isolated municipality in the periphery and one of the same size that is part of a metropolitan complex must be borne in mind.[15] As far as cross-national comparisons are concerned, this factor should influence statistics from each nation in a roughly similar fashion except for differences in the relative numbers of communities that are isolated and those that are closely bounded by others.

Utilizing seven categories of population size class, from municipalities of under 5,000 to those of over 250,000, one finds that in nine of the eleven cases (or four out of six if the West German states are lumped together), there is a declining rate of turnout from the smallest to the largest population group and that this decline is usually (but not in every instance) at a fairly steady rate. One

[14] Crewe, "Electoral Participation," 238–39; Powell, "Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies," 8.
[15] Verba, Nie, and Kim, *Participation and Political Equality*, 272–74.

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TABLE 2

Voter Turnout in Municipal Elections by Population Size of Municipalities, 1956–1979 Averages

	Percent of Eligible Voters (by Municipality Size)						
Country	*Under 5,000*	*5000–10,000*	*10,000–25,000*	*25,000–50,000*	*50,000–100,000*	*100,000–250,000*	*Over 250,000*
Denmark[1]	78.0	75.9	73.2	67.9	67.7	66.0	58.5
Finland	75.9	77.2	75.7	74.3	72.9	75.5	72.5
Ireland	71.5	68.8	65.8	63.0	55.8	55.3	42.3
Netherlands[2]	81.9	78.1	75.2	73.5	63.5	–	61.0
Norway	72.3	73.7	75.1	74.9	76.9	75.0	77.0
United States[3]	–	–	–	30.0	27.0	30.0	31.5
West Germany:							
Bavaria[4]	85.9	81.2	78.1	73.2	72.7	–	64.7
Lower Saxony[5]	81.2	73.8	74.4	69.8	71.5	67.8	–
North Rhine-Westphalia[6]	–	86.7	84.0	80.6	79.6	79.4	76.8
Rhineland-Palatinate[7]	83.7	80.1	77.1	74.5	74.1	72.0	–
Saarland[8]	88.6	82.1	79.4	76.2	–	65.8	–
Schleswig-Holstein	77.9	74.9	74.5	71.3	71.7	72.2	68.7

[1] 1970–79 only.

[2] 1970–79 only because of compulsory voting before 1970. Size categories vary slightly from those listed.

[3] From 1975 International City Management Association (ICMA) survey of cities of over 25,000 people. The last column is an approximation based on the original (250,000–500,000 = 32 percent; over 500,000 = 31 percent).

[4] 1956–1966 only. Size categories vary slightly from those listed.

[5] 1961–68 only. Size categories vary slightly from those listed.

[6] 1964 and 1975 only. Size categories vary slightly from those listed.

[7] 1969–1979 only.

[8] 1960 and 1964 only. Size categories vary slightly from those listed.

country (Finland) shows very limited differentiation and in one other (Norway) the trend is in the opposite direction. Within each country, the pattern does not appear to have changed notably from election to election over the twenty-three-year period. Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Bavaria, and Saarland show large declines (defined as more than 15 percentage points) from the smallest to the largest population categories. Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Schleswig-Holstein show moderate declines of 5 to 15 percentage points.[16]

Norway provides the major exception by generally showing a gradual increase in turnout with increasing size, although the rate of increase is not great. Relatively low turnout in the smallest Norwegian communities is not surprising, in

[16] Voting turnout data by size of municipality are not generally available in Switzerland, but for one canton (Aargau) where a report for individual municipalities in a 1977 election could be secured, there were no significant differences by size.

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part because of frequently widely scattered population in remote locations where topography and climate may inhibit voting, but that does not explain turnout in the other size classes. There remains a very considerable attitudinal difference between urban and rural communities in this country, and there are few large cities or metropolitan areas. In Norway, national politics is progressively less evident the smaller the community. As population size declines, fewer party slates are entered, thus reducing competition. The parties clearly have been most active in mobilizing voters in the larger communities, and perceptions of ideological cleavage may be stronger in those size categories.[17]

Although it is predominantly true that in these West European countries and states there is higher voter turnout in the smaller municipalities and that it progressively declines with increasing size, the full reasons for this require extended analysis with data beyond the scope of this paper. However, other kinds of evidence and experience at least make one hesitate to jump too readily to the conclusion that such turnout figures alone conclusively prove the case for neighborhood decentralization. The contention that residents of the smaller units possess a greater sense of community and thus of civic obligation needs to be tested more extensively than has yet been done. In any case, it seems unlikely that local issues in small towns are perceived as more significant than those in the larger cities, although individuals may feel their votes to be more effective when part of a smaller pool. Voters must at least believe that the local unit is dealing with matters that are of some importance if they are to participate actively. In Rotterdam, virtually the only city to have decentralized the actual decision-making responsibility to elected submunicipal councils, doubts about the significance of their role seem largely responsible for a turnout in submunicipal elections that is about one-third lower than in municipal elections in the same city. However, these units are also relatively new and thus are less familiar to voters.[18]

Table 3 shows the turnout rates before and after amalgamation of municipalities in several countries and states that have undergone extensive local-government reorganizations. Have the hopes been fulfilled that such changes would cause citizens to view the new municipalities as more important and thus increase participation? Apparently not. No significant pattern of change in turnout is evident. Of the seven governments compared, two showed a moderate increase in turnout, two a decrease, and three remained essentially unchanged. Moreover, neither the Swedish increase nor the Danish decrease is as significant as it appears at first glance. As noted previously, at about the time of the completion of its massive reorganization (a reduction of 89 percent in the number of municipalities), Sweden began to hold municipal elections at the same time as national elections, and also greatly increased the ease of absentee voting. Denmark, where change was almost as overwhelming in scope (an 80 percent reduc-

[17] Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "The Mobilization of the Periphery: Data on Turnout, Party Membership and Candidate Recruitment in Norway," *Acta Sociologica* 6 (1962): 111–58.

[18] Robert L. Morlan, "Sub-Municipal Governance in Practice: The Rotterdam Experience," *Western Political Quarterly* 35 (1982): 425–41.

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TABLE 3

Voting Participation in Municipal Elections Before and After Amalgamations

Country	Percent of Eligible Voters		Notes
	Before	*After*	
Denmark	75.2	68.1	In the first election after amalgamation the percentage dropped sharply (to 62.9), but four years later returned approximately to normal (73.2).
Norway	77.0	73.2	
Sweden	81.0	89.5	Comparisons are of little significance because at about the time of completing amalgamation Sweden made absentee voting much easier and began to hold municipal elections concurrently with national elections.
West Germany:			
North Rhine-Westphalia	77.3	69.9	
Rhineland-Palatinate	80.4	79.2	
Saarland	82.3	82.6	
Schleswig-Holstein	72.1	78.8	

tion), found that turnout dropped fairly severely (about 10 percentage points) from the previous election to the 1974 election that followed the amalgamation act. However, in the 1978 municipal elections, the percentage was back up to its earlier level. It is obvious also that factors other than amalgamation influence turnout at various points in time, and it is not possible to separate out that variable.

Only preliminary observations are possible in any case, since at the terminal date of this study there had been time for very few elections since the reorganizations (one in North Rhine-Westphalia; two in Denmark, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein; three in Rhineland-Palatinate; and four in Norway and Sweden). Even if there has not been any general increase in voter turnout following reorganizations, it seems clear that the creation of much larger units has not resulted in significant declines, as opponents had feared. That finding seems in some degree to run counter to the finding that turnout is normally lower in larger population municipalities. But established voting habits nevertheless appear to persist, and the "before" and "after" statistics are necessarily aggregates for entire countries that might cloak larger changes in certain communities.

Conclusion

Judged on the basis of voter turnout, one fundamental aspect of public participation, citizens in all countries studied perceived national elections to be more

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important than local ones. National elections are, to be sure, the focus of vastly greater publicity and, in general, of political party mobilization efforts. These may be either (or both) a cause and a result of popular attitudes. In every instance, average turnout was higher in national than in municipal elections, with the difference considerably less in Western Europe than in the United States.

With the single exception of Norway, and perhaps the rather inconsequential percentage differences in Finland, voting turnout in all West European countries and states studied was highest in municipalities of less than 5,000 population, and scaled quite consistently downward through increasingly larger size categories. The rate of decline, however, varied considerably from country to country. This differential lends some weight to the argument that a movement toward smaller units might tend to result in a higher level of participation, at least if those units have important responsibilities. Yet there are problems with such an assumption. First, as noted above, the reverse situation of a shift from a large number of small local units to a few large ones in a number of countries does not appear to have affected voter turnout significantly. Second, two countries with large numbers of small local units, in which there has been a strong tradition of local self-government with a relatively high degree of autonomy (and a heavy ideological emphasis on the values thereof) evidence the lowest voter turnout—Switzerland and the United States.

Other factors, therefore, would have to exert greater influence on municipal election turnout. As in the case of turnout at the national level, two critical factors are voter perception of the importance of the election outcome and of the efficacy of the individual vote in that outcome. These factors clearly have some relationship to the nature of the political system and especially to the type of election process. The sharpness of societal cleavages and the effectiveness with which parties and other political groups mobilize the electorate are manifestly of major importance. But, perhaps ironically, it appears likely that, on the basis of this study and to some extent the few other relevant investigations, probably the most significant factor of all in determining municipal election turnout is the extent to which local politics is intertwined with national politics. Countries with the most nationally politicized local elections generally have the highest popular participation in those elections.

This question of the relationship between the size of community and popular participation seems an eternally fascinating one, and many questions raised by this study remain as highly important areas for further more detailed research.[19] What are the actual reasons for the higher turnout in progressively smaller communities in the majority of these countries, particularly when voters apparently consider local politics in general to be less important than national politics? Do these citizens have a greater sense of community responsibility because of close acquaintance with both local problems and elected officials? Do the informal social networks simply function better as instigators of action where people are

[19] For a broad and thoughtful discussion see Dahl and Tufte, *Size and Democracy.*

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more likely to know a larger percentage of their fellow citizens? Why have local government reorganizations that have shifted from a large number of small units to a few very big ones in several countries not generally resulted in significant changes in voter turnout?

To what extent does "voter fatigue" occasioned by a multiplicity of elections (always defended in the name of democracy) reduce participation? How much weight should be attached to popular attitudes in some countries that election outcomes are not likely to produce extensive change or at least dire results? Do purely local traditions determine the differences among the West German states, each of which operates within a similar institutional environment, just as differences among the states prevail in other federal systems such as Switzerland and the United States, where ties to national politics are much weaker and local autonomy is greater? Since it appears to be true in most countries that national politicization of local elections results in relatively high turnout, and the highest degree of politicization is usually in the larger cities, why do such cities not show the highest turnout? The list could surely be extended. Tentative possible answers to some of these questions have been suggested here in the process of comparing experience in a number of Western democracies. The need remains for investigations to test extensively these possible answers and suggest others, in the continuing effort to find the persisting circumstances and conditions under which high or low turnout in municipal elections may consistently be expected, as well as to understand the implications for local government structure and the movements for reform.

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Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs

LUCIEN S. VANDENBROUCKE

Graham T. Allison's *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* was one of the most influential works of political science in the last decade. Yet the author took pains to specify that he presented only a tentative account of foreign policy decision-making; he called for more testing of his propositions and left the door open for the refinement of his models of decision-making.[1] Since these models have been so helpful in understanding what passes for the Kennedy administration's "finest hour," the Cuban missile crisis, it seems appropriate to respond to Allison's call for further case studies by applying his concepts to John F. Kennedy's "worst hour," the Bay of Pigs. This article therefore tests Allison's concepts by applying them to the decision to land a brigade of anti-Castro exiles in Cuba on 17 April 1961. This investigation comprises several parts that correspond to Allison's three conceptual models. Each part

[1] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 273. For other studies using Allison's or similar concepts, see Edmund Beard, *Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); I. M. Destler, *Making Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981); Morton H. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," *World Politics* 25 (1972): 62–95. Serious literature on the Bay of Pigs is limited but growing. The most detailed journalistic account is Peter Wyden's *Bay of Pigs* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979). The best accounts by members of the Kennedy administration are in Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 291–309; and especially two books by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), 443–67, and *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 226–97. Now that official documents are being declassified and participants are talking more freely, our understanding of the venture has improved. Much, however, remains to be made public.

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uses a separate model to put the facts in a specific perspective, then evaluates the findings the given model suggests. Upon completion of this threefold investigation I will consider the limitations of Allison's models and suggest the usefulness of complementing the third model with the insights of cognitive theory.

National Decision-making and the Bay of Pigs

Allison's first model holds that a nation's foreign policy reflects rational and purposive behavior. Decision-makers react to the threats and opportunities arising on the international scene by formulating a number of options and submitting them to a cost-benefit analysis. The government then selects the policy option that provides the maximum payoff in terms of the nation's goals and objectives. To explain a given national policy, the analyst must therefore establish, on the basis of the available evidence, that the policy represented a coherent, value-maximizing choice.

In 1961, the cold war dominated international affairs, and the West did not seem to be winning. The Soviet Union threatened intervention in the Congo, Communist forces were poised to overrun Laos, and much closer to home, the Cuban revolution was drifting ever more to the left. Many Americans believed that the emergence of a Communist state only ninety miles from U.S. shores would pose a grave threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Popular opinion in the United States pressed the executive to react.

Yet its options appeared limited in dealing with the Cuban challenge. Merely observing the Cuban scene would not check the Cuban "threat"; on the other hand, the United States was reluctant to resort to gunboat diplomacy, which had fallen into disrepute. Much preferred was a median course between acquiesence and direct intervention. But the United States's efforts to isolate Cuba internationally and to cripple it through trade sanctions seemed unpromising. Fidel Castro was circumventing these measures by drawing closer to the Eastern bloc. Meanwhile, American intelligence concluded that there was little hope of the amateurish Cuban underground overthrowing Castro on its own.

Still, there was evidence of increasing disenchantment and discontent in Cuba. Hence, policymakers developed the following scenario—the anti-Castro opposition might succeed if it were trained and organized by the United States. The landing of a disciplined, well-armed force of Cuban exiles would jolt the island and trigger uprisings against the regime. From the beachhead, the émigrés could launch air strikes to disrupt Castro's communications and military forces, while they set up a provisional government. At the same time, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would add to the disruption in Cuba through psychological warfare, using clandestine radio broadcasts and extensive leaflet drops to confuse and dishearten Castro loyalists, while encouraging the population to revolt. Chances were that, as in the case of the leftist Jacobo Arbenz during the CIA-sponsored coup in Guatemala in 1954, Castro would lose his nerve and his regime would fall apart. If not, the émigrés could take to the hills and wage a

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fierce guerrilla struggle. Carried out deftly enough to conceal the American hand, this invasion scenario promised to deal with Castro while preserving the United States's image.[2] In short, then, the rational actor model suggests that the lack of other viable alternatives prompted the choice of the invasion, which appeared best in terms of a rational cost-benefit analysis.

Such an interpretation, however, is questionable on several grounds. First, it was less than fully rational to assume that a plan that had worked in Guatemala would meet with equal success in Cuba. Castro had over 200,000 men in arms and the benefit of the Guatemalan precedent. He therefore expected an American-sponsored coup and took numerous precautions.[3] Nor was it rational, no matter how elaborate the deceit, to expect that the United States could deny involvement in the invasion and escape international censure.

Finally, the rational actor interpretation suffers from the fact that the president and his advisers did not carefully weigh competing alternatives and then select the invasion of Cuba as the best policy. In reality, in response to the Eisenhower administration's growing concern about Cuba, the CIA conceived a plan in the middle of 1960 to topple Castro, submitted it to the president, and received authorization to proceed with the preparations.[4] Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower withheld final approval, by the time John F. Kennedy took office in January 1961 the plan had acquired a momentum of its own. Thus, Kennedy's first policy decision on Cuba was not to choose a course of action among the various options available. Instead, it was to decide for or against an invasion project to which considerable resources had already been committed, and that a powerful agency vigorously promoted. The CIA's advocacy warrants looking at the operation from the perspective of bureaucratic politics.

[2] On the Guatemalan episode, see Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), and Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982). For the declassified portions of the official investigation of the Bay of Pigs, *see* Luis E. Aguilar, ed., *Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1981). The scenario of the Cuban invasion is derived from this source (pp. 9–19), and from Richard M. Bissell, interview with author, Farmington, Conn., 14 January 1981. The role of uprisings in the plan, however, remains disputed. Bissell reported that according to the CIA, the plan called for gradual rather than immediate uprisings within Cuba, and that success depended foremost on psychological warfare and Castro's loss of nerve. In fact, however, a shift occurred in CIA's perceptions as it continuously reworked its plan, and the agency progressively downgraded the role of uprisings. See Aguilar, ed., *Operation Zapata*, 86–87. But the CIA failed to make this change clear to the other decision-makers who generally believed that uprisings shortly after the landing remained a key to its success. Memorandum by Robert Kennedy, 1 June 1961, quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 445; General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, interview with author, Washington, D.C., 16 February 1982; Arthur Schlesinger, Memorandum for the President, "Cuba: Political, Diplomatic and Economic Problems," 10 April 1961, Box 65, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass., 3.

[3] Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala*, 196.

[4] Gordon Gray Oral History, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans., 27–52.

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A Bureaucratic Politics Interpretation

Allison's second model, based on organizational processes, holds that bureaucratic agencies and not simply the chief executive frequently make important decisions. Bureaucracies have their own goals, in particular, the promotion of their institutional interests, or "organizational health." Likewise, organizations possess their own logic, including sets of routines and standard operating procedures (SOP). As a result, bureaucracies tend to develop their own views, which they can often translate into policy. This power stems in part from their control over information. An organization that controls information on a given issue can shape the appearance the issue takes, and thus largely predetermine the executive's response. The organizational process model therefore explains policy decisions as bureaucratic outputs based on organizational control of knowledge and conformity to institutional patterns of behavior. This approach enables analysts to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to the Cuban invasion. The account comprises two parts: how the CIA decided in favor of the invasion; and how the agency obtained executive endorsement of the project.

As noted above, the CIA originated the plan to overthrow Castro and pressed it on the president. In so doing, the agency was probably displaying typical organizational imperialism. Over the course of the 1950s, this newcomer to the federal bureaucracy had assumed a major foreign policy role. Considerable evidence suggests that, encouraged by previous successes, the CIA sought a fresh occasion to prove its effectiveness and consolidate its position.[5]

The CIA explored different ways of eliminating Castro. But attempts on his life proved difficult to undertake and highly uncertain, while the weakness of the Cuban underground eroded the agency's faith in an insurgency. Bureaucratic logic eventually prompted the choice of an invasion executed by exile proxies.

The study of organizational behavior has revealed that an organization's behavior at a given moment usually differs only marginally from its previous behavior. An organization facing a new situation thus typically reduces the unfamiliar issue to a familiar problem and solution. Here the Guatemalan episode, in which the CIA toppled a leftist dictator with a handful of exiles and a skillful campaign of psychological intimidation, supplied the familiar precedent. The operation was a lucky longshot, but it covered the CIA with glory and became a manner of agency program for disposing of troublesome Third World dictators. A similar operation was attempted against Indonesia's Achmed Sukarno in 1958. Although the venture failed, the CIA again turned to the Guatemalan model in dealing with Castro. CIA officials repeatedly referred to the precedent while preparing the Bay of Pigs. The agency assigned many of the operatives involved in the Guatemalan coup to the Cuban project, and envisioned a similar

[5] By 1960, the CIA had a history of clashes with other bureaucratic actors, particularly the Defense Department, for control of activities such as aerial reconnaissance and paramilitary operations. Roswell Gilpatric Oral History, Kennedy Library, 41.

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type of psychological warfare.[6] The organizational process model's explanation of bureaucratic choices therefore suggests that it was natural for the CIA to imitate the Guatemalan scenario in its Cuban venture.

The agency's prime SOP, secrecy, also rendered the invasion option attractive. Secrecy meant that within the CIA itself only a few operatives of the Directorate of Plans (covert operations) were cleared for the project. Hence many potential dissenters were eliminated, with incalculable consequences. The CIA's scenario, for instance, made limited sense unless the landing had a reasonable chance of triggering uprisings or at least widespread defections from Castro's regime. But for reasons of secrecy the agency's own authoritative Board of National Estimates, which believed that Castro had a firm grip on the island, was never asked to evaluate the Cubans' likely reaction to an invasion. Instead, the operatives used fragmentary and selected reports to draw optimistic conclusions about the potential for anti-Castro reactions.[7]

Once the CIA's repertoire and routines led it to choose an invasion, the next step was securing the official go-ahead. This took place in several stages. The CIA pushed its program with all its might. The only organization in a position to impede the program, the military, went along out of bureaucratic parochialism and prudence. The president then agreed to the plan while insisting on certain constraints. But organizational behavior prompted the agency to deal with these restraints in its own way.

By the time the CIA had opted for an invasion, the agency fit organizational theory's description of a typical sub-unit that, instructed to explore an option, becomes an advocate for its adoption.[8] In securing presidential approval for its plan, the CIA enjoyed a prized bureaucratic resource—control over information. The agency first acquired a quasi-monopoly of information on the invasion by stressing the need for secrecy, thereby keeping all but a handful of White House advisers and top-level bureaucrats ignorant of the plan. Unfortunately, the latter were mostly generalists, and secrecy cut them off from non-CIA officials who knew Cuba well. The Cuban specialists of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for instance, could have provided a realistic appraisal of the Cubans' likely reaction to an invasion. The CIA's concern with secrecy was obsessive, at least in Washington. The agency never supplied any written documents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and collected the documents that circulated in White House meetings after each briefing. Secrecy made sense, but

[6] The failure of the Indonesian venture, a smaller operation than the Guatemalan coup, apparently was not enough to discredit the Guatemalan scenario. On Indonesia, see Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 88–92. On the Guatemalan precedent and the Bay of Pigs, see Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala*, 188–97.

[7] Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 99.

[8] Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 93; McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, 8 February 1961, Box 35, National Security Files, Kennedy Library. Bissell agreed that the CIA was "very involved in seeing the plan go ahead." *Washington Evening Star*, 20 July 1965.

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whether by design or not, it also increased the CIA's power to determine policy.[9]

Having become the privileged purveyor of knowledge, the CIA then supplied President Kennedy and his advisers with chosen reports on the unreliability of Castro's forces and the extent of Cuban dissent. The agency did not dwell, however, on its own Board of Estimates's memoranda that foresaw a continuous reinforcement of Castro's power, nor did it mention other pessimistic reports from independent observers. The CIA also ignored certain requests for information. Although both the JCS and Presidential Assistant Richard Goodwin asked on separate occasions for the planners' written assessment of the potential for uprisings in Cuba, they never saw such a document. Eventually the CIA became, in Arthur Schlesinger's words, "less than candid."[10] It reported that the exiles' morale was excellent, despite a near mutiny at the training base in Guatemala. After the invasion site changed from the coastal city of Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs, the agency continued to assure the president that if the brigade ran into difficulties it could "go guerrilla" in the Escambray Mountains. But if these mountains were indeed in the vicinity of Trinidad, eighty miles of impassible swamp lay between the Escambrays and the new landing site. Moreover, the exiles had long since ceased guerrilla training in favor of conventional tactics. Thus the CIA's selective information painted a rose-colored picture—that Castro was weak and the Cubans were rebellious. The invasion had a good chance of toppling him, and short of this, the operation would tie Castro down in an insurgency war![11] Meanwhile exile proxies and CIA deceit would disguise the U.S. hand. Viewed in this light, the project seemed reasonable.

The CIA also sold its plan by skillfully formulating the range of options. The agency bracketed the invasion between two unacceptable alternatives—procrastinating or disbanding the brigade. According to the CIA, the first alternative would jeopardize the plan since Castro was about to receive massive military aid from the Soviets, including jet fighters. The agency also claimed that disbanding the brigade posed a "disposal problem," as hundreds of disgruntled Cubans would spread the word that the United States had backed off. Kennedy would appear weak, and the Communist world could be counted on to create trouble. Implicit in the warning was the hint that the president's domestic adversaries might do the same. As CIA Director Allen Dulles later stated: "We had made it very clear to the President that to call off the operation would have resulted in a very unpleasant situation."[12]

[9] The CIA failed to communicate fully with the other government players, even after the loquacity of the Cuban exiles and the sheer size and visibility of the invasion preparations led to revelations in the press. The CIA's reasons are unclear. Roger Hilsman, then head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, believed that the CIA was "so emotionally committed that [it] deliberately cut out information." Roger Hilsman Oral History, Kennedy Library, 11. The CIA could reply that it was following standard procedures for covert action.

[10] Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 99; Lemnitzer, interview with author; Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 453; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 250.

[11] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 249–50; Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 102–103.

[12] Aguilar, ed. *Operation Zapata*, 147.

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By resorting to the typical organizational strategy of defining the options and providing the information required to evaluate them, the CIA thus structured the problem in a way that maximized the likelihood the president would choose the agency's preferred option. One organization might have frustrated this strategy, however, as the president asked the military to evaluate what amounted to a full-fledged invasion. But institutional logic led the Pentagon seemingly to concur with the CIA. Since the operation was not the military's direct responsibility, bureaucratic parochialism meant that the Pentagon viewed its role as merely responding to requests for advice. Thus, the military did not weigh fine points of the plan and missed deficiencies built into the details. Bureaucratic parochialism also led the armed services to believe that it was not their role to unduly emphasize whatever weaknesses in the plan they did perceive.[13] In addition, the Pentagon probably heeded the unspoken rules of bureaucratic Washington. Since this was another agency's plan, and did not threaten any of the military's vital interests, it made no sense to antagonize another powerful organization by excessive outspokenness. In the words of one of the joint chiefs: "You couldn't expect us . . . to say this plan is no damn good, you ought to call it off; that's not the way you do things in government. . . . The CIA were doing their best in the planning, and we were accepting it. The responsibility was not ours."[14]

Thus, when asked to evaluate the CIA's original plan for an invasion at Trinidad, the Pentagon did not dwell on the deficiencies it did perceive, and delivered a cautiously worded yet favorable evaluation. Then, after Kennedy rejected the Trinidad plan as too spectacular, the military's response proved less than frank. Asked to assess the CIA's three alternative proposals, the military expressed a guarded preference for Zapata, the plan to land at the Bay of Pigs. The Pentagon mentioned only once, however, its belief that Zapata was merely the least objectionable of the CIA's alternatives, and that the Trinidad plan remained the best. This preference appeared in a memorandum of 15 March 1961, which the secretary of defense somehow overlooked and the president never saw. But the military did not raise the issue again; nor did it mention at all its private opinion that none of the alternatives was in fact likely to succeed.[15]

Faced with the CIA's vigorous promotion of its program and the military's

[13] When asked why the military was not more open with its reservations about the plan, General Lemnitzer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, replied: "It was not our operation." Lemnitzer, interview with author. Admiral Arleigh Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations, echoed: "We were not responsible for the plan." Arleigh A. Burke, interview with author, Washington, D.C., 1 October 1983.

[14] Lemnitzer, interview with author.

[15] For example, the military experts dispatched to Guatemala to evaluate preparations for the Trinidad landing reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the odds against surprise were "about 85 to 15," and that without surprise the invasion would fail, adding that one plane "could sink all or most of the invasion force." The logistics expert reported that "logistically the operation would likely fall apart. . . . The Brigade's logistical capacity was marginal without resistance, but impossible with it." Aguilar, ed., *Operation Zapata*, 10, 154–55. The military's official appraisal is in ibid., 108–10; its private view appears in a Navy memorandum of 15 March 1961.

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acquiescence, the president had good reasons to agree to the invasion. But organizational theory recognizes that, while constrained by the programs in a bureaucracy's repertoire, government leaders are not helpless captives of bureaucratic choices. The government leadership can attempt to leave its own stamp on an agency's program, as the president sought to do with the invasion plan. Kennedy was clear about the limits he did not want to exceed. Insisting on a covert operation that would avoid charges of U.S. involvement, the president excluded the direct participation of American forces, and strove to reduce the visibility of the operation. The latter concern led first to the change in landing sites in March 1961, and later to the cancellation of the key second air strike. The final plan called for two bombing missions against Castro's air force by the brigade's air wing. Whereas the raid two days before the landing was mostly a diversion, the second was to be a major pre-emptive strike on the morning of D-Day. The agency hoped the strikes would pass for the work of Cuban air force defectors, but the cover story fell apart immediately after the first raid on April 15. A furor ensued at the United Nations, with American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson hard pressed to answer charges of U.S. aggression. In view of these difficulties, the national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk recommended canceling the second strike, and Kennedy agreed.[16]

The CIA's reaction to these constraints was again typical of organizational behavior. The change in the air plan put the operation in dire jeopardy. Because the exiles had too few aircraft to match Castro's air force in the sky, the CIA's plan called for the destruction of the Cuban air force on the ground through the limited air strike on D-Day-2 (April 15) and especially a major strike on D-Day. The cancellation of the second strike meant that the invasion force, particularly the brigade's landing fleet with its crucial supplies, would be defenseless against Castro's largely intact air force. The CIA knew that this could spell disaster, yet failed to make the point as forcefully as possible to the president, who might then have canceled the whole operation.[17]

Organizational theory again suggests various reasons for the agency's attitude. Sheer organizational momentum makes it difficult to call off a year's planning hours before execution. Administrative theory also warns that bureaucracies can resist unwelcome orders, particularly those that require a departure from organizational repertoires. It was difficult to contravene the cancellation of the D-Day air strike, but the CIA most likely thought it could circumvent this order by bending the restriction barring direct U.S. participation. Indeed, considerable evidence shows that direct American involvement was an integral part of the agency's program for Guatemala-type interventions. In the original Guatemala venture, American CIA pilots conducted bombing missions, and the planners envisaged overt military intervention in case the operation failed. American

[16] Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 185–90, 195–202.

[17] CIA officials Bissell and General Charles Cabell appealed the decision to Rusk, who phoned the president in their presence. When Kennedy maintained his decision, Rusk asked the men if they wanted to speak to the president themselves, but they declined. Aguilar, ed., *Operation Zapata*, 20–21.

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agents again fought in the 1958 Indonesian affair. The CIA's early planning documents also show that in applying the Guatemala scenario to Cuba, the agency once again contemplated direct U.S. involvement.[18]

The evidence is equally compelling that even after Kennedy ruled out direct American participation, the CIA did not relinquish an idea that was firmly rooted in the organization's repertoires. The agency had learned that in large operations "you can't draw narrow boundaries of policy around them and be absolutely sure they will never be overstepped."[19] In fact, as Dulles later revealed in an unpublished manuscript, the CIA had already seen a number of operations that had begun with strict prohibitions against direct U.S. involvement. Once the operations were actually underway, however, the limitations had tended to disappear.[20] The CIA also knew that the United States would be loathe to abandon its allies, especially when its own prestige was at stake.

Hence, as Dulles explained, in the Cuban operation the agency assumed that when the invasion actually occurred, the president would end up authorizing whatever was required for success, including overt U.S. military intervention if necessary, rather than allow the venture to fail.[21] As a result, the CIA probably did not object as strenuously as possible to the cancellation of the second air strike, confident that if the brigade ran into trouble, the White House would have no choice but to allow U.S. intervention. Indeed, when the invasion started to founder, the CIA pressed for American air support, but the president held his ground.

The organizational process model thus suggests that the decision to invade Cuba was reached in stages. The CIA first adopted the plan as an outcome of its goals and repertoires; the agency then steered it past the president by the skillful use of its monopoly of information. Meanwhile the bureaucratic routines and interests of the Pentagon muted a possible voice of dissent. Finally, despite last minute modifications jeopardizing the project, the agency proceeded with its plan as a result of three organizational characteristics—inertia, repertoires, and independence.

[18] During the Guatemalan coup, a dozen U.S. Navy units, a battalion of Marines, and an air transport wing were placed on standby alert. Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 111. On U.S. intervention in the CIA's Cuban scenario, see Aguilar, ed., *Operation Zapata*, 71.

[19] Richard Bissell, in "The Science of Spying," NBC Television, 4 May 1965.

[20] Allen Dulles, handwritten notes, Box 244, Allen W. Dulles Papers, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.

[21] Ibid. There is considerable other evidence that the CIA did not view the president's restrictions regarding U.S. participation as ironclad. The agency recruited American pilots for the operation, "feel[ing] that if there were great pressures, the prohibition on U.S. volunteers would be withdrawn." Bissell, interview with author. During the invasion, the first man to land and open fire was in fact an American CIA paramilitary operative. Nor was the CIA alone in considering the possibility of U.S. intervention. When the CIA's 1958 Indonesian venture ran into difficulty, the military was asked to rescue American agents, but was caught unprepared. Determined not to let a similar situation arise again, Admiral Burke took it upon himself to assemble shortly before the Cuban invasion a force of U.S. Marines on the island of Vieques (Puerto Rico), ready for action in case the U.S. decided to intervene.

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The organizational process model thus offers a more satisfactory interpretation of the decision to invade Cuba than does the rational actor model. Nevertheless, the organizational model fails to explain all of the record, for the CIA enjoyed a near monopoly of information only because the president willed it. He could have found alternative sources for different views on the situation in Cuba. Kennedy read the newspapers; in fact, he even asked one presidential aide, Arthur Schlesinger, to obtain a private assessment of the Cuban scene from the well-informed journalist Joseph Newman.[22] But apparently the latter's pessimistic views had little effect on the president. Moreover, the fallacy of believing that the United States could dissociate itself from the invasion was glaring. Kennedy's blindness to the fact cannot be laid simply to the quality of the advice he received.

There is another limitation to the organizational process model. It assumes the existence of quasi-monolithic bureaucracies whose members single mindedly promote their organization's shared goals and programs. But the bureaucracy did not function in this fashion in the case of the Bay of Pigs. Within the CIA, for instance, only a small sub-group in the Directorate of Plans handled the project. Moreover, this ad hoc group was somewhat atypical of the division as a whole. Although many of the middle-level operatives working on the invasion were veterans of the covert service, they were often drawn from the division's lesser talent. Furthermore, the chief architect of the invasion, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, was a relative newcomer to covert operations, having spent most of his time in the CIA developing the U-2 spy plane and the first reconnaissance satellite. Some of his closest collaborators in the venture were likewise rather unfamiliar with this sort of "dirty tricks." Bissell and his associates thus lacked some of the instincts of caution that characterized the covert branch's better careerists, who had risen through repeated hazardous duty in the field.[23] A look at the events from the perspective of Allison's third model is therefore in order.

A Governmental Politics Interpretation

The governmental politics model holds that government decisions are the result of a bargaining game. To understand a given decision, analysts must determine its context and the channels through which the decision was reached. They can then identify the important participants whose input in the decision reflects their values, goals, stakes and power. The final decision is thus the outcome of a process of "pulling and hauling" among different players with different interests and power resources.

The first step then, is to recall the enormous pressure of time involved in the

[22] Arthur Schlesinger, Memorandum: "Joseph Newman on Cuba," 31 March 1961, Box 35, National Security Files, Kennedy Library.

[23] Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 94–98; Robert Amory, interview with author, Washington, D.C., 16 February 1982.

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Bay of Pigs. By early 1961, the exiles had completed their instruction, and the Guatemalans who harbored the training base were pressing for their departure. Moreover, the invasion seemed viable only before Cuba received heavy weapons from the East. The decision had to be made now or never. Meanwhile, the new and inexperienced administration also faced crises in Laos and the Congo. The context of the Bay of Pigs favored anything but calm decision-making.

The CIA had charge of preparing and executing the plan, while evaluation and approval devolved to a loose de facto committee. Its core members included the president, CIA Director Dulles and Deputy Director Bissell, Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,[24] Special Assistant for National Security McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze and his deputy, William Bundy. Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Thomas Mann and White House aide Arthur Schlesinger also played significant roles.

These players had different stakes, values, goals, and power resources that dictated different inputs into the decision. Dulles and Bissell were devoted to the "national interest," which they equated with the militant prosecution of the cold war. They were also activists with a predilection for the "romantic" side of intelligence work, covert operations. Hence the idea of overthrowing Castro had an inherent appeal. There were probably more mundane motivations too. Dulles was about to retire, and there was strong competition within the agency for the succession. Kennedy was thinking of Bissell for the position, and the deputy director for plans, a reasonably ambitious man, knew that a brilliant success in Cuba would enhance his prospects. The operation was risky, but CIA's culture favored calculated risks, a factor that also appealed to Bissell's personality. He made a practice of defying odds, and often accomplished the unusual, as when he developed the U-2 in less than twelve months, a task the Air Force estimated would take six years. Finally, the operation could only fail if the United States remained passive in case of a mishap, and there were reasons to assume otherwise. Dulles and Bissell were soon enthusiastic about the project. As one participant recalled: "Allen and Dick didn't just brief us on the Cuban operation. They sold us on it."[25]

These players were influential indeed. They enjoyed prestige, as Schlesinger has noted: "We all listened to Bissell transfixed . . . fascinated by the working of this superbly clean, organized and articulate intelligence."[26] Bissell and Dulles

[24] Generals Lyman Lemnitzer (chairman), Thomas White (Air Force), George Decker (Army), David Shoup (Marines), Admiral Arleigh Burke (Navy). Of the five, Lemnitzer and Burke followed the operation most closely.

[25] Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 83, 101–102. Bissell's character helps explain his secrecy. Never a team man, he wanted all the reins in his hands. He had run the U-2 project, in his own words, as a "private duchy," and attempted the same with the Cuban invasion. Ibid., 97–104; Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc, *The Cuban Invasion* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), 103.

[26] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 241.

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also wielded real power in Washington. They were skillful bureaucratic players with easy access to the president, and they were well connected within the political network, often through Office of Strategic Services and Ivy League ties.[27] The situation further enhanced the CIA officials' bargaining power. The agency was the natural source of expertise on covert operations; it also enjoyed a near monopoly of information on the Cuban issue, and its officials had far more time to devote to the problem than any other participant. Under these conditions, it would have taken powerful players to resist their hard sell.

The Joint Chiefs could have been such players, for they knew enough about the agency's capabilities to be skeptical. But they believed that it suited neither the military's role nor its interests to be overly critical. Moreover, for General Lyman Lemnitzer, "there were all kinds of difficulties in the world at the time . . . and [the] operation was far from being a high priority."[28] Much of his attention went to other issues. Admiral Arleigh Burke, in turn, concluded that the lack of response to the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of March 15, favoring the original Trinidad plan over the CIA's alternatives, meant that the JCS had been overruled. As a military man, Burke thereupon believed his role no longer called for dissent but for loyal support of the commander in chief's decision.[29] Hence the CIA's potentially most damaging critics opted for acquiescence. Unfortunately, the remaining players were at a relative disadvantage in challenging the agency's plan. The tightly sealed decision channel cut off the civilian decision-makers from the effective source of expertise on Cuba, the middle-level bureaucracy both inside and outside the intelligence community. The only available rebuttal of the CIA's optimistic picture of the Cuban internal situation were the reports appearing in the press. Furthermore, the many other demands on their time limited the attention the civilian participants could spare for the operation. Robert McNamara, for one, devoted most of his energy to gaining control of the Department of Defense.

There were additional reasons for the civilian decision-makers' relatively uncritical stance. At the start of the Kennedy administration, McGeorge Bundy believed that his role was less to promote his own views than to ensure that in foreign affairs the president heard the views of all the relevant government actors. Hence Bundy did not voice his own misgivings. Meanwhile, Adolf Berle had long since become an almost fanatical cold warrior and was convinced that,

[27] Kennedy and Dulles became friends through common acquaintances at Palm Beach. Kennedy also admired Bissell, whom Bundy knew from Yale. Schlesinger knew Dulles in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, and became a friend of Bissell when the latter worked for the Marshall Plan. Mann was friendly with both Bissell and Dulles. Amory Oral History, Kennedy Library, 19-20; McGeorge Bundy, interview with author, New York, N.Y., 1 March 1982; Arthur Schlesinger, interview with author, New York, N.Y., 8 March 1982; Thomas C. Mann, letter to author, 30 June 1983.

[28] Lemnitzer, interview with author.

[29] Burke subsequently concluded that with Kennedy "you couldn't state your view and assume it was heard. When you were opposed to something, you had to pound the table." Burke, interview with author.

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like Adolf Hitler a quarter of a century before, the Communists had a plan of world aggression. Certain that "the battle [was] joined," Berle feared appeasement and believed that the sooner the U.S. stood up to the challenge, the better. Other participants from the State Department, such as Thomas Mann, also agreed to the invasion, fearing that Cuba might become a base from which the Communists could strike at the United States and other American countries.[30] Aware of the difficulties the invasion could create for the United States, however, State Department representatives fought to reduce the scale and visibility of the operation, while not criticizing the basic idea itself.[31]

Dean Rusk believed that the secretary of state should not "influence the debate but preside over it," and only afterwards express his views to the president in private. He therefore was reluctant to voice his doubts in the meetings he attended. Moreover, as a man very attuned to the nuances of power, Rusk was aware that he lacked a power base of his own, and did not yet enjoy the president's full confidence. He may thus have deemed it unwise to come out strongly against a plan whose advocates the president held in high esteem.[32] Indeed, such prudence probably characterized many of the civilian players. In these early days of the administration, it remained unclear when criticism ceased to be welcome and became foolhardy, especially when the subject was the overthrow of Castro, after the president had campaigned on the promise to check communism in general and Castro in particular.

Two members of the White House staff did harbor strong misgivings, but their dissent remained limited and cautious. Arthur Schlesinger and Richard Goodwin were junior appointees; the role the president meant for them was unclear and their power was uncertain. As an academic, Schlesinger was also hesitant to "speak up in church" against a paramilitary operation in the presence of the assembled CIA and military experts. Thus, neither adviser had the capacity or inclination to mount a major challenge to the CIA's hard sell.[33]

Several outside players could have had a major impact upon the decision. In late March 1961, Senator J. William Fulbright, alarmed by accounts surfacing in the press, suspected that the government was preparing a venture that he considered reprehensible. He offered Kennedy a memorandum outlining the legal, moral, and political objections to an invasion, whereupon the president invited him on April 4 to a meeting on the operation. There the senator restated his opposition, but all the other participants whom the president polled voted

[30] On Bundy's balancing of opinions for the president, see McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, 18 February 1961, Box 35, National Security Files, Kennedy Library. The National Security Council director also believed almost to the end that Kennedy did not favor the plan. Thus, Bundy was reluctant to express his own doubts, lest the president obtain an unbalanced view of the pros and cons. Bundy, interview with author; diary entry, 6 March 1961, *The Adolf A. Berle Diary*, (microfilm), (Hyde Park, N.Y.: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 1978), roll 8; Mann, letter to author.

[31] *Operation Zapata*, 11–12, 15–16.

[32] Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, N.J.: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980), 96, 100–15.

[33] Schlesinger, interview with author; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 306–307.

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in favor of the project. At this point, Fulbright too deferred to the contextual values of the cold war; satisfied that he had been heard, he would not undermine the nation's foreign policy by making his opposition public. Similar scruples helped silence another potential dissenter—the press. Alerted by rumors among the Cuban exiles in Miami, several prominent journalists soon discovered what was afoot. But the administration appealed to the editors' sense of the national interest, and despite partial disclosures by *The Nation* as early as November 1960, most of the press respected the secret until the eve of the invasion. When the *New York Times* finally disclosed the story in early April, it did so in a sanitized and relatively unobtrusive account.[34]

The key player, of course, remained the president. He had reserved the right to call off the venture up to twenty-four hours before the actual landing, and he alone reached the final decision to proceed. Kennedy's decision reflected both his goals and values. But perhaps the single most important reason behind his decision was the desire to avoid domestic criticism on the issue of communism. Memories of the savage attacks on the policies of the Truman administration remained fresh, and only months before the Republican presidential candidate, Richard Nixon, had assailed Kennedy's "softness" on Quemoy and Matsu. In an effort to establish his anti-communism, the Democratic candidate had lashed out against Cuba, rebuking the outgoing administration for its passive response to Castro and calling for American support of Cuban freedom fighters. Now as president, and acutely aware of his narrow victory as well as his vulnerability to a Republican opposition he viewed as "belligerent," Kennedy suddenly faced a plan that fit his campaign rhetoric. Moreover, the plan had the warm endorsement of no less a military expert than Dwight Eisenhower himself.[35] The new president had little taste for the venture; only days before the invasion he told Schlesinger: "I'm still trying to make some sense out of it."[36] But after his own attacks on Republican passivity towards Castro, canceling the operation could hardly fail to create an uproar that the president's rhetoric was mere sham, and

[34] Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 45–47, 122–23, 142–55.

[35] On Kennedy's deep concern over both his majority of a mere 118,000 votes and Republican criticism, see Adlai E. Stevenson, "Conference JFK and Blair," 6 December 1960, Adlai E. Stevenson Papers, Box 789, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton, N.J. Discussing the anti-Castro opposition during the presidential transition, President Eisenhower emphasized that it was his policy "to support such forces to the utmost." Regarding the training of anti-Castro forces in Guatemala, the outgoing president "recommend[ed] that the effort be continued and accelerated." Clark M. Clifford, Memo on Conference between President Eisenhower and President Kennedy and their chief advisers, 19 January 1961, President's Office Files, Box 29a, Kennedy Library. Reportedly, Eisenhower even proposed to Kennedy during the lame-duck period that the outgoing administration carry out the overthrow of Castro before the new president assumed office, but Kennedy declined. Walter Judd interview, quoted in Edwin J. Rozek, ed., *Walter H. Judd: Chronicles of a Statesman* (Denver, Colo.: Grier, 1980), 43.

[36] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 256. Dulles later told Tom Wicker of the *New York Times* that Kennedy's dislike of the plan was obvious. To secure approval, according to Wicker, "Dulles had to suggest repeatedly . . . that if Kennedy canceled the project, he would appear less zealous than Eisenhower against communism." Quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 453.

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that in truth, Kennedy had made his peace with Castro when Eisenhower would have swept him away.[37] In view of the public's anti-communism and concern about Cuba, Kennedy no doubt felt compelled to approve the invasion, despite his misgivings.

While the project was thus a means of implementing key presidential goals, Kennedy's personal values may have helped the president reach his decision. Young and relatively inexperienced, he was particularly open to suggestions from his experts, the CIA and the Joint Chiefs. Moreover, in his political career he had succeeded less as an innovator than as someone well versed in effective political management who knew how to use expert advice. The military's apparent endorsement of the invasion was thus bound to impress him. As Kennedy later admitted himself: "If someone comes in and tells me this or that about the Minimum Wage Bill, I have no hesitation in overruling them. But you always assume the military and intelligence poeple have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals."[38]

Other of the president's values, particularly his penchant for courage and action, may also have helped him overcome his doubts. The governmental politics model acknowledges that the core of bureaucratic politics is personality, and justifies such reference to a player's psyche. The cult of fortitude and energy was a deep-rooted trait of Kennedy's personality, and had repeatedly sustained him as he struggled to overcome physical liabilities and meet family expectations. More recently, the author of *Profiles in Courage* had promised in his presidential campaign to usher in a new era of "vigor." Such values of energy and courage may thus have made it easier for Kennedy to accept a bold course of action, despite nagging doubts, especially since the CIA was careful to present the plan as a test of his mettle.[39] The new president's values may also explain his apparent dismissal of unfavorable evaluations of Castro's strength such as Joseph Newman's. Courage meant indeed taking action in spite of risks and doubts.

Along with Kennedy's values, the new president's style also affected his decision. The hallmarks of the new administration were ad hoc, informal decision processes and impatience with matters of organization. This contributed to the mediocrity of the advice the president received on the Cuban invasion. Uncon-

[37] A glimpse of possible Republican reaction to a cancellation of the invasion appeared in Eisenhower's notes on a meeting after the invasion with William Pawley, who had been very close to the brigade. Pawley related the account, since disproven, that Kennedy revoked both the D-Day strike and an alleged promise of direct U.S. air cover after a last minute meeting in which Stevenson strongly opposed such assistance. Eisenhower wrote: "if the whole story ever becomes known to the American people (and . . . is substantially correct), there will be a terrible outcry and I should think a virtual repudiation of the present Administration. . . . If true, this story could be called a 'Profile in Timidity and Indecision.' " Memorandum, 5 June 1961, Post Presidential Papers, Eisenhower Library. I am grateful to Thomas G. Paterson for this information as well as the C.D. Jackson correspondence cited in footnote 50.

[38] Meyer and Szulc, *The Cuban Invasion*, 97; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 258.

[39] Herbert S. Parmet, *Jack: The Struggles of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Dial Press, 1980), 15–19; Theodore C. Sorensen, "Kennedy's Worst Disaster," *Look*, 10 August 1965, 49.

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cern for organization meant that Kennedy paid scant attention to structuring the debate. He made no particular effort to absent himself from meetings to encourage uninhibited discussion. As noted, he also failed to make clear to his advisers that it was safe to be outspoken. All this increased the timidity of their criticism. Nor did the president pause to think that by agreeing to the CIA's exclusion of so many knowledgeable players from the debate, he was allowing the agency to become both advocate and chief judge of the project's feasibility. Finally, there is cause to suspect that the president's impatience with organizational details kept him from studying the project as carefully as was warranted. After all, a glance at a map would have told him that by changing the landing site from Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs, the guerrilla option had become all but infeasible.[40]

The stance of the different players is thus quite understandable in terms of their goals and values, and in the context in which the players operated. Bissell hoped to enhance his position through the operation; the JCS underestimated the need for candid criticism of the plan and shunned an unnecessary clash with the CIA. The White House advisers were in no position to challenge this apparent unanimity of the intelligence community and the Joint Chiefs. Faced with intense lobbying by the CIA players, the president considered the operation in the light of his political goals. Despite hesitations, he could also reconcile it with his own values, especially since, for all he knew, the operation was fail-safe with the escape hatch of "going guerrilla." The decision to proceed was therefore the resultant of the different forces and resistances within the decision channels.

The governmental politics model thus views the invasion as the outcome of a bargaining game. But players rarely start out with fully formed perceptions; these usually take final shape through the exchange of information that occurs during the bargaining. This exchange is subject to miscommunication and misperception. In last analysis then, the decision depends on how the players communicate as well as who they are.

In the Bay of Pigs there was severe miscommunication and misunderstanding, caused in part by tight deadlines and the pace of events. For example, after Kennedy rejected the Trinidad plan in early March 1961, the CIA hastily devised several "quieter" alternatives, and gave the Pentagon only two days to evaluate them. The agency's reluctance to divulge details or provide written documents compounded the problem, while the incrementalism of the decision-making also had deleterious effects. Up to and even after the final "go," given a few hours before the scheduled landing, the plan was constantly changing to accommodate objections from various quarters. Cancellation of the D-Day air strikes, for instance, occurred while the pilots were in the cockpits, preparing for take-off.

[40] According to the official investigation, the plan outlining the air strikes of D-2 and D-Day was presented at a meeting on 12 April 1961. "However, this document was only passed around at the meeting, read and considered by some, and collected after the meeting. It is doubtful if the President read it or understood the details." Aguilar, ed. *Operation Zapata*, 129–30. This reveals a lack of thoroughness both on the part of those giving the briefings and those receiving it.

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Finally, making matters even worse was the tendency to consider these changes one by one while losing sight of the operation as a whole. According to the official postmortem, the Joint Chiefs "reviewed the successive changes of the plan piecemeal and only within a limited context, a procedure which was inadequate for a proper examination of all the military ramifications."[41] Nor did the president review the entire plan as it stood in its latest form before granting the final go-ahead. Owing to repeated changes and the lack of overall perspective, the plan eventually meant many different things to many people. Kennedy thought he had ordered a large but quiet infiltration of freedom fighters. Meanwhile, the CIA was staging a miniature Normandy landing.

The governmental politics model thus provides an insightful analysis of the decision to land at the Bay of Pigs. Yet there are limitations to this account. Applying the model requires extensive information about the players that is not always available. Certain findings of the government politics analysis are therefore incomplete. In particular, the different joint chiefs' reasons for going along with the agency are not sufficiently clear. Nor is it possible to ascertain yet the relative influence Kennedy's penchant for bold action, respect for expertise, and operating style had upon his stand.[42] The richness of the governmental politics explanation will increase, however, as new material becomes available.

A second and more enduring limitation of the model is its inability to account for an essential flaw in the decision. Neither the goals and values of individual actors nor the pulling and hauling of the players seem adequate to explain the decision-makers' persistent refusal to face up to unpleasant facts. For instance, once Richard Bissell and his aides opted for the invasion, they never seem to have reconsidered their assumption that a judicious application of pressure would topple Castro's regime, despite numerous indications to the contrary. Instead, the operatives ignored the agency's own analysts, who stressed the regime's control over the island, as well as the outside experts who confirmed that Castro retained considerable support. As one specialist, who shortly before the operation tried to warn the operatives of Castro's real strength, recalls: "It was like talking to a brick wall."[43]

[41] Aguilar, ed., *Operation Zapata*, 21, 42, 131, 206; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 302. As the official inquiry discovered, few if any participants had a common understanding of the plan. Robert Kennedy marvelled at the chaos uncovered: "It's very significant that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, whom the President . . . thought had approved this plan, had an entirely different idea of what the plan was. It seems that something has gone wrong somewhere along the line." Aguilar, ed., *Operation Zapata*, 251.

[42] Knowledge of the separate joint chiefs' thoughts about the invasion plan remains limited, as the JCS long felt they would best serve the national interest by not commenting on the debacle. Lemnitzer, interview with author. Some joint chiefs, however, expressed their candid views in material that is currently unavailable. Studies such as Doris Kearns's forthcoming psychobiography of John Kennedy will also help complete the governmental politics explanation.

[43] The CIA's Board of National Estimates concluded in a memorandum of 10 March 1961 that despite a fall in Castro's popularity, and scattered resistance to his regime, there were "no signs that such developments portend any serious threat to a regime which by now has established a formidable

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Cognitive Theory and the Essence of the Cuban Decision

Governmental politics do not account for the self-delusions held by policymakers. Here, the findings of cognitive theory might usefully complement the governmental politics analysis. The literature of cognitive theory holds that the human mind strives for cognitive consistency, or the congruence of beliefs and perceptions. Individuals tend to disregard information that challenges their beliefs, especially if the information is ambiguous.[44] In this perspective, the operatives' dismissal of unfavorable reports on Castro's strength becomes more understandable; the CIA's planners could always find off-setting reports stressing Castro's weakness to bolster their beliefs. The operatives, however, were not the only ones practicing self-delusion. The president too seemed blind to certain facts, particularly insofar as he hoped the operation would remain quiet. Fourteen hundred men with tanks, artillery, an invasion fleet and air force do not infiltrate quietly, even in a backwater. As Lyman Kirkpatrick, the CIA inspector general who conducted the agency's own postmortem, noted: "President Kennedy seemed to believe [the operation] was going to be some sort of mass infiltration that would perhaps, through some mystique, become quickly invisible."[45] The invasion clearly had also lost its secrecy, precluding the "plausible denial" that was Kennedy's *sine qua non* for accepting the venture. Reading accounts in the American press on the eve of the invasion, the president exploded: "Castro doesn't need agents over here! All he has to do is read our papers! It's all laid out for him!" And Bundy later mused: "I'm amazed that we thought there was a chance of deniability."[46]

Again, neither the pressure of advocates nor miscommunication is sufficient to explain such self-delusions. A second strand of cognitive theory, however, stressing defensive avoidance, might also complement the account of the government politics model. According to Irving Janis and Leon Mann, a decision-maker who realizes there are high risks to a policy yet sees no better alternative tends to alleviate the ensuing stress by ignoring "threat cues." Kennedy's delusions may have reflected such behavior. The president, despite serious misgivings about the plan, felt nevertheless compelled to accept it, largely out of fear of domestic criticism. In this case, he may well have practiced "defensive avoidance" in his hope that somehow the invasion would be "quiet," and that the U.S. hand would not show.[47]

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structure of control over the daily lives of the Cuban people." Quoted in Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 99. Schlesinger had John Plank, a Harvard professor of Latin American Affairs, who had recently returned from a visit to Cuba, brief the CIA. John Plank, interview with author, Storrs, Conn., 9 December 1981.

[44] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 143–54, 172–202.

[45] Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, "Paramilitary Case Study: The Bay of Pigs," *Naval War College Review* 2 (1972): 32–42.

[46] Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 155: Aguilar, ed., *Operation Zapata*, 182.

[47] Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 57–58, 74, 107–33. Janis has also ex-

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Cognitive theory, however, holds that cognitive consistency and defensive avoidance foster perceptual distortions once the decision-maker starts to favor, or definitely espouses, certain views or policies. But it seems that Kennedy had even rejected discrepant information *before* he leaned towards the CIA's plan. Even when the president appeared close to rejecting the project, he nevertheless seemed to believe that, should he authorize the operation, the United States could deny being involved. At this stage, another cognitive mechanism may have operated, one that does not merely reflect order-inducing thought processes or the need to circumvent fear. This may have been an instance of wishful thinking, in which emotions color perception and result in mistaking one's wishes for reality.[48] Evidence suggests that such thinking, encouraged in part by the cumulative successes of a lifetime, was present in the Bay of Pigs. This was one of Kennedy's first major foreign policy ventures. Until then, he had defied probability to reap an unbroken series of political victories. Reflecting upon the Bay of Pigs, Arthur Schlesinger later wrote:

> One further factor no doubt influenced him: the enormous confidence in his own luck. Everything had broken right for him since 1956. He had won the nomination and the election despite every odd in the book. Everyone around him thought he had the Midas touch and could not lose. Despite himself, even this dispassionate and skeptical man may have been affected by the soaring euphoria of the new day.[49]

Such wishful thinking may also have affected other decision-makers. The CIA's Richard Bissell and his deputy Tracy Barnes were men upon whom fortune had always smiled. Gifted with wealth and high ability, they had moved smoothly from Groton to Yale, and thereafter from success to success, often like Kennedy, in the face of considerable odds. Buoyed by their previous experiences, it was easy for them to assume that Castro was but another weak despot who would be no match for their craft. As one colleague recalled, they "just didn't contemplate losing." However, the thinking of the planners in Washington and the organizers in Miami did disturb another observer, a particularly well-informed journalist, who warned a colleague shortly before the invasion:

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plained the Bay of Pigs in terms of groupthink. Irving Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), 14–49. This explanation is less persuasive, however, for Kennedy made a number of major decisions concerning the operation outside of any given group. Furthermore, the action group involved displayed little of the cohesiveness or intolerance of criticism characteristic of groupthink.

[48] Schlesinger has written that at the time he believed "the tide was flowing against the project. . . . Obviously no one could believe any longer that the adventure would not be attributed to the United States—news stories described the recruitment in Miami every day—but somehow the idea took hold around the Cabinet table that this would not much matter so long as United States soldiers did not take part in the actual fighting." *A Thousand Days*, 249. On "wishful thinking," see Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, 52–54 and passim; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 356–81; Otto Klineberg, *The Human Dimension in International Relations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 91; Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 169–222.

[49] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 259.

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> The thing that concerns me the most about their plan is the faith they are putting in militia defections. Maybe that will happen; it had better, or they are dead ducks. Napoleon used to sack generals for "making pictures"—that is, presuming on their own wishful thinking. . . . It may be a rough landing. Cross fingers.[50]

Conclusion

Taken together, then, Graham Allison's second and third models explain the Bay of Pigs decision more satisfactorily than a rational actor account. The organizational process model is most helpful in explaining the genesis of the plan within the CIA and the agency's response to the constraints on its freedom of action. The government politics model sheds considerable light on the government's decision to adopt the CIA's plan. Yet as they currently stand, none of Allison's models provide a full explanation of the decision to invade Cuba. At this point there is evidence that the players' thought processes may help explain the remaining questions. Because of the secrecy surrounding the record, the available knowledge of these processes is still limited. Thus more research is needed, particularly as new material on the operation becomes available. Nevertheless it appears that cognitive theory could prove a fruitful means of complementing Allison's governmental politics model.

The need for additional information and research, however, goes beyond the purpose of refining these conceptual models. The Bay of Pigs held significant lessons for policymakers that the Kennedy administration drew from thereafter. Two lessons in particular stand out. The first was to distrust the experts; from then on the Kennedy team systematically questioned the assumptions of the bureaucracy. The White House further controlled the views of the bureaucratic leadership by soliciting the opinions of subordinates in direct contact with the issue under consideration. A second major lesson was to be skeptical of consensus. Thereafter, White House advisers received "a license for the impolite inquiry" and open encouragement to be devil's advocates.[51]

Unfortunately, details of the Cuban fiasco were jealously guarded. Most copies of the report by the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs were destroyed, and for years information on the episode amounted mostly to a few accounts in memoirs by members of the Kennedy administration. As a result, the lessons of the disaster grew dimmer as the event receded into the past. Thus, some twenty years later, as decision-makers authorized another ill-fated venture, the Iranian hostage rescue mission of 24 April 1980, they consciously recalled the precedent of the Bay of Pigs. Ironically, though, President Jimmy Carter and National Security Council director Zbigniew Brzezinski seem to have overlooked the major lessons of the Cuban fiasco. Their recollection of the event prompted

[50] Amory, interview with author. Gene Farmer to C. D. Jackson, 28 March 1961, Box 42, C. D. Jackson Papers, Eisenhower Library.

[51] Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Missile Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969), 111-17; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 296-97.

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them to doubt the wisdom of interfering with the military experts once an operation was underway. Apparently forgotten, however, was the wisdom of doubting these experts before an operation ever got underway.[52] Yet had the civilian leaders been skeptical enough to question the planners' optimistic assessments, and sought first-hand information on the actual preparation for the rescue mission, the shortcomings the White House would have discovered may well have prevented it from authorizing the mission at all.[53]

Thus, if the mistakes of the past are to be avoided, the Bay of Pigs fiasco must be fully understood. Needed then is more research, as well as more information than those limited amounts made available so far. Such knowledge will not benefit historians and political scientists alone; it may also prevent a future decision-maker from echoing Kennedy's lament after the invasion: "How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead?"[54]*

[52] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Failed Mission," *New York Times Magazine*, 18 April 1982, 64. After the Bay of Pigs, Bundy concluded: "In the future the President . . . should hear something from other than advocates." Aguilar, ed., *Operation Zapata*, 181. Yet the official inquiry into the hostage rescue mission noted that "planners—in effect—reviewed and critiqued their own product for soundness as they went along. . . . The hostage rescue plan was never subjected to rigorous testing and evaluation by qualified, independent observers and monitors short of the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves." United States Naval War College, "Iran Rescue Mission Report," Washington, D.C., August 1980, mimeographed, 21.

[53] David C. Martin, "Inside the Rescue Mission," *Newsweek*, 12 July 1982, 16–25.

[54] Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 309. Only portions of the study by the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs have been released. Other postmortems are not available at all, including two by the CIA and one by the State Department. One of the conversations of the Kennedy administration on tape at the Kennedy Library is also devoted to an analysis of the Bay of Pigs.

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Secrecy, Foreign Intelligence, and Civil Liberties: Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?

DUNCAN L. CLARKE
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Several measures promulgated, implemented, and proposed during the Reagan administration in the foreign intelligence area have together constituted a distinct change in tone and direction with respect to what the federal government may do domestically in the name of national security. The perennial issue of the appropriate balance between civil liberties and the demands of national security has lost none of its poignancy; nor is it any easier today than it was in the past to determine how, where, and when to draw the line between these two sets of interests. However, the balance shifted between 1981 and 1984. Here we assess this shift. But first, a brief overview of some past developments pertaining to the relationship between foreign intelligence and civil liberties is in order.

A catalogue of illegal and improper intelligence community activities was revealed in the mid-1970s by the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee.[1] Much attention was focused on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which, under the National Security Act of 1947, was forbidden to have any

[1] Rockefeller Commission, *Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975); Senate, *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, S. Rept. 94–755, book II, 2 (hereinafter cited as *Church Committee Report*).

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"policy, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions."[2] While it was acknowledged that the CIA would have such domestic functions as recruiting personnel and conducting security clearances for employees in the United States, and that the agency could even conduct limited domestic intelligence activities (such as interview American businessmen returning from overseas trips), it was universally understood that the CIA's central mission was foreign intelligence. Surprisingly, however, the word "foreign" does not appear in the National Security Act and the critical (but ambiguous) phrase "internal security functions" is undefined.[3] The lack of clarity concerning proscribed and permissible domestic activities related to foreign intelligence provided an inviting escape hatch for the agency to, among other things, open the mail of American antiwar activists during the Vietnam era and institute its own ambitious domestic operation, called Operation CHAOS, ostensibly to determine the extent of foreign control over various dissident groups in the United States.[4]

These and other revelations stimulated unprecedented developments in Congress and the executive branch. President Gerald Ford's 1976 Executive Order tightened guidelines governing the surveillance of American citizens.[5] President Jimmy Carter's 1978 Executive Order went further. It completely banned the CIA from engaging in electronic surveillance in the United States, and from conducting any physical searches without consent within the United States. It also prohibited agencies other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from engaging in physical surveillance of United States persons except in certain expressly prescribed instances, for example: when a CIA employee was being surveilled for the purpose of protecting foreign intelligence sources and methods; when the surveillance was conducted outside of the United States and the subject was reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power, engaging in terrorist activities or narcotics trade; or when the person was the subject of a "lawful counterintelligence, personnel, physical or communications security investigation."[6]

From 1950 to 1974, almost 200 bills were introduced to make the intelligence community more accountable to Congress. None passed. But a reform-minded Congress, spurred by knowledge of an unauthorized, clandestine CIA-directed war in Laos, passed the Hughes-Ryan bill in 1974, which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. The bill prohibited the use of any funds by the CIA for

[2] 50 U.S.C. Sec 403(d).

[3] It remains unclear whether this term, whatever its meaning, permits domestic activities incidental or ancillary to legitimate foreign intelligence purposes.

[4] *Church Committee Report*, 97, 103, 107; Jerry Berman and Morton Halperin, eds., *The Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies* (Washington, D.C.: Center for National Security Studies, 1975), 119–48. Some of the CIA's domestic operations were justified by the agency under the National Security Act's charge to the director of central intelligence to protect "sources and methods." Other intelligence units were also involved in questionable domestic operations. See *Church Committee Report*, 103–104; James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982).

[5] Executive Order 11905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (1976).

[6] Executive Order 12036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674, Sec. 2–206 (1978).

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foreign operations except for intelligence gathering activities unless "the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of Congress. . . ." Hughes-Ryan has been a noteworthy, yet modest, deterrent to ill-considered proposed CIA covert operations.[7]

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted in 1978. It requires, in part, that a federal court order be given for electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes of American citizens, corporations, and resident aliens when they are in the United States. In such cases, the court must find that there is probable cause to believe that a person is "an agent of a foreign power" and that his or her activities "may involve" a federal crime. However, at least through 1983, no request for such a court order had been denied.[8]

The final piece of pertinent legislation prior to the Reagan administration (excluding annual authorizations of intelligence community expenditures—a practice begun only in fiscal year 1979)[9] was the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.[10] At first, the act was to be a comprehensive new charter for the intelligence community. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence produced a 263-page bill in 1978 that would have effectively replaced the National Security Act of 1947.[11] But the brief consensus for reform was ebbing and the bill that eventually passed contained just three pages. While the act extended the Hughes-Ryan amendment's coverage to include the entire intelligence community and reduced from eight to two the number of committees to which the president must report on covert operations, it was hardly a comprehensive charter. Nonetheless, for the first time, Congress now had a statutory right to be fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities.

Sentiment for tighter controls on intelligence activities was reversed by several developments between 1975 and 1980—the killing of the CIA station chief in Athens, concern about growing Soviet military strength, the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, finally, the election of Ronald Reagan as president. Many now believed that fewer, not more, restrictions were needed for intelligence agencies. The metaphorical pendulum had swung.

[7] 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2422. See Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 115-34; Patrick Tyler, "U.S. Tracks Cuban Aid to Grenada," *Washington Post*, 27 February 1983; and Jay Peterzell, "Can Congress Really Check the CIA?" *Washington Post*, 24 April 1983.

[8] 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978); note 28, *infra*. It should be noted, however, that federal and state courts rarely deny requests for search warrants in criminal cases.

[9] Annual authorization of intelligence agency budgets is, in practice, the single most important vehicle for congressional oversight of the intelligence community.

[10] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980*, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, S. Rept. 96-730.

[11] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978.

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Executive Order 12333 of 1981

President Ronald Reagan's 1981 Executive Order replaced and revoked President's Carter's 1978 order.[12] It greatly expanded the CIA's authority to spy on Americans overseas, though this change encountered little opposition since foreign intelligence is the agency's central mission.[13] Most of the criticism concerned a provision that allowed the CIA to collect "significant foreign intelligence" in the United States except "for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons." This change once again raised the issue of the legal breadth of the CIA's authority in domestic foreign intelligence matters under the National Security Act of 1947. The matter was especially worrisome as the director of central intelligence (DCI), subject only to the attorney general's approval, determined the meaning of "significant." And the order greatly reduced the leverage of the attorney general by stipulating that "where the agency head and the attorney general are unable to reach agreement on other than constitutional or other legal grounds," the National Security Council (NCS) may establish valid procedures. As the attorney general is not an NSC member, and as the order states that he or she may be excluded from NSC groups dealing with "substantive intelligence matters" (a phrase open to interpretation), it was quite possible that he or she could at times be entirely excluded from the decision-making process.[14]

The CIA was also permitted to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States—consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978—in order to train, test, or conduct countermeasures to "hostile electronic surveillance." The agency could physically surveil American citizens within the country if they were past or present CIA employees, contractors (or contractors' employees), or applicants for such employment or contracting. Moreover, the CIA could infiltrate any domestic organization that was not "composed primarily" of United States persons and it could infiltrate any other domestic organization, but not for the purpose of influencing its activities or members.[15] Finally, the CIA was allowed to engage in covert activities within the United States with the approval of the president if such activities were "not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media."[16] Although institutions of higher learning and academic freedom might be par-

[12] Executive Order 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59, 941 (1981). An early draft of the order encountered substantial congressional criticism, which prompted several significant revisions.

[13] Ibid., Sec. 2.4 (a) (d). Cf. Carter Executive Order 12036, Sec. 2-206 (a) (c).

[14] Executive Order 12333, Sec. 2.3; Eric L. Richard, "'Unleashing' the Intelligence Community," *American Bar Association Journal* 69 (1983): 903. However, wholly apart from the NSC connection, the FBI is answerable to the attorney general, and internal regulations require FBI-CIA coordination.

[15] Concerning the infiltration of domestic organizations and physical surveillance of U.S. citizens in the United States, the Reagan order was virtually identical to the Carter order except that, coverage in the Reagan order was extended to past government employees. This portion of the order has not been criticized, even by civil libertarians.

[16] Executive Order 12333, Secs. 1.8 (e), 2.4, 2.9, 3.4 (h).

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tially covered by the term "public opinion," they were not expressly included on the list of exemptions.

The Reagan order has permitted the CIA to engage in some questionable domestic activities that contravene the spirit, if not the ambiguous letter, of the National Security Act of 1947. Memories of past intelligence community abuses were either short or, more likely, overcome by concern about the Soviet threat. Harry Howe Ransom has written that "the greater the hostility between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and the stronger the consensus about threats to national security, the fewer restrictions, audits, and controls that will be imposed upon the CIA."[17] The Soviet Union and other nations indeed pose serious threats. But American institutions and liberties can also be, and quite recently have been, jeopardized by the United States government.

Conducting domestic counterintelligence and collecting foreign intelligence at home is vital; foreign intelligence agencies are active in the United States. Such matters have traditionally and rightly fallen primarily to the FBI. For the CIA to engage in such activities raises at least three problems, in addition to legal propriety. These problems have been well articulated by Stansfield Turner and George Thibault.[18] First, and most importantly, a large CIA role in domestic affairs is a time bomb. Former DCIs William Colby, George Bush, and Stansfield Turner struggled to restore the agency's tarnished image with Congress and the public. By the late Carter administration, their efforts had borne fruit. But President Reagan reopened the door for potential future abuses. Human nature, bureaucratic proclivities, and perceptions of the Soviet threat might collectively result in improprieties. The backlash from such wrongdoing could again damage the CIA and, along with it, American national security. Second, the agency's expanded domestic role invited bureaucratic "turf" fights with the FBI that could impede effective coordination between the two. If there is a compelling need for more intelligence personnel in the domestic sphere, the FBI's budget should be increased. Lastly, as Turner and Thibault stated: "There is little evidence that spying on Americans in the United States would produce significant intelligence. And whatever intelligence is available the FBI can acquire it."[19]

The case against broad CIA jurisdiction in domestic intelligence matters is persuasive. Indeed, new, more explicit legislation is required here. But if a president insists upon conferring such jurisdiction on the CIA, his directive should be, as the Carter order was, very specific. It is unwise for the DCI to have blanket discretion to determine what is "significant" intelligence. The order should spell out precisely what is and is not permissable.

The Reagan order was also disquieting for what it did not say—for instance,

[17] Harry Howe Ransom, "Strategic Intelligence and Intermestic Politics," in Charles Kegley, Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf, eds., *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 300.

[18] Stansfield Turner and George Thibault, "Intelligence: The Right Rules," *Foreign Policy*, no. 48 (1982): 122–38.

[19] Ibid., 128.

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that academics may be fair game for investigation. As a result, there was little to prevent the CIA from using informants and "pretext" interviews to collect information on unwitting Americans, including university professors. For example, an academic might complete a sabbatical in Pakistan and upon his or her return refuse an invitation to meet with the CIA. However, the professor might discuss his or her findings and experiences in classes, at professional gatherings, and in guest lectures. The CIA could send an informer, perhaps even another academician, to these sessions who would report back to the agency.[20] And the targeted individuals, should they discover this, may have no legal recourse against the government.[21]

Physical Foreign Intelligence Searches

The Carter administration contended that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and the president had concurrent authority to approve physical searches for intelligence purposes.[22] Although this administration submitted only three applications for physical searches to the FISC, it did allow for some judicial participation.[23]

The Reagan administration, however, maintained that the president alone and, by delegation, the attorney general, has the constitutional authority to approve warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes.[24] In June 1981, while not sustaining the administration's position, the FISC nonetheless held that, under existing legislation, it lacked the power to rule on physical searches.[25] The court had reversed itself and, under existing law, properly so. When it passed on three applications for physical searches during the Carter administration, it clearly misconstrued the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. That law applies only to applications for electronic surveillance, not physical searches.

[20] In the Carter administration, internal CIA regulations prohibited such activities. Of course, nothing would prevent the FBI from doing this.

[21] The Reagan order states that it does not "confer any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization." Executive Order 12333, Sec. 3.5. The courts are reluctant to grant relief where foreign intelligence matters are involved. See *Jabara v. Webster*, 691 F. 2d 272 (6th Cir., 1983).

[22] The FISC was established pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to review government applications for orders approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801 *et seq.*, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978).

[23] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978*, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, S. Rept. 96-1017, 19; and Richard, " 'Unleashing' the Intelligence Community," 910.

[24] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: 1981-82*, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, S. Rept. 97-691, 5. Reagan's order diverged sharply from Carter's here. The latter did not delegate authority directly to the attorney general to approve warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. Rather, it required prior, specific presidential authorization for such acts. The Reagan order eliminated this presidential authorization and, instead, delegated broad authority to approve such practices directly to the attorney general. This opened the door somewhat wider for potential abuse.

[25] "Special Court Says It Lacks Power to Approve Searches in Security Cases," *New York Times*, 24 June 1981.

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It is uncertain whether presidents have inherent power to order physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. As of June 1984, no federal court has ruled that a warrant for such searches is or is not necessary.[26]

In 1982, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that "consideration be given to the possibility of amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to provide a statutory basis for physical searches in the United States for intelligence purposes."[27] An amendment that gives the FISC jurisdiction over such physical searches is advisable for three reasons. First, if the track record of the FISC concerning electronic surveillance requests is any indication, the executive branch need not be worried that the court will be unduly obstructive. This court has never rejected an application for electronic surveillance. Indeed, court orders authorizing electronic surveillance increased by almost fifty percent in the first two years of the Reagan administration—from 322 in 1980 to 473 in 1982.[28] Second, judicial review of physical search proposals would ease some of the misgivings about existing executive oversight of intelligence searches. The very existence of a judicial approval procedure will likely deter blatantly unconstitutional searches. Finally, court-sanctioned physical searches could bolster the confidence and morale of intelligence agents who would then know that their actions were lawful.

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982

Shortly after Philip Agee's *Counterspy* and Louis Wolf's *Covert Action Information Bulletin* named individual Americans working overseas as CIA agents, some of these people were the targets of assassination attempts. CIA station chief Richard Welch was murdered in Athens, Greece, less than a month after his CIA connection was revealed in *Counterspy*.[29] These events highlighted the potential dangers such disclosures posed, not only to the physical safety of agents and their families, but also to the overall effectiveness of U.S. covert operations. Public disclosure nullifies an agent's value as a collector of covert intelligence, since foreign intelligence sources are reluctant to offer their cooperation absent a cloak of secrecy. In addition, the disclosure of agents' identities makes it difficult to reassign them and forces the CIA to train replacements, a costly and time-consuming process.[30]

With the backing of the Reagan administration, Congress responded to this

[26] See United States *v.* Troung, 629 F. 2d 908 (4th Cir., 1980).

[27] Senate, *Implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: 1981–82*, 6.

[28] Ibid., 2: George Lardner, Jr., "Secret Authorizations for Electronic Spying up Almost 50 Percent," *Washington Post*, 9 June 1983. This record raises at least a presumptive concern about the degree of the FISC's scrutiny of requests, but the secrecy of its proceedings prevents an outside assessment of its effectiveness.

[29] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report on the Intelligence Identities Protection Act*, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, S. Rept. 96-896, 7. However, it appears that Welch's affiliation and residence in Athens were well known even before the *Counterspy* story.

[30] Ibid., 9; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Hearings: Intelligence Identities Protection Legislation*, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, 8.

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problem by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. A relatively noncontroversial provision of the act prohibits intentional disclosures of the identities of covert agents by past or present intelligence personnel and by those who have or have had authorized access to classified information.[31] But the Act further provides in Section 421(c) that:

> Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such individual and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such individual's classified intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more than $15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.[32]

Section 421(c) has serious implications for the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and press, as it would penalize those who have never been affiliated with the intelligence community and have never had access to classified information for publishing information already in the public domain. Several constitutional problems are raised.

In *United States* v. *Heine* in 1945, Judge Learned Hand held that the espionage statutes then on the books did not prohibit the compilation and transmission of information derived from public sources, reasoning that "all this information came from sources that were lawfully accessible to anyone who was willing to take the pains to find, sift, and collate it. . . ."[33] While *Heine* is not directly applicable to the current act, it supports the proposition that government should not punish the dissemination of information derived from public sources.

In addition, laws affecting fundamental rights, like freedom of speech and press, must be narrowly drawn, even where national security concerns are present.[34] Evolving judicial standards have measured the constitutionality of such laws. *Schenck* v. *United States* established the first major test in this area in 1919: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."[35] *Schenck's* "clear and present danger" test held sway until *United States* v. *Dennis* held in 1950 that the courts must inquire whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is

[31] *Intelligence Identities Protection Act*, 50 U.S.C. Sec 421 (b) (c).

[32] Ibid., Sec. 421 (c).

[33] *United States v. Heine*, 151 F. 2d 813 (2d Cir., 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946).

[34] *Aptheker v. Secretary of State*, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); *Broadrick v. Oklahoma*, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1972).

[35] *Schenck v. United States*, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

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necessary to avoid the danger."[36] Such balancing continues to be employed by the courts.

While there is thus some question as to whether the 1982 act can pass constitutional muster, a more interesting issue relates to a covert agent's "cover" (a protective guise to conceal identification with clandestine activities or organizations). Here, the "danger" that the government fears is that identity disclosure will both endanger the compromised agent and inhibit the willingness of foreign intelligence sources to provide information. But does the identity disclosure itself create this danger, or is the covert agent's cover very often so thin that disclosure is a superfluous act? That is to say, if a covert agent's cover is so superficial that his or her true identity is known widely, not only within the CIA, but to many citizens of a foreign country and even to hostile intelligence agencies, this situation would undermine the constitutionally required causative link between unauthorized disclosures (an exercise of free speech) and the "substantive evils" that Congress is trying to prevent. If so, it is doubtful whether the act would survive judicial scrutiny. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the identities of covert CIA agents are often well known overseas and within the agency itself. The CIA sometimes purposefully gives agents thin covers so that potential defectors and information sources will know where to go.[37]

Another question about Section 421(c) pertains to the meaning of the phrase "in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents." The concern here focuses not on those, like Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, who name names for disclosure's sake, but on those instances where disclosure is incidental to a publication whose primary purpose is to inform some aspect of the public debate on intelligence matters. Congress addressed this concern not in the law itself, but in the Conference Report of the act. That report stated that the act "does not affect First Amendment rights of those who disclose the identities of agents as an *integral* part of *another* enterprise such as news media reporting of intelligence . . . abuses [and] academic studies of U.S. Government policies and programs. . . ." To meet the standard of this law, a discloser must "be in the business of 'naming names.' "[38]

But it is uncertain whether (and perhaps unlikely that) the courts will adopt the Conference Report's interpretation. Indeed, the very existence of uncertainty as to what is or is not proscribed under the act may deter vigorous media

[36] *United States v. Dennis*, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir., 1950), aff'd. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also *Haig v. Agee*, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981); and *Snepp v. United States*, 444 U.S. 507, 509 (1980). In *Shelton v. Tucker*, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) the Supreme Court stated that "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same purpose."

[37] *Church Committee Report*, book I, 458; testimony of Morton Halperin and former CIA agent John Stockwell, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Hearings: Intelligence Identities*, 58, 99.

[38] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Conference Report: Intelligence Identities Protection Act*, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, 9.

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reporting and academic research on intelligence matters. Those who fear that the government might employ this act to curb legitimate reporting or research might take comfort in an incident where a *Wall Street Journal* article apparently identified several American covert agents involved in an Australian banking scandal. The reporter who authored the article said he "never gave [the new law] any thought," and a CIA spokesperson reportedly stated that, "I would not think this kind of reporting is what we're talking about when we talk about the need for this bill."[39] One wonders, however, if the government would have viewed the matter so benignly if the article had appeared in the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*.

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act has one other potentially troublesome aspect. Felony prosecutions usually require a clear showing of criminal intent, or *mens rea*, for each material element of the crime. But the act requires only that the defendant have "reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede" U.S. foreign intelligence activities. Hence, the rule effectively becomes "let the discloser beware." If disclosers proceed on the belief that their disclosure will have a salutary or, at worst, an innocuous, effect upon U.S. intelligence activities, they run the risk that a jury might think otherwise. This may well inhibit aggressive investigation or research.

A difficult policy dilemma would thus arise. Exposure of official wrongdoing and the safeguarding of civil liberties is one of the fruits of a vigorous free press. Past CIA abuses, like drug experiments on unwitting Americans, may not have come to light if the press had been subject to the constraints of this Act. Ford Rowan, a laywer and journalist, testified that reporters who revealed such abuses "*wanted* to impair or impede this one type of intelligence activity."[40] This presents complex, value-ladden issues. Are there intelligence activities whose impairment should be encouraged by society? If so, does a "reason to believe" standard militate against this societal goal?

If the Act is ever enforced, it can be challenged on several grounds. Such challenges will surely have great significance for the delicate balance between civil liberties and the requirements of national security.

The identities protection legislation may afford greater secrecy for U.S. covert intelligence agents. It quickly caused the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* to excise its "naming names" column. But the identities of many covert operatives are rather commonly known both inside and outside the American intelligence community. Of course, even loose cover might be effective vis-à-vis those outside the arcane world of covert intelligence. Still, the Supreme Court has observed that the DCI rather than the judiciary or the press bears prime responsibility for protecting sources and methods, and that the threat of disclosure could be

[39] *Wall Street Journal*, 24 August 1982; Tony Mauro, "Identifying Agents Now A Ticket To Prison," *First Principles* (January/February 1983): 4.

[40] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Hearings: Intelligence Identities . . .*, 108 (emphasis added).

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greatly reduced through stricter internal CIA security procedures.[41] This admonition should be heeded. Not only would it enhance the agency's effectiveness, but it could increase respect for the legislation and perhaps reduce the likelihood of successful legal challenges to it. Where there is legitimate need for loose cover, it should be satisfied by other means.

Additionally, the act should be amended to provide for a "legitimate news or research purpose" defense or exception. As it now stands, an academic or journalist who authors an article that names a covert agent might reasonably believe that he could be prosecuted, despite the intent of Congress as expressed in the Conference Report.

Lastly, while the "reason to believe" standard raises important concerns, there are three reasons why it may be unwise or unnecessary to replace it with a subject "intent" standard, at least until sufficient time elapses to assess the act's impact. First, the act seeks to prevent the gratuitous naming of names. If the requisite state of mind for prosecution was the "intent" to impair or impede U.S. foreign intelligence activities, gratuitous disclosers would have a ready defense. They might assert that their whistle-blowing activities were intended to improve U.S. foreign intelligence by eliminating those covert operations that harm America's prestige in the world. They might even preface their writings with: "This report is intended to assist the foreign intelligence activities of the United States by helping to reestablish the moral premises upon which such activities should be based." Second, a decision to prosecute will be taken only after careful consideration, since the government must then pay a price. It must prove that the agent's identity was classified. This would eliminate whatever residual value the agent's cover might have retained even after the unauthorized disclosure and consume time and resources. Finally, although this is arguable, sufficient criminal "intent" may already be embodied in the language: ". . . in the course of a pattern of activities *intended* to identify and expose covert agents. . . ." Indeed, this may be the crucial element of the act, with the subsequent language merely permitting an escape route for those who reasonably believe that their disclosure will not harm foreign intelligence.

Public Access to Information

Freedom of Information Act Exemption. Although the Constitution has never been interpreted, expressly or implicitly, to allow public access to national security information, the Founding Fathers recognized the importance of a well-informed public to a healthy government. James Madison wrote: "A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both."[42] Congress also has recog-

[41] *Snepp v. United States*, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); *Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia*, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978).

[42] Quoted in Edward M. Kennedy, "Foreward: Is the Pendulum Swinging Away From Freedom of Information?" *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review* 16 (1981): 311.

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nized the importance of public access to government information. It passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1966 to provide such access and, in 1974, amended the act to further facilitate the public's ability to obtain information.[43]

However, in the Reagan administration, some agencies constricted use of the FOIA by, among other things, requiring sizable advance payments from requesters and issuing new, stricter guidelines for the granting of fee waivers.[44] The administration also supported several congressional efforts to amend the FOIA to exempt U.S. foreign intelligence agencies from its coverage.

These agencies have employed various arguments in seeking an exemption. First, the FOIA has made some foreign intelligence sources reluctant to share their information for fear that it will be revealed. Even the perception that this information might be released causes reticence. Second, the FOIA is costly in money and manpower. Third, because of inevitable human error, some classified information will be accidentally released in processing FOIA requests. Finally, since classified material located intermittently throughout the requested material must be excised, the resulting documents are of little benefit to the requester.[45]

Opponents of such an exemption have a response to each argument. First, no information has been released through the FOIA when the CIA has contended that release would harm national security, and the FBI has never shown publicly that any informant's identity has been revealed as a direct result of a proper agency response to a FOIA request. If the perception of possible damage is a culprit, it must be recognized that this perception is also caused by executive-branch security leaks, publications by former intelligence insiders, and CIA behavior, such as the abandonment of its South Vietnamese agents during the final days of the Vietnam War. Thus, to the extent that damaging perceptions stem from factors other than the FOIA, they cannot be eliminated by the exemption proposal. Second, the government spends more on military bands than it does to process FOIA requests. Third, there is little evidence that human error has caused the release of significant classified information and, at any rate, this is a risk worth taking. Finally, FOIA releases have shed new light on such matters as CIA drug testing, CIA and National Security Agency domestic spying, CIA activities on American campuses, and government concern with John Lennon as a "subversive force," to name but a few.[46]

[43] Freedom of Information Act, *Statutes at Large*, 80 Sec. 250 (1966), 88 Sec. 1561 (1974).

[44] See, for example, the testimony of Robert Lewis, Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, *Hearings: The Freedom of Information Reform Act*, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 7–8 (mimeographed).

[45] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Hearings: Intelligence Reform Act of 1981*, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 9, 13; and William J. Casey, "Freedom of Information Harmful to the CIA," *New York Times*, 1 October 1982.

[46] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Hearings: Intelligence Reform Act of 1981*, 40; testimony of Robert Lewis in Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, *Hearings: The Freedom of Information Reform Act*, 4, 12; and Center for National Security Studies, *The CIA and the Freedom of Information Act: A Report on the Proposals for an Exemption*, CNSS Rept. 106 (Washington, D.C.: Center for National Security Studies, 1980), 1–2, 16–17.

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A compelling case to completely exclude foreign intelligence agencies from FOIA coverage has not been made. The act is a vital artery through which information flows out to the public, and it has helped expose official wrongdoing. There is substantial authority under the existing array of FOIA exemptions to protect sensitive national security information. The Supreme Court has emphasized that "disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective" of the FOIA, and that the act's exemptions "must be narrowly construed."[47] Despite fifteen years of experience under the FOIA, then-CIA Deputy Director Admiral Bobby Inman conceded in 1981 that the CIA had never been required by the courts to release documents in response to a FOIA request that the agency had withheld under one of the act's exemptions.[48] If foreign sources of information lack confidence in the American government's reliability in maintaining secrecy, this is almost certainly due to far more numerous and important factors than a largely misplaced uneasiness about the FOIA.

There is no measureable protest from taxpayers about the government's FOIA compliance costs. Some agencies in the Reagan administration have required onerous and perhaps arbitrary advance payments for FOIA requests and have often refused to grant fee waivers, as the act allows in certain instances. This seemed to contravene an express congressional intent, cited and upheld in court decisions concerning fees and fee waivers, that the law "allows documents to be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge where the public interest is best served thereby. This public interest standard should be liberally construed by the agencies. . . ."[49] Two Senate bills were introduced in 1983 that sought to reduce executive branch discretion to deny fee waivers and require excessive advance payments.[50]

Another change might be considered. Some believe the FOIA permits the Soviet KGB to request information from the government.[51] An amendment could be drawn that prohibits citizens of certain countries and agents of specified foreign intelligence services from making FOIA requests. It could also require requesters to certify, under threat of criminal prosecution, that they were not acting as proxies for these countries or intelligence services. But the amendment must be meticulously drafted so as not to prevent legitimate, nonsecurity related

[47] *Department of the Air Force v. Rose*, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).

[48] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Hearings: Intelligence Reform Act of 1981*, 6. On occasion, federal district courts have ordered the CIA to release documents under the FOIA, but such orders were either mooted or overturned on appeal.

[49] *Eudey v. Central Intelligence Agency*, 478 F. Supp. 1175 (1979); and *Rizzo v. Tyler*, 438 F. Supp. 895 (1977).

[50] Freedom of Information Improvement Act of 1983 (S.1034); and Freedom of Information Reform Act (S.774).

[51] The widely held view that the Soviet bloc makes FOIA requests was tested in 1983, first by a FOIA request for evidence and then in a lawsuit brought under the Act. U.S. defense and intelligence agencies could cite no instance when this had occurred. This does not mean that Soviet bloc requests have not been made, but there is no publicly available evidence to substantiate the assertion. See George Lardner, Jr., "Lawyer Says FOIA Is No Pipeline to Soviets," *Washington Post*, 13 September 1983.

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requests by citizens of friendly countries and so as to rule out possible government intimidation of requesters who are merely suspected of being proxies of a hostile power.

In 1983, the CIA dropped its prior insistence on a total exemption from the FOIA and supported a bill that was unanimously reported out of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in October 1983. This bill would, if enacted into legislation, strike a reasonable balance between the public's right to access to information and the CIA's interest in protecting intelligence sources and methods.[52]

Classification Provisions

President Reagan's April 1982 Executive Order concerning government classification and declassification procedures diverged sharply from the Carter order.[53] It could permit the administration to accomplish by Executive Order what it largely failed to do by legislation. The Carter order directed that material be classified only if its unauthorized disclosure "could reasonably be expected to cause *identifiable* damage to the national security."[54] This provision required classifiers to ascertain some specific damage before classifying a document. The Reagan order merely required that unauthorized disclosure of classified information "reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security."[55] Elimination of the "identifiable damage" standard allowed classification in instances where there was only some vague or general notion of the harm that might ensue from disclosure; it could obviate the need for rigorous analysis of classification decisions. Hence, fewer documents would likely be made available to the public.

In addition, under the Reagan order, reasonable doubts as to whether to classify must be resolved in favor of classification, pending a final determination.[56] This was a marked departure from the Carter order's provision that any "substantial doubt" about the need to classify be resolved in favor of releasing the information.[57] Finally, the order eliminated the discretion possessed by Carter administration officials as to whether to classify minimally classifiable material;

[52] The Intelligence Information Act of 1983 (S.1324), which amends the National Security Act of 1947, permits the CIA to exempt only those files designated by the director of central intelligence as "operational files"—those that store information about particular intelligence sources and methods—from FOIA provisions requiring publication or disclosure, or search and review related to publication or disclosure. Other CIA-held information would remain subject to FOIA provisions. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report: Intelligence Information Act of 1983*, Rept. No. 98-305, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983.

[53] Executive Order 12356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14, 874 (1982).

[54] Executive Order 12065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), Sec. 1-104 (emphasis added).

[55] Executive Order 12356, Sec. 1.1 (a) (3).

[56] Ibid. A final determination must be made by an "original classification authority" within thirty days.

[57] Executive Order 12065, Sec. 1-101.

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classification of such material was now mandatory.[58] Given the tendency of officials to err on the side of secrecy, overclassification was thereby encouraged.

The Reagan order also eliminated the Carter order's "balancing test" in determining whether to declassify information. The Carter order stated that: "In some cases . . . the need to protect . . . information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure . . ., and in these cases the information should not be classified."[59] Elimination of the balancing test has been praised as a means of preventing the courts, allegedly inexpert in classification questions, from second-guessing the government through a *de novo* weighing of the interests involved. But striking the balancing test could well result in classifying information of substantial public value, despite its marginal national security sensitivity.

Furthermore, the Reagan order afforded officials broad leeway to reclassify previously declassified information. Such authority might be invoked to retrieve declassified documents in pending publications expected to be critical of or embarrassing to the government.[60] Indeed, shortly before the issuance of this order, the Justice Department sought the return of a report that James Bamford had obtained through the FOIA while researching a book on the National Security Agency. The department contended that the information was mistakenly released by the Carter administration, and thus was still classified. Bamford succeeded in retaining the report by citing the Carter order's prohibition against reclassification of documents that had been released by a competent authority.[61] But had the Reagan order been in effect at the time, the government would likely have employed the reclassification provision as the basis for its request.

Finally, the Reagan order greatly broadened the scope of classifiable information by enumerating new classification categories, such as information relating to a "confidential source." The term "confidential source" was defined as "any individual or organization that has provided, or that *may reasonably be expected to provide,*" national security information to the United States.[62] Individuals seeking government information about themselves under the FOIA might be denied such information on the ground that they are deemed potential future sources of information.

Some changes are advisable. The requirement of "identifiable" harm to national security from the disclosure of information should be reinstated as the test for classification. The Reagan standard was objectionably vague and promised substantial overclassification. Moreover, the requirement that the classifier be able to articulate "identifiable" harm would bring more vigorous evaluation to classification decisions. Rather than casually appraising particular material, the

[58] Ibid., Sec. 1-302; Executive Order 12356, Sec. 1.3 (b).

[59] Executive Order 12065, Sec. 3-303.

[60] Executive Order 12356, Sec. 1.6 (c). George Lardner, Jr., "Reagan Order Keeps Secret That Isn't Secret Anymore," *Washington Post*, 15 June 1983.

[61] Judith Miller, "U.S. is Demanding Return of Papers," *New York Times*, 14 March 1982. See also David C. Martin, "Putting Secret Puzzles Together," *The Washingtonian*, 18 (1983): 89.

[62] Executive Order 12356, Secs. 1.3 (a), 6.1 (f) (emphasis added).

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classifier would have to spell out the damage expected to result from disclosure. If such damage could not be specified, the material could not be classified. This would better reconcile the public's essential need for information with national security interests.

Concerning declassification decisions, the Carter order's required balancing of the public's interest in disclosure against the government's need for continued protection should be reinstated. There is no indication in FOIA litigation that judges have substituted the government's judgment with their own. The fear that courts will engage in wholesale interference with classification decisions in *de novo* hearings is unfounded and premature. Until such evidence exists, the balancing tests provides the least restrictive means of satisfying the government's legitimate classification needs.[63]

The danger in eliminating the "identifiable" harm standard and the balancing test was best expressed by Justice Potter Stewart in the *Pentagon Papers* case: "For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion."[64]

Reagan Directive on Unauthorized Disclosures

In March 1983, when President Reagan remarked that he had had it up to his "keister" with leaks, he issued a directive, related to the above discussed classification order, that sought to safeguard against unauthorized disclosures of classified information.[65] The Directive imposed five main strictures. First, all executive branch employees with access to classified information must enter into nondisclosure agreements with their agencies or departments as a precondition to such access. Second, those with access to the more highly classified Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) were required to submit any prospective publication for prepublication review by their agency, even after they left the government's employ. Third, federal agencies were to closely monitor contacts between their personnel and media representatives. Fourth, departments and agencies were allowed to require their personnel to submit to polygraph examinations in investigations of unauthorized disclosures. Finally, those violating the directive's provisions or any implementing guidelines would be denied further access to classified information, and might be subject to demotion or dismissal and criminal prosecution.[66]

[63] A 1983 Senate bill sought to mandate reinstitution of both the balancing test and the identifiable harm to national security standard, the Freedom of Information Protection Act of 1983 (S. 1335).

[64] *New York Times v. United States*, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971).

[65] National Security Decision Directive-84, "Safeguarding National Security Information," 11 March 1983.

[66] Ibid., Secs. 1 (a) (b), 2 (e), 5. Also see Michael Getler, "Reagan Warns U.S. Employees Against Leaks," *Washington Post,* 1 September 1983.

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While even John Beery III, the Reagan administration's assistant secretary of defense for health, found in a memo to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, that the polygraph "misclassifies innocent people as liars,"[67] most criticism focused on a provision that promised to cause thousands of former government officials, especially those employed by universities and the media, to conclude that they had had it up to *their* "keisters" with government censorship. This was the provision that extended prepublication approval procedures for those with SCI clearances (a practice previously confined largely to intelligence community employees) to all federal agencies; 127,500 federal employees and contractor employees, excluding the CIA and the National Security Agency, were thereby covered.[68] The injunction would follow former employees for the rest of their lives, requiring that they submit proposed publications to their former agencies for clearance.

This evoked an outpouring of criticism from Congress, academics, journalists, and others. Less than a year after it was issued, in February 1984, on the eve of Senate hearings on Edwin Meese's nomination to be attorney general, President Reagan announced the indefinite suspension of this provision.[69] But the issue merits close scrutiny for several reasons. First, the president did not rescind the provision, he merely suspended it. This left open the possibility of its reimposition. Also, another administration might consider a similar measure in the future. Second, prior to the announcement, the government had moved to implement the provision. In June 1984 the Reagan administration apparently continued to enforce prepublication review agreements signed by thousands of federal employees. Third, this action raised fundamental constitutional and public policy issues. Finally, the question is so important that legislation is advisable.

Had the prepublication review provision not been suspended, it could have had a huge impact on public information flow. Such former officials as Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and Alexander Haig, to name but a few, would have been subject to the censorship of their successors if they had been in government when the directive was issued. And this poses some not so hypothetical questions. Would universities, newspapers, independent research

[67] George C. Wilson, "Polygraph Tests Are Unreliable," *Washington Post*, 27 April 1983. See House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, *Report: The Administration's Initiatives To Expand Polygraph Use and Impose Lifelong Censorship on Thousands of Government Employees*, Rept. No. 98-578, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, pp. 1-3, 20. Also see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing (A Research Review and Evaluation) Technical Memorandum*, October 1983. Under mounting congressional opposition, President Reagan announced the indefinite suspension of this provision of his directive in February 1984. David Hoffman, "Reagan Shelves Requirement for Polygraph Tests," *Washington Post*, 16 February 1984.

[68] House Committee on Government Operations, *Report: The Administrtion's Initiatives To Expand Polygraph Use and Impose Lifelong Censorship on Thousands of Government Employees*, 98th Cong, 1st sess, 1983, H. Rept. No. 98-578.

[69] Hoffman, "Reagan Shelves Requirement for Polygraph Tests."

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organizations, and law firms wish to hire people who must submit their publications to government censors? Would the *New York Times* want to rehire its former reporter, Richard Burt, a Reagan administration State Department official, when his publications would forever be subject to censorship? Could Georgetown University reembrace Reagan's United Nation's ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick? Would Heritage Foundation associates who served in the Reagan administration welcome censorship by a future liberal Democratic administration? Furthermore, publishing companies may be reluctant to conclude contracts with such people; aside from the staggering editorial problems of having a manuscript dissected by a censor's scissors, publishers themselves might be held liable.[70]

Reagan's deputy assistant attorney general, Richard Willard, principal drafter of the directive, contended that prepublication review could not be used to delete material that was embarrassing or critical, only that which was classified. Moreover, he argued that a speedy agency review would be required and an agency's decision would be subject to judicial review.[71] Especially under the broad Reagan classification order, however, there was little assurance that embarrassing or critical material that in no identifiable way jeopardized national security would not be classified, or, if government censors missed it in the first instance, reclassified when an author sought to publish. Moreover, the CIA's selective enforcement of its own longstanding prepublication review requirement suggested that the Reagan directive could also be used selectively against dissenters. Although numerous former CIA employees have not submitted their work to prepublication review, only six have been challenged. Five of these were real or presumed CIA critics. The sixth, former DCI William Colby, was merely fined for not having cleared his memoir.[72] Nor did the availability of judicial review mitigate the directive's impact. Judicial review is such a long and costly process that it effectively enables the government to impose its will on most former government employees. There is also the problem of legal representation. To discuss the censors' deletions with an attorney who lacks a security clearance violates the secrecy agreement. One's own choice of legal counsel is thereby precluded.

The announced primary purpose of the directive was to curb a supposed outpouring of unauthorized leaks. But the General Accounting Office found that from 1979 through 1983 only two unauthorized disclosures of classified information resulted in SCI being disclosed through the writings or speeches of govern-

[70] See Morton Halperin, "Reagan's National Security Censorship: A Mockery of the First Amendment" (Paper for the Seminar on Reagan Directive, Washington, D.C., 29 March 1983); and Frank Snepp, "This President Wants Silence By Censorship," *Washington Post*, 12 June 1983.

[71] Richard K. Willard, "The Who, What and Why of Reagan's Prepublication Review," *New York Times*, 27 March 1983.

[72] Snepp, "This President Wants Silence." The CIA's regulation applies only to writings pertaining to intelligence, but the line between intelligence and foreign/defense policy is murky. During the Carter administration the agency was fairly relaxed in drawing that line although autobiographical accounts are always scrutinized.

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ment employees.[73] Stansfield Turner has stated that, within the intelligence community, while there were several leaks in the past six or seven years, "very little information harmful to U.S. intelligence interests has been revealed . . . [and] the impression that intelligence agencies cannot keep secrets is highly exaggerated."[74] Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged by high-ranking former officials, like Bobby Inman, as well as by members of Congress—the frequent recipients of leaks—that executive branch leaks commonly originate with senior administration officials who either gossip excessively and are never prosecuted or who purposefully use leaks to further administration policies.[75]

The Reagan directive may or may not have succeeded in curbing leaks of classified information. But even if it had succeeded, the price was too high. It may have injected an air of inequity and hypocrisy, undermined the morale of government officials, inhibited thousands of talented private citizens from entering government services, and—most importantly—cast a chilling pall over national policy debates.

Of course, given the vast number of former government employees having had SCI clearances, enforcement (especially uniform, equitable enforcement) would have been difficult at best. Why, for instance, would the government want to spend time and money suing former employees who fail to submit their writings for prepublication review if they contain no classified information? Nor should such lawsuits be necessary. There is ample authority in existing government regulations to deter unauthorized release of truely vital classified national security material, and, since the *Snepp* v. *United States* holding—which permits the government to force the forfeiture of any profits derived from publication of classified information—nondisclosure agreements should adequately inhibit disclosure of classified information.[76] Certainly, anyone not deterred by existing regulations and nondisclosure agreements is not going to be deterred by a prepublication review process either.

Security leaks are legitimate government concerns. However, this problem can be addressed by less intrusive means than draconian, lifelong restrictions on former government officials' publications. Such restrictions almost certainly constitute unconstitutional prior restraints on First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. There is ample legal precedence for the unconstitutionality of prior restraints particularly when applied in the context of public or political speech, and including instances when national security information was considered to be at stake.[77] The *Snepp* case did uphold the validity of a pre-publication

[73] General Acounting Office, *Effect of National Security Decision Directive-84, Safeguarding National Security Information*, GAO/NSIAD-84-26, 18 October 1983, 5.

[74] Turner and Thibault, "Intelligence: The Right Rules," 135.

[75] Hodding Carter III, "Truth Is, Leaks Trickle Down More Than Up," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 March 1983; Snepp, "This President Wants Silence."

[76] *Snepp v. United States*, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).

[77] *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); *Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan*, 372 U.S. 58 (1969); *The New York Times Co. v. United States*, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); *Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. v. Conrad*, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); and *Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).

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review agreement signed by a CIA agent, but *Snepp* is not germane to the question of the constitutionality of the Reagan directive, as it was strictly limited to government employees within the intelligence community.[78]

Groups and associations representative of educational, media, legal, research, and many other interests should continue to monitor this matter. Since this provision of the Reagan directive had such expansive policy ramifications, it should be the subject of new legislation. Congress could, for instance, consider prohibiting prepublication reviews for those former federal employees who served in agencies and departments outside the intelligence community.[79]

Conclusion

Some observers hold that the Reagan administration's shift on foreign intelligence in the domestic arena was more apparent that real.[80] Among the reasons cited for this view are the following: the actions taken were mostly rhetoric, without substance, intended to appease the Right; the intelligence community remains chastened by the fallout from the Church Committee hearings; intelligence agents can now be held personally liable for illegal acts; legislation, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, deters wrongdoing; the CIA's Office of the General Counsel has been strengthened; some officials, such as FBI Director William Webster, have a deep personal commitment to observing the constitutional rights of American citizens; and classified internal regulations within the intelligence community make Operation CHAOS-type activities very unlikely.

Some of these developments and situations do, indeed, present formidable barriers to a reoccurrence of the more egregious actions that intelligence agencies took against U.S. citizens prior to the mid-1970s. Nonetheless, we are more cautious than those who subscribe to the above point of view. Various Reagan administration measures and attempted measures in the foreign intelligence area have cumulatively tilted the perennial and imprecise balance between civil liberties and national security toward the latter set of issues. This is nowhere more apparent than in the secrecy area.

There is ample evidence that the Reagan administration established a pattern of restricting the public's access to government information. Nor was that pattern limited to foreign intelligence related matters, prepublication review, limitations on FOIA, and more restrictive classification procedures. It was across-the-board, and included a wide variety of measures: proposals to restrict

[78] *Snepp v. United States*, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).

[79] In the fall of 1983, Congress voted to prohibit implementation of the directive (concerning government employees outside the intelligence community) for six months. The House Government Operations Committee found it to be "an unwarranted prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment" and called for its recision in *Report: The Administration's Initiatives To Expand Polygraph Use*, 20.

[80] Richard, "'Unleashing' the Intelligence Community," 910.

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the availability of information under the Privacy Act of 1974; a decrease in the resources devoted to federal statistical activities; cutbacks on the number and availability of government publications; imposition of restrictions on the ability of reporters to speak with government officials; increased government efforts to manage news and to prevent the press from reporting on major government actions such as the invasion of Grenada; registration of films from foreign countries dealing with issues of public interest, like the Academy Award-winning film "If You Love This Planet"; denials of visas to selected foreign nationals, like the widow of assassinated Chilean President Salvador Allende; and scores of threats against university professors challenging their right to publish and discuss unclassified information, usually of a scientific or technical nature, on or off campus.[81] And since these subjects overlap the jurisdiction of many congressional committees, unlike strictly "intelligence" matters that fall primarily under the purview of the two intelligence committees, effective congressional oversight is much more difficult.

These developments, as well as those we have discussed more fully, affect many Americans, but none more directly than academics and the media. The university and the press are principal guardians and beneficiaries of First Amendment liberties; they would do well to intensify their customary watchfulness toward government infringement of them. A strong defense and intelligence apparatus is vital to national security, but it is the Constitution and Bill of Rights that distinguish America from its adversaries.*

[81] House Committee on Government Operations, *Report: The Administration's Initiatives To Expand Polygraph Use . . .* , p. 22; Floyd Abrams, "The New Effort To Control Information," *New York Times Magazine*, 25 September 1983, 22ff.

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American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa

STEVEN METZ

Many writers consider U.S. policy toward decolonization, at least under John F. Kennedy, as an extension of Americans' traditional support for self-determination, and argue that without judicious prompting from the U.S., Europe would have dragged out the decolonization process for the rest of the century.[1] Radical and Third World authors, on the other hand, claim that in those very rare instances in which U.S. foreign policy was conducive to decolonization, it simply fostered the transition from formal control under European masters to informal control under the aegis of American corporations.[2] What little real change occurred, this group argues, was the result of protest and rebellion on the part of the Africans. These conflicting interpretations and dis-

[1] Strangely enough, most "radical revisionists" remain silent on the American role in African decolonization. In three of the better known works in the genre—David Horowitz's *The Free World Colossus* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1971), Gabriel Kolko's *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), and William Appleman Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Delta, 1969)—there are a total of two indexed references to Africa plus two additional references to the more specific issue of the Congo crisis.

[2] For a range of approaches utilizing this approach see: E. A. Tarabin, ed., *Neocolonialism and Africa in the 1970s* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978); Samir Amin, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973); idem, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 10 (1972): 503-524; I. William Zartman, "Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?" *Foreign Affairs* 54 (1976): 325-43; and Timothy M. Shaw and M. Catherine Newbury, "Dependence or Interdependence: Africa in the Global Political Economy," in Mark M. DeLancey, ed., *Aspects of International Relations in Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana African Studies Program, 1979).

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agreements leave the essential questions concerning the American role in decolonization unanswered.

It was pointed out in a report prepared in 1959 for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that postwar American policy towards Africa could be divided into three distinct phases.[3] During the Truman administration, Africa was viewed as an appendage of Europe, and there was very little Africa policy separate from European considerations. The residue of this emphasis on the European aspects of African problems remained throughout the 1950s. During the period from 1952 to 1956, attention was riveted on Korea and again on Europe, and thus interest in Africa declined to a new low. But in the years after this low, African issues once again surfaced in American foreign policy.

Given the emphasis placed on nation-building and Third World problems by Kennedy, it is often assumed that the shift in favor of a more rapid decolonization process, which was undoubtedly an aspect of U.S. foreign policy by 1962, arrived with the Kennedy administration.[4] This shift is often considered to have culminated in the transition from a Eurocentric Africa policy to an Afrocentric policy. But, as a closer examination will show, there was no radical shift in American attitudes towards African decolonization in 1961.[5] In fact, American perceptions of the decolonization issue underwent a gradual evolution during the entire period from 1952 to 1962, with 1958 generally representing a watershed.

In this article, I will examine this evolution of American attitudes toward the decolonization of Africa during the decade from 1952 to 1962.[6] Although the real roots of the decolonization debate can be traced back much further, the issue was a crucial one during World War II.[7] The 1950s saw the culmination of the issue. The focus of the paper will fall on what can be termed the opinions of the foreign-policy elite, with official policy statements, scholarly publications, and the news media providing the bulk of the evidence. The body of the paper will comprise four sections: an overview of the position of Africa in the

[3] U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Foreign Policy: Africa* (A study prepared by the Program of African Studies, Northwestern University), 86th Cong. 1st sess., October 1959, 49–50.

[4] For example, Waldemar A. Nielsen, in *The Great Powers and Africa* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), points to 1960 as the "hinge year." While the great number of African nations reaching independence in 1960 undoubtedly marked a watershed for U.S. policy, the change in attitude which set the stage for this policy change can be found earlier.

[5] For a detailed discussion of this point see, inter alia, George Liska, "The Third World," in Robert E. Osgood, et al., *America and the World From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970).

[6] The term "Africa" when used here actually refers to Sub-Saharan or "Black" Africa.

[7] See William Roger Louis, *Imperialism At Bay* (New York: Oxford, University Press, 1978). Evidence for the gradual growth of support for decolonization is also found in the League of Nations mandate system and the U.N. trusteeship system. See also: Henry Gilchrist, "The United Nations: Colonial Questions at the San Francisco Conference," *American Political Science Review* 39 (1945): 982–92; Ernst B. Haas, "The Attempt to Terminate Colonialism: Acceptance of the United Nations Trusteeship System," *International Organization* 6 (1953): 1–21; and *The Mandate System: Origin, Principles, Application* (Geneva: League of Nations Publishing Office, 1945).

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emerging American world view during this period; a sketch of the evolution of official attitudes toward decolonization; a corollary outline of non-official thinking on the issue; and a synthesis and conclusion.

Africa and the Dilemma of Power

Foreign policy can in the broadest sense be broken down into two constituent elements – goals and means. This simple typology can provide some basic insight into the problems faced by the U.S. on the decolonization issue. There was in the long run very little debate over the goal of the policy; after World War II, the inevitability of decolonization was an accepted fact in nearly every corner.[8]

The actual debate centered on three aspects of the implementation of decolonization. First was the actual method for decolonization and the role that the United States should play. Issues dealing with the proper role of the United Nations in decolonization can also be classified here. Second was the timing and speed of decolonization. This later became the key issue in the debate, and thus was the point that exhibited the greatest degree of change over the period examined here. Third was the issue of the actual stake or interest of the United States in Africa, an issue that would determine the approach to the other two.

Hans Morgenthau began a 1955 essay on the U.S.'s Africa policy by stating that "the United States has in Africa no specific political or military interests" and that nearly every observer agreed that actual American interests were "somewhat marginal."[9] Although this type of attitude may have overstated the case for the lack of interests in Africa, and is certainly not true today, the real security interests of the United States were beyond a doubt minimal.[10] U.S. interests in Africa during this period can be broken into three categories. First were the economic and what can be termed "Open Door" interests. Although the degree of actual trade and investment was limited, as is true in most cases of Open Door thinking, it was the pure potential of the African market that awed American businessmen. But the African market was the most underdeveloped in the world, and since most American attention was concentrated on rebuilding Europe and on fostering the postwar transition to mass consumerism in the United States, economic interests in Africa played only a minor role in policy formulation.

The second category comprises ideological or altruistic interests. Strains of Wilsonian idealism were still important in many debates over U.S. foreign policy,

[8] A major exception that is discussed below is Philip W. Bell, "Colonialism as a Problem in American Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 5 (1952): 86–109.

[9] Hans J. Morgenthau, "United States Policy Toward Africa," in Calvin W. Stillman, ed., *Africa in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 317–28. See also Donald Rothchild, "Engagement Versus Disengagement in Africa," in Alan M. Jones, Jr., ed., *U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (New York: David McKay, 1973).

[10] For an excellent evaluation of current U.S. interests in Africa see Gordon Bertolin, "U.S. Economic Interests in Africa: Investment, Trade and Raw Materials," and Geoffrey Kemp, "U.S. Strategic Interests and Military Options in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, ed., *Africa and the United States: Vital Interests* (New York: New York University Press, 1978).

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and the longstanding American dedication to self-determination was often mentioned in discussions of the decolonization issue. Paul Nitze illustrated this strain of thinking in 1955 when he argued that support for colonialism was "abhorrent to American sensibilities."[11] But as was often the case, this type of interest proved more valuable as a mechanism for mobilizing support behind policies created through other motives than as an actual instigative factor in policy formulation.

The third type of American interest was undoubtedly the most important—cold war considerations and the global containment of communism. As late as 1960, candidate Richard M. Nixon argued that "in the struggle with the Russians, Africa is the most critical area in the world," while a few months later President-elect Kennedy claimed that Africa was the objective "of a gigantic communist offensive." Every defector from the Soviet Union came complete with a copy of the "blueprint" for the Soviet takeover of Africa.[12] It had gradually become clear to American policymakers that instability and chaos in Africa, which was increasingly the result of the continuation of the colonial relationship, would foster Soviet expansionism.

The intense desire for stability in Africa that resulted from this led to the first of several dilemmas that faced U.S. policymakers. The primary goal of American policy during this period was the strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance and the continued prosperity of the recovering West European economy. The exploitation of the resources of Africa was considered essential to this recovery. But as the 1950s wore on, two facts became increasingly obvious. The link between African resources and political stability in Western Europe was not as strong as had been expected earlier.[13] After 1948 no new European states fell to Communist control. By the mid-1950s, as pressure for decolonization mounted in Africa, it was obvious that the West European economic and political systems had withstood the challenges that had seemed so dire in the immediate postwar period. Secondly, the European empires were not stabilizing factors in Africa, but rather served to generate growing waves of repression and rebellion. This left the U.S. in the face of a tremendous paradox in which the support of European economic growth created conditions conducive to the expansion of Soviet influence. This was a problem that American policy never successfully overcame, but one that was eventually alleviated by the

[11] Paul H. Nitze, "The United States and Africa: An American View," in C. Grove Haines, ed., *Africa Today* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 475–69.

[12] See, for example, *Newsweek*, 28 November 1956.

[13] The economic benefits of colonies had been hotly debated in Britain at least since the publication of J.A. Hobson's *Imperialism* in 1902. By the end of World War II common opinion was that, contrary to the Leninist thesis, colonies were more an economic burden than a benefit. On this debate see Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa*, 28; L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Burden of Empire* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), 55ff.; and Leonard Woolf, *Empire and Commerce in Africa* (London: Labour Research Department, 1920). Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher argue in *Africa and the Victorians* (London: MacMillan, 1969) that the motives for African colonization were almost exclusively geostrategic and political.

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pure rush of events in Africa and by a reevaluation of the economics of colonialism.

A second dilemma resulted from the debate concerning the proper role of the United States in the decolonization process. The postwar world situation had left the United states with an imbalance between the means of projecting power and the proper ends for this extension.[14] The U.S. was like an ungainly adolescent boy who suddenly finds himself strong, but yet is without the guiding constraints on the use of the strength. Thus, the United States found itself with a tremendous degree of influence in a sphere where no material interests guided the proper use of the influence. Later, with the growth of what Robert W. Tucker and George Liska have called an "imperial" foreign policy, in which American security and world stability were congruent, the effects of this dilemma would diminish.[15] By the 1960s the value given to global stability—the defining characteristic of an imperial power—had become a major theme of U.S. foreign policy.

In discussing the role of the United States in African decolonization, Vernon McKay argued in 1963 that by the early 1960s American interests in Africa had become "an integral part of [a] broader interest in American security, prosperity and freedom," while Chester Bowles noted as early as 1956 that on African issues "wealth and power have inescapably committed the United States to world policies and world responsibilities."[16] G. Mennen Williams, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the Kennedy administration, probably expressed this position best when he wrote in 1962: "Our self-interests in Africa stem from acceptance of the idea that there can be no peace for our children or our children's children unless there is stability and satisfaction around the world."[17]

Both of these dilemmas—the wavering between a Eurocentric and an Afrocentric policy and the transition from a national to an imperial definition of security—led to a policy of indecision and inaction on issues concerning African decolonization. The usual U.S. policy consisted of vague rhetoric about the right of self-determination coupled with insistence on the benefits of colonialism and abstention on U.N. votes on decolonization problems. American policymakers not only waited until it was entirely clear exactly which side change was on, but very nearly waited until the winds of change had blown the roof from the house.

[14] George Liska argues in the "Coda" to *Russia and World Order* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) that this imbalance between foreign policy means and ends is a defining characteristic of the modern world system.

[15] For more on this point see Robert W. Tucker, *Nation or Empire*? (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969); idem, "The American Outlook," in Osgood, et al., *America and the World From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam*; or George Liska's *Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967) and idem, *Career of Empire* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[16] Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 273; Chester Bowles, *Africa's Challenge to America* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956), 3.

[17] G. Mennen Williams, "American Foreign Policy and the Emerging Nations of Africa," State Department Press Release 241, 4 November 1962.

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Official Attitudes: From Eurocentrism to Global Strategy

Other than in the brief period following the Spanish-American War, U.S. attitudes had always been decidedly anticolonial. Before World War II, however, isolationist sentiment and America's status as a minor power had limited this anticolonialism to a strictly rhetorical level. During the war, however, support for the worldwide expression of American values was whipped to a fervor in order to solidify public support for the war effort. According to the popular view, the war was not fought in order to prevent the aggrandizement of German or Japanese national power, but for the global promulgation of American ideals. This great belief that the war represented the victory of American ideals, when combined with the preponderance of American power, led to a new wave of foreign-policy idealism best expressed in the creation of the United Nations. This belief also formed the embryo of American support for African decolonization. Even during the war, Franklin Roosevelt "repeatedly and insistently . . . made clear to the European allies his conviction that the Age of Imperialism was over." Secretary of State Cordell Hull was an especially vigorous proponent of decolonization.[18]

At the beginning of the 1950s, however, many American policymakers felt that decolonization could at least be postponed if not avoided altogether. It was thought that when the European metropoles had recovered enough from the war to turn their attention to the construction of their proposed imperial unions, the unrest and burgeoning nationalism in the colonies would prove transitory. It did not. By the late 1950s, it was found that nationalism did not disappear when suppressed, but tended to surface with increased vigor, increased popularity, and increased violence. Thus, there was a slow and incremental growth in the attitude among U.S. policymakers that change could not be stemmed, and that somehow the U.S. should throw its weight with the trends of the future.

But the problem arose in this evolution of discovering exactly which side change was on. The lack of trained and knowledgeable Africa experts was appalling—there was no Africa Bureau in the State Department until 1958, so all information about the continent was handled by the thinly stretched Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. The crucial decade of 1952–1962 was not only a period of transformation of American policy towards Africa, but was also a period of learning for the foreign-policy elite. For the first time, Africa was not merely an appendage of Europe, but had become a policy problem in its own right.

The leitmotif of foreign policy during the first years of the Eisenhower administration, both towards Africa and towards the rest of the world, was the cold war. The perceptions generated by this struggle pervaded policymaking. Within this context, the American experience with the new states of Asia and Africa in

[18] See Hull's speech reprinted in Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds. *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1944), 5:6. For more detail, see the first volume of Hull's *Memoirs* (New York: Macmillan, 1948).

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the period directly following World War II tainted opinions on other aspects of the decolonization issue. As John Foster Dulles so repeatedly expressed, decolonization and the other problems of the new states were to be viewed through the prism provided by the cold war, and thus strategic and tactical considerations molded attitudes towards further decolonization. It was felt that decolonization was to proceed only when the allegiance of the new states to the Western alliance could be ensured. Often in Africa this criterion could not be met.

This fact led to the two primary aspects of U.S. policy towards African decolonization before 1958: a Eurocentric policy that placed the growth and stability of the European economies at the top of the priority list in the colonial relationship; and a repeated warning that in the long run colonialism had benefited the African states and that the detrimental results of an independence granted before the African state was "fully prepared" would outweigh any possible benefits. These two aspects of the U.S. Africa policy are evident in nearly all official statements during this period.

The assessment of the situation in Africa as the 1950s began had been radically different. Africa at that time, according to one State Department official, was "not a crisis area"; there had been "no significant inroads" by communism, and the political situation across the entire continent was "relatively stable and secure."[19] The general recommendation was that the United States should not pursue the decolonization issue too strenuously, and when action was required, it should be strictly through the auspices of the metropole. There was a widespread feeling that this "stable and secure" area, replete with the "happy" colonial relationships that Philip Bell described, should be left alone. Colonialism was "progressive"; it had led to the modernization of Africa and would eventually generate stable and economically viable states.[20]

The only obvious result of severing the colonial relationship before the sufficient development of the economy and political system would be chaos, a situation conducive to Communist penetration. It was felt that Britain and France, at least, were making the minimum acceptable movements toward decolonization. Warnings of the dangers of premature independence pervaded statements on Africa policy during the first Eisenhower administration. George C. McGhee, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian and African affairs, stated in 1951 that "the United States government has always maintained that premature independence for primitive, uneducated peoples can do them

[19] George C. McGhee, "United States Interests in Africa," State Department Press Release 469, 5 June 1950, 2. McGhee was assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian and African affairs.

[20] The emphasis on the beneficial nature of colonialism was standard in policy statements of this period. See, for instance, Julius C. Holmes, "The United States and Africa: An Official Viewpoint," State Department Press Release 235, 1 May 1958; George V. Allen, "United States Foreign Policy in Africa," State Department Press Release 206, 21 April 1956; and George C. McGhee, "Africa's Role in the Free World Today," State Department Press Release 564, 27 June 1951.

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more harm than good."[21] Two years later, McGhee's successor, Henry A. Byroade, echoed this viewpoint when he argued that "premature independence can be dangerous, retrogressive and destructive."[22] Even in the later years of the decade, Julius C. Holmes, a special assistant to the secretary of state, argued that "premature independence and lack of appreciation of the interdependence of the world community may be as dangerous for Africa as the denial of independence."[23]

The problem with thinking of this type is obvious. As premature independence became a stock anathema in U.S. policy, the tendency was great to categorize all moves towards independence as premature. When premature independence grew to a phobia for policymakers, the ability to accurately discern the phenomenon diminished. And likewise, the ability to "get on the side of change" was eroded.

In the larger struggle that represented the cold war, Europe was, of course, the first line of defense. Thus, all policy considerations tended to become sublimated to European concerns. U.S. policymakers were seldom bothered by the fact that the use of African resources as a tool for European economic recovery and the simultaneous economic development of the African economies were, in the long run, antithetical. The United States had been stung by the post-independence neutralism of India and others, and wanted to be certain that Africa would not join this desertion of the West. The Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955, had heightened American fears that the newly independent nations, although operating under the guise of "non-alignment," were, in fact, inching toward the Communist camp.[24]

Therefore, the brunt of American policy was composed of support for slow, orderly progress towards some faraway state of independence, or preferably, of autonomy within a colonial league—all instigated and controlled by the metropole. What Americans desired, in fact, was the preservation of a facade of Wilsonian-type support for self-determination while carefully avoiding any affront to the European metropoles.[25]

[21] McGhee, "Africa's Role," 3.

[22] Henry A. Byroade, "The World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge to America," State Department Press Release 605, 30 October 1953, 3.

[23] Julius C. Holmes, "Africa: Its Challenge to the West," State Department Press Release 32, 27 January 1958, 6.

[24] For an analysis of the Bandung Conference see George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956). For more on Dulles' reaction to the nonaligned movement, see Michael A. Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 252–64. Richard Goold-Adams argues in *The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962) that Dulles's inability to adjust to neutralism sometimes leaned him toward support for the continuation of colonialism. See, inter alia, 310.

[25] But it must be remembered that Woodrow Wilson too could jettison self-determination when other calls beckoned. Wilson's original mandate plan was used as a bargaining chip with the British and French on other issues. See, for instance, Ernst B. Haas, "The Reconciliation of Conflicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System," *International Organization* 5 (1952): 521–30.

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The total bankruptcy of this position gradually became evident. As Senator John Kennedy noted in a 1956 speech in Kansas City, Missouri, the U.S. position on decolonization issues had "frequently been characterized by indecision, confusion, haste, timidity and an excessive fear of giving offense."[26] But the growing rapidity of change, as crucial event piled on crucial event in Africa, forced a reevaluation of the U.S. position on decolonization and in a broader sense, came to illustrate the changing perception of America's role in the world.

These changes in the United States Africa policy were not the result of large-scale alterations in policy strategy or content, nor were they entirely the result of personality differences between the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations. The most significant of these changes, in fact, took place within the Eisenhower administration. *New York Times* columnist James Reston noted that by 1956, U.S. foreign policy was "in its tone and procedure . . . quite different from what it was at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration," and that one of the most important of these changes was "a new emphasis on working with the rising nationalistic forces of Asia, the Middle East and Africa."[27] Reston accredited the bulk of this shift to a growing involvement of Eisenhower himself in the foreign-policy decision-making process.

The first hints that the American policy of promulgating glacial change was ineffective had come not from Africa, but from Asia. There was a feeling among American policymakers that communism had gained dominance over nationalism in many of the new states of the region.[28] The drawn-out rebellions in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indochina seemed to illustrate the results of futile attempts at stopping the tide of decolonization.

Although the Suez crisis in 1956 represented the first great divergence of American and European thinking on events in the Third World, most of the shift in Africa policy that took place between 1952 and 1960 can be traced to the climactic ruse of events in Africa itself. Even though violent uprisings had been crushed in Madagascar, Kenya, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Guinea, there was a feeling among both Africanists and policymakers that perhaps revolution in Africa was not as far in the future as had been expected.[29] The growing strife in Algeria provided stark evidence for this.

[26] Reprinted in *Congressional Record*, 6 June 1956, 9,614-15.

[27] James Reston, "U.S. Diplomacy," *New York Times*, 19 November 1956.

[28] Paul M. Kattenburg, *The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy 1945-75* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), 10. For a good thumbnail sketch of decolonization in India, Pakistan, Burma and Malaysia see *Britain and the Process of Decolonization*, pamphlet RF.P. 5865/70 (London: Reference Division, Central Office of Information), 10-16.

[29] Crawford Young, "Decolonization in Africa," in Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, eds., *Colonialism in Africa*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1970), 2: 461. For a good discussion of the political events surrounding the rebellions in the French colonies see Edward Mortimer, *France and the Africans 1944-1960* (New York: Walker, 1969). On the Mau-Mau revolt in Kenya see Robert Buijtenhuijs, *Le Mouvement "Mau-Mau"* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971); Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., and John Nottingham, *The Myth of "Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966); and Fred Majdalany, *State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963).

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Political events in Africa also added to the feeling of great and imminent change. 1958 proved to be an especially crucial year in this respect. The independence of Sudan in 1956 and, even more importantly, the creation of Ghana in 1957 had had far-reaching consequences in the rest of Africa. The imminence of continent-wide independence could be sensed by the remaining African colonies. In 1958, a series of conferences and meetings, beginning with the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference, illustrated both the ability of African peoples to speak for themselves in the world arena and the importance which this group placed on speedy decolonization.[30]

In addition, gradual changes in the intensity and tone of the cold war could finally be felt in the years following Josef Stalin's death in 1953. Waldemar Nielsen noted:

> President Eisenhower took office early in 1953 in an international atmosphere still dominated by the confrontation with the Soviet Union. By the beginning of his second term, however, profound changes had begun to take place within the Soviet Union and the Communist world and throughout the less developed areas, which led to the emergence of a new and more intricate world balance and, in the case of Africa, called for far-reaching revisions of American policy. The adequacy and the timeliness of the Eisenhower administration's response to the new requirements led to great disputes and eventually made Africa for the first time a major issue in American politics.[31]

In 1959, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, the first assistant secretary of state for African affairs, recognized that 1958 was a landmark year and noted that "the political situation in Africa can be described as vibrant if not effervescent."[32] Given these events, U.S. policymakers began a frantic re-evaluation of the decolonization issue.

The changes that emanated from this reevaluation were again more transitions of tone than of content. A type of Aristotelian ethics predominated, as moderation remained the password for policy proposals. In May 1958 State Department official Julius Holmes summed up the attitudes toward decolonization as "support for progressive tendencies in the metropole and moderate leaders in Africa."[33] This distillation of U.S. policy illustrated two overwhelming problems. First, while everyone supported "progressive" actions by the metropole, it was much more difficult to garner consensus as to the definition of progress. A major source of irritation with African leaders was the American satisfaction with any action professing movement towards independence; what interested the Africans was the speed with which this movement proceeded. Thus the African

[30] For a discussion of the impact the events of 1958 had on U.S. policy see Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics*, 399-442.

[31] Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa*, 259.

[32] Joseph C. Satterthwaite, "The United States and the New Africa," State Department Press Release 38, 17 January 1959.

[33] Julius C. Holmes, "The United States and Africa." Holmes repeated this point later in the same month in the speech "Africa's Challenge to the Free World," State Department Press Release 292, 29 May 1958.

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leaders called on the United States to foster movements that were both progressive and rapid. Second, "moderate" African leaders were often merely whoever both had power and was anti-Communist. As was illustrated after a slate of military coups swept Africa in the mid-1960s, "moderation" often equaled pro-Westernism.

But policy rhetoric did change after 1958 and by 1960 on the verge of the great wave of African independence—administration spokesmen did begin the call for a stronger degree of support for decolonization.[34] But in the long run, Eisenhower policy towards Africa remained Eurocentric and avoided direct involvement in the decolonization process. It was found that it was easier and politically expedient to avoid taking sides altogether in decolonization conflicts. As late as 1959, Dana Adams Schmidt, a foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*, wrote in an article entitled "U.S. Still Seeking an African Policy" that the United States had no coherent and clear Africa policy.[35]

But change in Africa had begun to flow at a breakneck pace even without U.S. support. The growing importance of Africa could be sensed in policy-making circles. The 1959 study of the U.S. Africa policy made for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was highly critical of the apathy of the policy. The report opened with the contention that "the United States has never had a positive, dynamic policy for Africa."[36] It was noted that the rapidity of change in Africa had eroded the validity of the Eurocentric policy of the pre-1958 period, and that the retention of any degree of influence in Africa required the relinquishment of the "negative, ad hoc approach that has marked . . . [U.S.] policy."[37] Among the recommendations of the report were the creation of a policy that would emphasize three main features: the realization that Africa was a major policy area in its own right and not merely an appendage of Europe; the acceptance of nonaligned and neutral positions by the new African states; and support in the United Nations for a definite timetable for decolonization, especially for the trusteeships.

There were two other very important themes of this study, one of which represented a radical break with past policy and one of which represented a continuation of earlier policy. First, the report stated that "evidence of effective penetration by Russia or her satellites is light and spotty," thus opposing the cold war considerations that had and would continue to determine much of the American Africa policy.[38] Second, although the report did call for a more intense degree of support for decolonization, it continued to stress the emphasis on the mechanisms of the metropole in this process. Thus, the U.S. continued to favor moderation in all changes.

[34] See, for example, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, "The United States and the Continent of Africa," State Department Press Release 610, 24 October 1960.

[35] Dana Adams Schmidt, "U.S. Still Seeking an African Policy," *New York Times*, 2 February 1959.

[36] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *United States Foreign Policy: Africa*, 1.

[37] Ibid., 12.

[38] Ibid., 11.

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Kennedy had beeen an early vocal supporter of decolonization. In 1956 he had called for increased pressure for decolonization on the European metropoles and for an end to the American practice of abstaining from U.N. votes on decolonization issues.[39] But like Dulles and other members of the Eisenhower administration, the primary rationale behind this position was cold war considerations, thus illustrating that a schism in tone but not in content existed between the Kennedy and Eisenhower positions. The actual decolonization issue played a smaller part in Kennedy's Africa policy than in Eisenhower's since the majority of Africa states were independent by the time Kennedy took office in 1961. There were three aspects of the Kennedy approach to the issue that set it off from earlier methods.

First was the great emphasis placed on the internal nature of the threats to the African states, including those that were approaching independence. G. Mennen Williams noted in an important policy speech soon after Kennedy's inauguration that the revolution of rising expectations, and its ensuing chaos and instability, was the greatest threat to peace in Africa and not Soviet intervention.[40] Even earlier, Williams had emphasized that a basic change in American relations with Africa would have to be predicated on a slate of domestic changes in the United States, including a solution to civil rights problems, an increasing study of Africa and African issues, and the growth of cultural exchange programs with African states.[41]

As an aspect of the nation-building policy, Williams argued that the creation of stable economies in Africa would prove a greater deterrent to Communist intervention that would other cold war tactics. It was proposed in a State Department pamphlet that as African nations develop "the opportunities for communism to establish quick or easy footholds on the continent will diminish."[42] Williams furthered the exuberant optimism of the nation-building mentality when he announced that "we can compete with the Communists on equal terms, and I think we need have no fear of comparison with them."[43]

When a newspaper in Kenya quoted Williams as advocating "Africa for the Africans," many black Africans felt that a real change in the American position was imminent.[44] Economic development through the local leaders appeared to be the order of the day. But contrary to a trend that appeared to have emerged in the last Eisenhower years, cold war considerations were again the paramount rationale of U.S. policy; nation-building was, in the end, merely a new tactic in

[39] See the speech reprinted in *Congressional Record*, 6 June 1956, 9,614–15.

[40] G. Mennen Williams, speech to National Press Club reprinted as State Department Press Release 156, 24 March 1961.

[41] G. Mennen Williams, speech reprinted as State Department Press Release 41, 30 January 1961.

[42] U.S. Department of State, Office of Public Service, "The United States and Africa," Department of State Publication 7710, African Series 40, July 1964, 15.

[43] G. Mennen Williams, "American Foreign Policy and the Emerging Nations of Africa."

[44] For a discussion of this event see McKay, *Africa in World Politics*, 351–53. It later turned out that this quotation was printed out of context, but because of the furor that it created among the white settlers in Kenya, Williams later explained that he meant all Africans, black and white.

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the strategy of global containment.[45] Tactics and tone had changed, but policy content, whether verbal or real, changed very little from the Eisenhower to Kennedy administrations.

A second major aspect of the Kennedy policy was a concerted attempt to separate the African and European aspect of the problem. Decolonization was no longer considered a zero-sum game in which the independence of an African state meant the weakening of a European state. This change was due to two developments. First, the resurgent European economy had proved that it could function quite well without attached empires. Second, national liberation movements in Africa had raised the costs of colonialism to the point where the benefits of empire were far outweighed by the costs.

A third important aspect of the Kennedy policy was the growth of imperial-type interests in the evaluation of American security concerns in Africa. When G. Mennen Williams wrote that "there can be no peace for our children or our children's children" without world stability, he expressed this trend of changing U.S. attitudes. Other U.S. officials, while noting the lack of American material interests in Africa, stressed that Africa was part of an indivisible security system based on global containment and world stability.[46]

In sum, the official line in U.S. policy towards decolonization exhibited a gradual evolution in tone from 1952 to 1962, with a growing acceptance of eventual African independence and the role that the U.S. would play in the post-independence period. There was a parallel shift from a strictly Eurocentric policy in which the benefits of colonialism to the NATO countries was the primary motive of our Africa policy to a position that attempted to separate the European and the African aspects of the problem. There was a shift from the perception that African independence was a threat to the West to the perception of an opportunity for the establishment of stable, pro-Western states. But in the long run, the changes in U.S. policy were often frantic attempts to catch up with the tremendous pace of change, and this meant that the actual impact of U.S. policy was often small.

Non-official Opinion: Developing Critiques and Proposals

While most issues in U.S. foreign policy inspire criticism in academia and journalism, the U.S. Africa policy during the 1952–1962 period showed an amazing lack of discussion. This was due in part to a widespread ignorance of African

[45] Two important policy statements by the deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs in 1959 and 1960, for example, made no mention of the cold war aspects of U.S. policy in Africa. See James K. Penfield, "The Role of the United States in Africa: Our Interests and Operations," State Department Press Release 325, 19 May 1959; and "Africa: A New Situation Requiring New Responses," State Department Press Release 246, 5 May 1960.

[46] G. Mennen Williams, "American Foreign Policy and the Emerging Nations of Africa"; J. Wayne Fredericks, acting assistant secretary of state for African affairs, "The Impact of the Emergence of Africa on American Foreign Policy," State Department Press Release 291, 4 May 1962.

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affairs in the United States and in part simply to the lack of African experts in the universities and the press. When the need arose in the early 1950s for a cadre of African experts in the State Department, few could be found among career Foreign Service officers. Africa had traditionally been a very low-status area that was often avoided by the most highly skilled professionals. This meant that many of the State Department's Africa experts were drawn from the universities. Prior to the 1950s, American policy had relied on European sources, both diplomatic and academic, for African information. A small number of African studies programs had been established at American schools in the 1950s but the number of available scholars, and thus the number of Africa experts in the State Department, was limited. This meant that there was an astonishing dearth of appreciation for the long-range implications of events transpiring in Africa. Because of the interconnectedness of policymakers and students of African affairs—with several key figures such as Chester Bowles and Vernon McKay having written both as policymakers and as scholars—the academic discussion of the U.S. Africa policy closely followed the contours of the official line.

An early discussion of the decolonization issue is found in a 1952 article in *World Politics* by Philip W. Bell.[47] In an extreme example of realpolitik logic, Bell decried the "general moral-political attitude" that led the U.S. at least verbally to support decolonization even in instances where the decolonization process would have run counter to American interests. Bell pointed out that the primary goal of U.S. foreign policy was the continuation of the European economic recovery. Since decolonization would have ostensibly have damaged or slowed this recovery, he argued, the United States should foster what Bell called "happy" colonial relationships, while allowing decolonization where resistence was strong.[48] Thus, the U.S. should support colonialism as long as it did not clash with other vital interests or become "morally corrupting to our own culture or institutions." There are two very obvious shortcomings in these proposals. First, Bell did not clarify the order of priority of his various proposals. For example, what should the U.S. do in a case in which the metropole practices repressive policies to the point that support for the metropole is contrary to American "culture and institutions"? Which is the higher goal, American culture or Europe's economy? Second, Bell did not discuss the means by which "happy" colonial relationships are to be preserved in the face of growing nationalism and widespread dissatisfaction with the colonial relationship. As resistance and nationalism grew in Africa, arguments such as Bell's tended to disappear, but the idea that European economic recovery depended on the survival of colonialism persisted well into the late-1950s.[49]

In a 1955 article, Hans Morgenthau focused on the problems which arise when the interests of the metropole states clash with those of the United States on

[47] Bell, "Colonialism as a Problem."

[48] Ibid.

[49] See, for example, "Africa Makes a Start Toward a Better Day," *New York Times*, 8 February 1953.

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decolonization issues.[50] Morgenthau realized that "the United States has in Africa no specific political or military interests," which meant that the major interest in the continent were those associated with global containment and world stability.[51] Because of the tendency to subordinate American to European interests in U.S. Africa policy, Morgenthau argued that the United States "subordinated its long-range interest in the autonomous development of the native population in short-range considerations of strategy and expedience."[52] Morgenthau proposed the abandonment of the Eurocentric aspects of the Africa policy and an attempt to "internationalize" the decolonization issue by increasing the role of the United Nations. In this way, Morgenthau argued, the United States could hurry the decolonization process and increase its influence in Africa without tarnishing its image either in Africa or in Europe. Whether the gradual erosion of the ability of the U.S. to control the General Assembly and the ensuing radicalization of the body on decolonization issues would have altered Morgenthau's position remains unknown.

In stark opposition to the realpolitik of Bell and Morgenthau, Paul Nitze argued in a 1955 essay that colonialism was completely incompatible with "American sensibilities," and in a somewhat Hegelian vein, proposed that the "historic development of world forces" would force the United States to take a stronger stand on decolonization.[53] Nitze felt that since unequivocably supporting all instances of decolonization could lead to chaos (and to Communist penetration), a middle course should be found that consisted of "throwing our weight behind the acceleration of self-determination for all peoples under conditions which will see preserved these precious freedoms one attained."[54] This proposition was obviously simply a rehash of the Eisenhower administration's warnings of the dangers of premature independence with an added dose of bombast.

One of the most influential discussions of the American role in Africa to emerge from this period was Chester Bowles's *Africa's Challenge to America.*[55] Bowles argued that the Eurocentric nature of American foreign policy had led to a perception of containment that stressed only the military aspects of the policy, thus creating an African policy constructed of "negativism," which actually eroded the potential influence of the United States in Africa. Like Morgenthau, Bowles favored a more Afrocentric policy in which the goal of the American policy was to be an increase of U.S. influence rather than the stabilization of the European situation. But again, the policy positions of Bowles did not differ substantially from official policy, since he favored the "orderly evolutionary approach" to decolonization. But in one respect Bowles was slightly ahead of the official line, in that he favored the establishment of a specific

[50] Morgenthau, "United States Policy Toward Africa."
[51] Ibid., 317.
[52] Ibid., 321.
[53] Nitze, "The United States and Africa," 477.
[54] Ibid., 478.

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timetable for decolonization rather than the open-ended procedure then in practice.

This emphasis on a gradual decolonization continued throughout the 1950s, often surfacing even after the events of 1958 had proven the inevitability of decolonization. An editorial in the 27 January 1959 *New York Times* stated that "in many, if not most, cases it can be argued that the native people are not yet capable of organizing a democratic, efficient, economically viable state," and thus "progress should be controlled and measured."[56] But one year later, C. L. Sulzberger pointed out that U.S. policy towards Africa adapted to change much too slowly, and thus a transformation of American attitudes was needed.[57]

This admixture of conflicting approaches, divergent interpretations, and jumbled policy proposals was as typical of American comments on African decolonization as it was an official policy. But the actual differences in content were small. The view that pictured decolonization as a minor struggle between an intransigent Europe and an equally intransigent Africa persisted throughout the decolonization period. The need to preserve the image of the United States as the altruistic champion of liberal causes lent weight to those who supported the African position, but the spectre of Communist gains in Europe created a policy that could not sever the support for any European policies, however hopeless and misdirected. What resulted was a widespread desire to avoid the issue completely and to remain aloof from the decolonization process.

But this approach too proved hopeless. As Rupert Emerson has pointed out, for the U.S. during this period, hegemony precluded apathy on an issue as important and as inflammable as decolonization. Emerson noted that "the softening of the attitude toward colonialism is . . . one phase of the general American turn toward conservatism in world affairs."[58] And this was a conservatism bred by superpower status. As Vernon McKay argued, world hegemony had caused American attitudes towards Africa decolonization to swing from an "unthinking support of the abstract principle of self-determination" to the exact opposite—an overwhelming fear of "the dangers of premature independence."[59]

Rupert Emerson's *From Empire to Nation*, written in 1959, perhaps came the closest to expressing the attitudes of a nearly mature U.S. attitude toward decolonization.[60] While warning of the ominous—and inevitable—struggles that accompany the rise to nationhood, Emerson noted also the unstoppable nature of decolonization. Part of imperialism was the diffusion of culture and ideas, he argued, and a major portion of the ideas borne by European imperialism consisted of a high value for nationalism. As Emerson wrote: "Imperialism forged

[55] Bowles, *Africa's Challenge*.
[56] "Africa on the Move," *New York Times*, 27 January 1959.
[57] C. L. Sulzberger, "When the Cold War Reaches Africa," *New York Times*, 6 January 1960.
[58] Rupert Emerson, "American Policy in Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 40 (1962): 309.
[59] McKay, *Africa in World Politics*, 322.
[60] Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).

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the tools with which its victims could pry it loose."[61] In Emerson's work, as in the policy of the Kennedy administration, there was a pervasive feeling that whether to support or oppose decolonization was no longer the issue—the real question was how best to tap the currents of change that decolonization brought.

As Donald Rothchild has noted, by the late 1950s the United States had "emerged as a key force for stability, not transformation."[62] America attempted to "get on the side of change," but all too often it was change which had already occurred rather than change which was about to happen, and "as a result, the United States stands out prominently as a status quo power in a rapidly changing African context."[63]

Conclusion

Americans' attitudes toward decolonization, like their perceptions of many other facets of world politics, underwent a drastic evolution during the crucial decade from 1952 to 1962. The United States had begun to feel comfortable with the hegemony which had been thrust upon it, and had begun to explore the resulting consequences and nuances. It was found that hegemony was not merely a source of unwanted responsibility and unnecessary fear, but was also a potential vehicle for the enactment of practical change. The evolution of U.S. perceptions towards African decolonization during this period is illustrative of many of these changes.

The African policy of the U.S. exhibited the growth of an imperial-type array of interests. No longer were the limited bounds of physical security the only, or even the major, parameters of U.S. interests. Although the argument can be made that the increasing costs of repression in Africa would have offset the economic benefits, Philip Bell may very well have been right when he argued that the continuation of the African empires would have contributed to containment as it was originally construed. But for the first time stability—world stability—was a central goal of U.S. foreign policy. It is this broadening of the concept of national interests that is the first indication of an imperial-type policy. But even as American interests became imperial, it was imperialism of an adolescent type in which the ideological and moralistic considerations indicative of a minor power continually infringed on the more amoral analyses of a true empire.

This situation created a paradox in which the traditional cry for world self-determination, which had been a useful rallying point when American attitudes actually mattered very little in world politics, was mixed with the difficulties of world leadership. Americans discovered that one must be more careful of what one says when people listen. As an imperial power, America's interests and world stability had become more congruent. But perhaps the major problem of many

[61] Ibid., 18.
[62] Rothchild, "Engagement versus Disengagement," 217.
[63] Ibid., 221.

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imperial powers, as Henry Kissinger has pointed out, is the paradox of promulgating stability in a revolutionary world system.[64] And the world of the 1950s and 1960s was nothing if not revolutionary. This paradox led to many attempts to remain detached and aloof from the events that transpired in Brussels or Accra, though the total bankruptcy of this position was quickly evident. However much Americans wanted to, they could not both create stability and ignore potential instability. This led to frantic attempts to "get on the side of change," often with mixed results.

Thus the United States attempted to mold what was considered a "moderate" policy that would foster decolonization only when a slate of crucial criteria were met. To a casual reader of statements on African decolonization during this period, it would appear that even though the boundries of moderation were never seriously challenged, there was a gradual shift from a strongly Eurocentric policy to a strongly Afrocentric one. In fact, this was not true. What actually happened was an attempt to solve this paradox through the separation of the European aspects of world stability from the African aspects. The U.S. claimed that it could both wholeheartedly support decolonization and continue to place the highest priority on the European alliance. In effect, Americans came to realize (somewhat later than Europe itself) that Europe did not really need Africa, and that by fostering political independence within the framework of economic dependency, Europe could come very close to preserving the benefits of colonialism without the onerous costs.

At some time during this period, essential American attitudes about the meaning of national liberation and decolonization were changed. Independent Africa was no longer a "threat" to the West, and decolonization was no longer synonymous with the collapse of the European economy and a new Communist onslaught. Africa was considered an eager laboratory for the experiments in nation-building. It was realized that somehow, through sheer luck and in spite of frequent bungling, we had won the battle for men's minds in Africa, since, for the time being, most of the new African nations had rejected Marxism/Leninism. Even the "worst-case" situations—the Nkrumahs, the Tourés and the Nyereres—were not Fidel Castro or Ho Chi Minh. In effect, the United States decided that decolonization was not so bad after all. It would take more time and some real instances of "premature independence" (the Congo and the Portugese colonies) to seriously challenge this new euphoria. While the Congo did bear out the fact that the granting of independence "prematurely" could augment Soviet influence in Africa, the American answer to the problem had changed since 1952. Rather than attempting to bolster European rule during the period of political development in Africa, the U.S. itself stepped in to fill the political void. The problems remained the same, but the answers were different.[65]

[64] See Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).

[65] On the impact that the Congo crisis had on U.S. policy toward Africa see Henry F. Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960* (New York: William Morrow, 1982), 21-52; Arnold Riukin, *Africa and the West* (New York: Praeger Publishers 1962),

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Racism and ethnocentrism were still intricately interwoven in U.S. Africa policy; it was, however, racism of a different type. Africans were no longer considered intractable primitives in need of perpetual (or at least long-term) tutelage, but rather as people who, given economic assistance and an occasional well-placed shove, might possibly prove able to govern themselves. American leaders, however, remained blind to the fact that aid and shoves given in an imperial context cannot destroy colonialism, but only serve to make it slightly less onerous and marginally more bearable. The residue of this blindness remains an element of American Africa policy today. U.S. policymakers have yet to learn that decolonization is not merely an exchange of flags, but is a transformation of both attitudes and actions.

110–25; and Steven R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974).

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Book Reviews

A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan *by Lloyd C. Gardner. New York, Oxford University Press, 1984. 251 pp. $22.50.*

This is a bold, suggestive book that advances a provocative and significant thesis. According to Lloyd Gardner, American presidents since Woodrow Wilson have progressively abandoned the major premise that had guided the republic since its inception—that geopolitical rivalries in Europe could and should be ignored in the definition of U.S. national interests. Wilson broke with this tradition of geopolitical aloofness when he led the United States to intervene in World War I. Wilson's endeavor included the effort to construct a world peace system at Versailles that would create a global setting favorable to "liberalism," understood as a mixture of moderate governance and capitalist economic organization. Gardner argues that Wilson was also a key figure in mounting a "liberal" campaign against overseas revolutionary dangers. Wilson's interventionary response to the Mexican Revolution, and then to the Russian Revolution, is treated persuasively by Gardner as a vain effort to find some middle moderate ground between the old tyrannies of the right and the rampaging revolutions of the left.

A Covenant with Power possesses the virtues of a gifted diplomatic historian. As such, it is strong on narrative illustration and illuminating personal anecdote. Gardner writes well, and interestingly, and exhibits an impressive familiarity with original material on the archival level. A reader feels that the text represents only a tiny selective sample of Gardner's knowledge of the subject. Furthermore, unlike many interpreters of broad historical trends, Gardner is sensitive to the economic dimensions of diplomacy. On this solid foundation, Gardner presents an interpreatation of the broad sweep of American diplomacy since World War I that challenges standard cold war histories. As such, we are led to think about the structural or world order goals of American foreign policy that underlie more transitory ideological preoccupations and geopolitical rivalries.

Despite this undoubted major contribution, I have some criticisms. Gardner is unnecessarily elusive when it comes to clarifying the flow of his argument; his framework and orientation can only be constructed by indirection. I found it difficult at many stages to grasp his real intentions. Also, he has a tendency to make controversial, unsubstantiated

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assertions without any bibliographical backup. For instance, he makes the important suggestion that American leadership was eager *not* to stir things up within Eastern Europe: "Like John Foster Dulles, who actually cared more for stability than 'Liberation,' the Nixon-Ford administration was concerned that the Soviets not do anything that might stir up trouble, even—and perhaps especially—within their own sphere" (p. 205). This assessment runs directly counter to official pronouncements of these leaders, including their support for such destabilizing gestures as "Captive Nations Week," and it would be useful to substantiate it.

Along a similar line, Gardner contends that American policymakers were actually far more worried that Salvador Allende would show that it was possible to pursue a radical social program without abandoning democracy than they were that Allende's policies were endangering Chilean democracy. Such a contention seems plausible enough, but since it contradicts numerous official claims, it would be helpful, to say the least, to have some indication of what evidence Gardner is relying on. How, indeed, would a reader, if not already convinced, have any way of knowing whether or not to rely on Gardner's interpretation?

There is an effort by Gardner to portray America's entry onto the world political stage as moving through the decades ever more ominously toward catastrophe. The last chapter brings the story up to the present, but mainly by marshaling an array of information about the drift of events since Vietnam, leading to the renewal of interventionary diplomacy and cold war tensions in the Reagan presidency. Gardner ends the book melodramatically, associating Reagan's foreign policy with Captain Ahab's methods and goals. I find this dark, brooding assessment of post-Vietnam foreign policy as congenial, but not because Gardner has been persuasive. The latter chapters contain, to be sure, a virtual cascade of specific observations about international developments, but there is a dearth of interpretative generalization. By the end of Gardner's book, the grand thesis implied by the title, "the covenant with power," remains unnecessarily hazy and obscure. We learn little more than the simplistic assertion at the outset that America's "security" at home has come to depend on obsessive, and increasingly self-destructive, intervention. In my judgment, the enduring value of *A Covenant with Power* lies in its texture of detailed findings, rather than in the clarification or demonstration of its overarching thesis. And yet even this praise must be somewhat qualified, because the reader is provided with no means to track down Gardner's most intriguing assertions, insights, and quotations.

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Princeton University

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People, Positions, and Power: The Political Appointments of Lyndon Johnson *by Richard L. Schott and Dagmar S. Hamilton. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984. 245 pp. $18.00.*

America's Unelected Government: Appointing the President's Team *edited by John W. Macy, Bruce Adams, and J. Jackson Walter, with Senior Consultant G. Calvin Mackenzie. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984. 128 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $8.95.*

Each of these volumes begins by making the same point—executive appointments by the president are one of the most critical and most understudied aspects of our governmental process. Given the media and scholarly attention that has been lavished on the 537 elected Washingtonians, it is difficult to dispute the premise. Although different in scope and purpose, these two books make significant progress in remedying the neglect.

The Schott and Hamilton volume is the second title in the general series on the administrative history of the Johnson presidency under the editorship of Emmette S. Redford in Austin, Texas. The approach is historical and descriptive, based on documentary materials at the Johnson Presidential Library and specially conducted interviews. Unfortunately for researchers, the terms of Lyndon Johnson's bequest restrict access to information injurious to the reputation of individuals, presumably an area of some importance in personnel decision-making. Still, until Johnson's dictaphone recordings of telephone conversations are opened almost forty years hence, this book will probably be our closest look inside LBJ's presidency regarding personnel matters.

The authors basically reconstruct the story of each cabinet officer's appointment, as well as the major subordinate appointments in three agencies (the Office of Economic Opportunity [OEO] and the Departments of Interior and Housing and Urban Development). These descriptions are supplemented by a statistical profile of all Johnson appointees compiled from special mail questionnaires (with a disappointingly low 53 percent response rate). There are a few surprises in all this information (would many of us remember that LBJ never fired an appointee?). But the glimpses of Johnson the man that emerge seem mainly in line with other historical accounts of the period. After a first "let us continue" stage Johnson moved to assert his own priorities in political appointments (although never making the break with his predecessor's personnel that Harry Truman did with Franklin Roosevelt's appointees). As troubles with Vietnam mounted after 1966, a kind of siege mentality took over in the appointment process, and criteria of personal loyalty to Johnson and partisan political advantage came to the fore. Schott and Hamilton do a commendable job in showing how the formal, merit-based process headed by White House aide (and concurrently Civil Service Commissioner) John Macy was at first supplemented and ultimately almost displaced by the informal, more personal, and fluid political process surrounding the president.

The major weakness, as I see it, is that one gains such a president-centric, that is to say incomplete, view of the administrative history of the Johnson presidency. What happened within the White House compound regarding appointments is not clearly linked to what was going on in the excecutive branch before and after the appointment in question was made. For example, volume one in the Redford series, *Organizing the Executive*

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Branch, tells the story of OEO, the poverty agency, as a problem of reorganization. In the Schott and Hamilton volume, we now discover the tragicomic story of OEO appointments; if one wants to know what went wrong with Johnson's poverty program, here is a good place to begin. The authors' major conclusion is that the Johnson political appointment "system" worked well. The individuals selected were with few exceptions of high caliber, experienced, and qualified. The result was a cadre of talented persons committed to social reform through government activism. These were persons of character "free of the scandal, personal pettiness, and adventurism which, unfortunately, came to characerize the presidency that was to follow" (p. 209). This is true perhaps, but it is a conclusion reached in vacuo—as if a person's resumé rather than performance defined a good appointment. Things went wrong with social reformism in the Johnson presidency, and the author's account of OEO appointments is a good example. Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan could not have hoped for more helpful advancement in laying the groundwork for their anti-Great Society domestic agendas.

Coincidentally, there also now appears a book on political appointments under the senior authorship of John Macy, LBJ's personnel aide. *America's Unelected Government*, prepared under the auspices of the National Academy of Public Administration, is unabashedly prescriptive, although the volume does make good use of Calvin Mackenzie's excellent earlier work on the history of the political appointment process. For a book with three authors, one senior consultant, and seventy reviewers, commentators, and interviewees, the result is amazingly clear in style and coherent in conception.

The first two chapters establish the important point that a "modern" political appointment process (that is, one that defines job requirements, actively recruits and evaluates people for jobs rather than passively finding jobs for people with political IOUs) is a phenomenon of the past twenty-five yars. The authors applaud this development, but argue that it has not gone far enough, especially given the contemporary demands on political appointees. Chapter three offers a schematization of how political appointments are typically processed in Washington. The next two chapters trace important problems facing political executives (such as unconstructive media coverage and unattractive pay), and offer an especially informative account of the operation of conflict-of-interest laws.

The final twenty-two recommendations of the National Academy group range from hopeful exhortations (presidential candidates should stop denigrating the Washington bureaucracy) to quite operational amendments of the law (surely there is no good reason political appointees should not have government reimbursement for moving expenses when military and career personnel do). On the whole, the authors' conclusions will strike many people as quite sensible, much as did John Macy's formal political appointment process that held sway in the first half of the Johnson years in the White House.

What the volume fails to come to grips with is the underlying structure of political incentives that shape (and reformers would say distort) the real-world system of political appointments. The basic issue is not to think up improvements that could be made, but to think through ways in which the inevitable calculations of political advantage can be used to sustain whatever improvements seem called for. Surely there is a puzzle here. All outside observers agree that the political appointment process is crucial for the success of any president's administration. Yet to judge from the reformers' recommendations, presidents have to be begged to take the process seriously—to give recruits their job

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description, to help them prepare for confirmation and life in the bureaucracy, and even to talk with them!

America's Unelected Government proposes fixing obvious weaknesses in the existing system, but it stops short of rethinking the structure of political personnel in the executive branch. Now that we have discovered that we have a political appointment process that political scientists and reformers can write about, there is no reason to be timid in thinking about what it all means. We seem to be drifting toward the creation of some form of complex formal and informal political technocracy in Washington without much thought of what it implies for democractic government.

HUGH HECLO
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Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question *edited by John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1983. 222 pp. Cloth, $28.95; paper, $9.95.*

The first use of nuclear weapons by the United States has been a central component of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense policy for nearly three decades. During the 1950s, U.S. nuclear forces served, in part, to deter a Soviet conventional attack on Europe. Given Soviet superiority in European-based conventional weapons, NATO forces existed mainly as a tripwire to a massive U.S. nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, as the Soviets developed a capability to inflict considerable damage on the United States in retaliation to a U.S. nuclear attack, U.S. policy changed to a posture of "flexible response." First use of U.S. nuclear weapons remained implicit in NATO doctrine, but the target became Soviet invading forces instead of first use against the Soviet homeland. By the 1970s, however, the Soviet Union achieved not only strategic parity but also, by some measures, superiority in European theatre nuclear forces. In these new circumstances, it strained credibility to believe that the U.S. would use its nuclear forces to halt a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. In 1979, NATO proposed to bolster the tripwire effect by deploying U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe capable of striking the Soviet Union. In the view of many Western experts, this was the wrong solution. What is required is a completely new approach—reduced, not increased, reliance on nuclear weapons and gradual strengthening of conventional deterrence.

The authors of this Brookings study skillfully examine the merits of and prospects for such a new approach, including in some detail the requirements and implications of nuclear and conventional deterrence. Their collective objective is to illuminate the objectives involved in alliance security by focusing on the controversial question of whether NATO should renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. This is an important contribution, because the authors appreciate the complex and often tortuous history of this issue, and yet strive to rethink first principles.

The contributors are not of one mind on either the desirability or the feasibility of a no-first-use policy. Jonathan Alford argues against a formal no-first-use doctrine on the assumption that it would "encourage an opponent to believe that the risks of conventional

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operations might be limited and tolerable . . ." (p. 103). Leon Sigal believes a no-first-use policy might enhance stability, but at the same time would probably arouse European anxieties and delay essential changes in NATO's posture and plans (p. 145). Interestingly, Johan Holst is more attracted to the idea, in part because he believes it would have precisely the opposite effect (ch. 9).

There is widespread agreement, however, on the most serious flaws in NATO's current posture and on the need for sensible adjustments. For example, NATO's short-range nuclear weapons are vulnerable to preemptive attack and should be withdrawn from their forward positions. Battlefield nuclear weapons should also be less tightly integrated into ground and air forces in order to free these systems for conventional missions.

A second area of near consensus emerges from the authors' assessments of the balance of conventional forces in Europe. William Kaufmann presents a detailed analysis based on both U.S. and Soviet methods (outlined in a useful appendix) to demonstrate that conventional deterrence is feasible in principle. Kaufmann further explores a variety of practical options designed to improve NATO's conventional defenses, assessing both their costs and relative urgency. His list of most pressing military needs includes defensive barriers, war reserve stocks, improved line of communications, and expanded ground and tactical air forces. While these are eminently reasonable proposals, the reader is likely to question whether NATO will implement such improvements, given the enormous economic and political constraints identified by Jonathan Alford (ch. 5) and Leon Sigal (ch. 7).

Overall, this is a thoughtful and richly suggestive study. It would have benefited from a chapter on Soviet perspectives and policies regading the no-first-use question. But this omission aside, academics and policymakers alike are certain to find this volume compelling reading.

CYNTHIA ROBERTS
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The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces *by Paul Bracken. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983. 252 pp. $19.95.*

At the outset of his book, Paul Bracken states his intention to study the "concepts and realities of the *management* of nuclear forces" (p. 1, emphasis added). The term "management" is shorthand here for "command and control." This is a subject that has received considerable attention, at least since the Carter administration, with the growing concern over the survivability of retaliatory forces, the fear of nuclear "decapitation" and the heightened interest in limited nuclear options. Much of this discussion, however, has been about the physical aspects of the problem, that is, the technical demands of maintaining "connectivity" between decision-makers and nuclear forces in crisis and war. Bracken, on the other hand, is concerned principally with the organizational factors that will hinder, if not totally undermine, the control of nuclear forces during a major alert and after war has begun. In particular he wants to shake us out of the "decades of sleepy, unexamined confidence that 'it can't happen here' " (p. 239), and if it does, "everything will be alright

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on the night." This then is an important and timely reminder to those of us cloistered in the rarefied atmosphere of academia, think tanks, and most importantly government, that our expectations of crisis management are almost certainly too optimistic and that our intellectual constructs about how nuclear war can be executed are most probably divorced from reality.

The first part of this book traces the growing organizational complexity and interdependence of nuclear forces within and between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The net result has been a reduction in the level of centralized political control and a concomitant increase in the potential for escalation during crisis and war. The spectre of a uncontrollable slide to nuclear war similar to the outbreak of war in 1914 appears very real. The second part of the book goes beyond this to illustrate how the "fog" of nuclear war will make the careful orchestration of the war plans and possible damage limitation options highly questionable. Moreover, the chance of early termination is also remote. Both these problems are especially acute in the European context, and it is useful that Bracken has provided a whole chapter on this issue.

Throughout the study, Bracken unconsciously raises a whole series of paradoxes: that increasing the survivability of nuclear forces and in theory crisis stability (such as by dispersion) necessitates the delegation of authority which lessens the degree of control; that the sophisticated procedures for managing nuclear forces increases the chance that they will not work according to plan; that the premium on early warning and intelligence can swamp the system with irrelevant and distorted information; that more accurate weapons may reduce collateral damage but make command centers more vulnerable and therefore war less controllable; and that the layers of checks and balances necessary to prevent unauthorized use in peacetime may well hinder operational flexibility in crisis and war. These are just a few.

On the negative side, the book has some significant flaws. It is unnecessarily repetitive in many places and could have been reduced by half. Alternatively, a discussion of the technical dimension of the issue, which Bracken deliberately eschewed, could have been added to make a more balanced and complete study. Similarly, many of the diagrams are superfluous to the text and could have been replaced by more pertinent illustrations of the U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Soviet command and control networks. The footnotes do not adequately cover the material contained in the text, and there is no preface or bibliography. Indeed, the impression that this book was completed in a hurry is especially evident in the final chapter. Having spent 243 pages on scaring the wits out of us, only 4 pages are given to possible ways to change the situation. This is very shallow and in stark contrast to the analysis contained in the rest of the study.

In short, this is a useful book and one that should be read by scholars and policymakers alike. But with a little more care and work it could have been a much better one.

PAUL STARES
The Brookings Institution

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The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decisionmaking for Arms Sales *by Paul Y. Hammond, David J. Louscher, Michael D. Salome and Norman A. Graham. Cambridge, Mass., Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1983. 310 pp. $27.50.*

This book is a welcome antidote to the popular literature on the arms trade published in recent years, most of which paints the United States as an overeager supplier, flooding the international market (and especially the Third World) with ever-higher volumes of military hardware. The authors convincingly argue that nothing could be further from the truth. For when measured in constant dollars, U.S. security assistance agreements worldwide were no greater in fiscal year 1979 than in fiscal year 1952, and only in fiscal years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1980 did they exceed the 1952 level. More importantly, when measured in terms of actual deliveries (a more precise yardstick of the arms traffic), it becomes clearer still that the volume of American transfers (again in constant dollars) has not risen sharply since the early 1950s.

What has changed is the regional emphasis of arms transfer activities, and the sophistication of the weapons transferred. As the authors carefully document, the focus of America's security assistance program has shifted over the past thirty-odd years from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Europe to East Asia and the Pacific and, more recently, to the Near East and South Asia. This change has reflected changing perceptions among government officials of the threat posed to vital U.S. interests. No doubt given the explosive politics of the Middle East, together with the quality of arms available to local combatants, this trend is not entirely comforting. It does, however, undercut the thesis that the 1970s witnessed a wholesale increase in U.S. arms sales throughout the Third World. As a result, the authors are able to pare down the problem of how best to pursue arms transfer restraints, placing it in a narrower and more manageable (if nonetheless challenging) regional context.

This is not to suggest that the analysis presented holds out hope for substantial reductions in the conventional arms trade. The authors argue that quite apart from the ongoing demand for arms (especially in the Persian Gulf), arms transfers have become increasingly important foreign-policy tools. What's more, for many producer nations (most notably the West Europeans), exports are vital to the very survival of their defense industries. Indeed, in one of the book's most interesting chapters, the authors point to the reluctance of West European suppliers to forego lucrative sales—as well as to the shortsightedness of unilateral U.S. restraints—as principal causes for the failure of Carter administration efforts to negotiate tighter control over the world arms flow.

Nevertheless, for those who look forward to a less robust weapons trade, the authors do provide modest grounds for optimism. In the first place, within the United States at least, the arms trade decision-making process (the subject of an entire chapter) is much more carefully monitored than it once was, both in the Executive Branch and by Congress. Secondly, for a number of diverse reasons, including the reduced attractiveness of credit sales because of high interest rates, greater concern over Third World indebtedness, industry opposition to co-production arrangements, and the prior needs of the U.S. military services, the opportunities for further growth in American arms sales may be nar-

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rowing. Both factors, the authors conclude, are likely to render the United States an even more "reluctant supplier."

CHARLES PERRY
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation *by Nelson W. Polsby. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984. 185 pp. $18.50.*

This book's eight cases of national policy innovation during the first two postwar decades are a diverse array—the creation of the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Science Foundation, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Peace Corps, and the Medicare and Community Action programs; and the approval of the nuclear test-ban treaty and aid to Greece and Turkey. The case narratives, digested from published materials, are presented here succinctly and in a style that captures the conflict, drama, suspense, and frustration of the American policymaking process.

The author's original contribution is, of course, his comparative final chapter where he breaks important ground. He identifies seven variables—the speed of the innovation, the relative influence of experts and politicians, the degree of early consensus on the need to act, the public prominence of the issue, the extent of partisan conflict, the influence of research, and whether certain stages in the policy development were separate or fused. Employing the independent judgments of fourteen graduate students, Polsby locates each case on a three-point scale for each variable. From this analysis, two clusters of three cases each emerge. One cluster, named Type A, consists of innovations that were arrived at quickly, with little time for research or consideration of alternatives, and with low partisanship and limited conflict. Type B policies, in contrast, went through long incubation periods, with systematic research and canvass of alternatives, and with high partisanship and intense conflict.

Polsby presents his typology modestly, calling it "exploratory, tentative, and speculative" (p. 172). Yet its usefulness is apparent already in this short book. It leads to many insightful observations—all presented in tantalizing brevity—about the roles of presidents, legislators, bureaucracies, interest groups, researchers, and policy entrepreneurs, as well as the importance of crises in making innovation possible. One day, this "tentative" approach may well be seen as seminal. Other variables will be added to his seven, and subvariables will be identified. Types C and D, or at least Types A_1, A_2, B_1, and B_2, will be defined. But in future studies of policy innovation the Polsby variables and typology are not likely to be ignored.

If this is the only book on policy innovation a student reads, however, his or her view of the American policymaking system will be severely skewed, for these cases are all success stories. The policy entrepreneur is always in the right place with the right idea at the right time. The president leads, but compromises at the crucial moment—yet not too

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much. The senator deftly manipulates the bill to passage. In the end, the system always works.

Polsby recognizes this limitation, noting that these studies might well be balanced by accounts of "those dozens or hundreds of nonevents which might have happened but did not" (p. 11). Some nonevents are, in fact, presented—Medicare, for instance, was a nonevent for at least thirty years (or eighty years, if one dates from passage of the first such program abroad) before it finally became an event. But such nonevents are described complacently, even affirmatively, as the necessary incubation periods of successful innovations. This behavioral study, like so many others of the genre, needs a companion normative book that will examine the adequacy of a system that is left unevaluated here. In that work, a more random sample of cases would be examined, one including failures as well as successes—and some drawn, ideally, from countries where our decades-long incubation periods are sharply compressed, with no apparent loss of quality in the policy product. Here, perhaps more than in any other area of political science, cross-national comparative studies are of the utmost pertinence.

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST
The Brookings Institution

Domestic Policy Formation: Presidential-Congressional Partnership? *by Steven A. Shull. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1983. 218 pp. $29.95.*

This book is packed with reams of data on presidential policy leadership. Breaking the policy process into four steps—agenda-setting, initiation, congressional modification, and congressional adoption—the book reflects Shull's effort to bring quantitative analysis to bear on presidential-congressional relations. The book is neither written nor priced for undergraduates.

Sometimes, the material is simply overwhelming. Shull uses his data for a broad range of arguments on how presidents first establish the national agenda and then draft specific proposals, tolerate congressional tampering, and win final passage. Unfortunately, tables run into tables without much attention to careful explanation or theory-building. This book asks a great deal from the reader in gleaning the important conclusions from the data.

Sometimes, the material is quite provocative. Shull's analysis of presidential agenda-setting is based on his careful coding of all presidential speeches, press conferences, letters, and public messages in *Public Papers of the Presidents*. The data reveal a number of interesting trends in how presidents set the rhetorical agenda. Jimmy Carter, for example, emerges as the most active president in trying to set the agenda on Shull's selected policy areas, with Lyndon Johnson second. Shull could exploit the data further by relating Carter's lack of success in winning final congressional adoption to his high rhetorical activity.

Sometimes, the material is based on innovative analysis and data. Shull should be commended for trying to find new measures of presidential activity. He has made an effort

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that few other presidential scholars would undertake, coding countless documents and running endless computer analyses.

Yet there are times when Shull's data fail him. His lack of any qualitative research to support his arguments—whether interviews with staffers or case studies—undermines the book. In particular, Shull's major error comes from using the old *Congressional Quarterly* boxscores of presidential success in Congress. It is surely the single most discredited measure ever devised for this subfield of political science research. Even its creators at *Congressional Quarterly* eventually recognized their problems and abandoned the measure. Though Shull acknowledges the pitfall, he concludes that the boxscore is the best measure available and must therefore suffice. That is simply not rationale enough. There are times when no measure is better than some measure. This appears to be one of them. The boxscore has too many problems to detail here, but it remains ill-suited to many of Shull's tests, particularly his analysis of temporal patterns in presidential success. More importantly, it limits Shull's ability to finish the Carter analysis since, unfortunately for Shull, *Congressional Quarterly* dropped the measure in 1975. Use of this measure would threaten practically any book on the presidency, but it is especially difficult for a book so clearly pinned to quantitative techniques.

Despite these flaws, Shull's book clearly merits attention. It strongly represents one side of presidential research. It also addresses ongoing issues in other political science fields. Shull's effort to put into operation Theodore Lowi's policy typology is an example for other scholars. His analysis of competing presidential-congressional spheres of influence is also useful. Though many will argue with Schull's conclusion that the president's "power to achieve his goals is remarkably limited" (p. 175), particularly given Reagan's success, the book deserves inspection—and I might add on a personal note, a lower price.

PAUL LIGHT
The Brookings Institution

Special Interest Groups in American Politics *by Stephen Miller. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1983. 151 pp. $19.95.*

Despite its title, this is not a book about special interest groups. It is about public interest groups—and the author hates them. He thinks they are uncompromising, unpredictable, insensitive to public opinion, and unrepresentative of most of "the public." The contemporary targets of Miller's attack are Common Cause and Ralph Nader's Public Citizen. But he leads up to them with two historical chapters, one on the Federalist Party at the turn of the nineteenth century, and the other on the Mugwumps, the "reformers" that broke away from the Republican Party in 1884. Their downfall, according to Miller, was their insistence on following principle rather than interest. Like them, Common Cause and Public Citizen, being based on principles, are "incapable of modifiying their views in light of new evidence." They are so "certain of their pure motives" that they "are inclined to dismiss opposing points of view as those of venal or corrupt men" (p. 125). Thus, they "foster a climate that is not conducive to deliberation" (p. 125).

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This is, of course, not a new charge against public interest groups, but people looking for ways to buttress the charge may find some in Miller's historical analyses. Such readers will be disappointed, however, if they also want new reasons to defend special interest groups against accusations that the money they spend on campaigns and on lobbyists gives them disproportionate influence on government. Miller simply does not take on the literature criticizing interest-group liberalism. He merely restates the opinion that the power of any one special interest to affect government is offset by the competition among all private interests.

The book begins with a discussion of interest itself. Drawing on a variety of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers, including Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Samuel Johnson and Adam Smith, Miller demonstrates the dilemma of trying to identify the "true and real interest" of the populace in a diverse society. He assumes only two possible resolutions to the dilemma. In American history, these resolutions were first embodied by what Miller calls the patriots and the scientists. The former were emotional types who believed that the problems of governance would be solved if everyone tried to think of the good of the country. The latter were rational people who believed that private interests are inevitable and that they can only be done away with at the expense of democracy. Miller thus sets the stage for an analysis that puts reason, clear thinking, practicality, and wisdom on the side of special interests, and romance, dogma, irrationality, and naive faith on the side of public interests.

He develops this theme in a section on *The Federalist*, describing James Madison's and Alexander Hamilton's efforts to redefine patriotism to make it compatible with the pursuit of private interests. Moving to the appearance of political parties, Miller devotes a chapter to the effect of the French Revolution on American politics. Using the Federalist Party as an example, he argues that parties "from principle," unlike parties "from circumstance," demonstrate little faith in the circulation of contradictory opinions. The chapter on the Gilded Age underscores this thesis by arguing that a "politics of disinterest" such as the Mugwumps pursued actually prevents its adherents from making the decisions a changing society requires.

At the end, Miller says that contemporary disinterested politics (that is, public interest groups), are simply wrong-headed in their negative evaluation of private interest groups. If there is a problem, he says, it is that some legislators are corrupt. The solution lies in attracting more "talented and ambitious people" to Congress.

SYLVIA TESH
Yale University

The Painful Prescription: Rationing Hospital Care *by Henry J. Aaron and William B. Schwartz. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1984. 161 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $8.95.*

This book is a comparative study of the implications of different amounts of resources devoted to health in Great Britain and the United States. The book is divided into three main sections: an introductory section that largely describes the British medical system; a section that describes differences in the use of medical technology and surgical proce-

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dures in the two countries; and the final section, which describes how Great Britain has rationed medical care compared to the United States.

I would recommend the book to anyone interested in health policy. The authors have provided a well-written, concise account of the major differences in how health care is delivered and rationed in the two countries. The book is timely given the structural changes in the health care financing system in the United States and the attendant interest in cost containment.

Much of the book is devoted to an examination of how ten medical procedures are used in Great Britain and the United States. In general, the authors find substantial differences in the per capita number of X-rays performed, the treatment of chronic renal disease, coronary artery surgery, and CAT scanning. In contrast, bone marrow transplants and megavoltage radiotherapy were available in similar supplies across the two countries. The description of the rationing process was also quite interesting. Holding other factors constant, the authors found less rationing in Great Britain of health care for children, for so-called dread diseases (like cancer), and for diseases that are very visible (like hemophila).

The latter sections of the book are devoted largely to a normative discussion of efficiency and rationing in the United States and Great Britain. Given the relatively strict budget constraints employed in Great Britain, health care services have not been rationed to maximize "efficiency." This is not at all surprising, of course, because as the authors themselves note it is largely distributional considerations that drive social choices regarding how to restrict access to scarce medical resources.

The only part of the book that I found problematic was the final chapter. This chapter, which provided a discussion of rationing hospital care in the United States, departed in style from the earlier largely descriptive chapters. Two main theses are developed here further: first, that advancement in new medical technology is the primary factor responsible for continued growth in medical care costs; and second, that any appreciable reduction in medical care expenditures requires the sacrifice of medical benefits. Certainly, both of these theses are open to serious debate. Indeed, as the authors note, only 20 percent of the difference in per capita spending in the United States and Great Britain are explained by the "new" technology described in the book. Certainly, a more important source of the difference in medical care costs can be attributed to the increased intensity of care delivered to all patients in the United States.

Further, the implications of the discussion are that current cost-containment initiatives would be largely ineffective. The authors argue that Health Maintenance Organizations and prospective reimbursement will not have an appreciable impact on health care costs. The frustration here is that an "appreciable" effect has not been defined, either in this book or in the minds of policymakers. Finally, the authors overlook the results and implications from the 1983 and 1984 Rand Health Insurance studies, where it was demonstrated that increased cost sharing in private and public insurance plans would save billions of dollars, often without having any adverse impact on "benefits" as measured by health status. Some discussion of the implications of these results would have been useful.

KENNETH E. THORPE
Columbia University

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A Time of Turmoil: Values and Voting in the 1970s *by Ronald R. Stockton and Frank Whelon Wayman. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1983. 201 pp. $18.95.*

The mobilization of political action in the 1970s was quiescent compared to that of the preceding decade, but just below the surface, powerful tides were in motion. The legacy of the Johnson administration and two Republican presidential victories had, by 1972, raised serious doubts about the image of the Democrats as the party of prosperity and economic competence. The rise of social and racial issues explained short-term defections from the majority party, and political scientists wondered whether a more permanent realignment of party strength was underway. By 1974, however, Watergate and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo had so undermined the Republican beneficiaries of the Democrats' troubles that it was an open question whether either party could govern adequately. In this circumstance, political party dealignment seemed as likely a possibility as realignment. Stockton and Wayman offer a detailed view of a tidal pool on the coast of this ocean of political forces, in a case study of one community observed over the three middle years of the decade. The site for their case study is Dearborn, Michigan, an established suburb of Detroit. The design implements a panel survey with four waves of interviews between early 1974 aand late 1976, and their guiding questions are about changes in the public's view of political issues and parties.

Dearborn epitomizes "conventional establishment values" (p. 37) in its view of politics as the competiton among social and economic groups, in its orientation toward materialistic rather than life-style values, in its uneasy combination of rejecting the virulence of traditional racial prejudice while subscribing to symbolic racism and worrying inordinately about the threat to law and order posed by the nearness of Detroit's black population. When queried about their partisan beliefs, the residents limn a perfect picture of the working-class core of the New Deal Democratic coalition, but they give their votes with astonishing regularity to incumbents regardless of party (p. 57). Their values held steady over the turbulent first half of the 1970s—neither opinions on the issues nor the linkages connecting ideological positions across a host of issues changed much over time.

If issue positions were stable from 1972 to 1976, then the procession of embarrassing Democratic defeat followed by narrow victory for the nominal majority party must indicate that the salience of voters' concerns about particular issues fluctuated widely. Most theories of party realignment depict a historical process in which a new issue arises, mobilizes the public, and displaces the old basis of party competition. Stockton and Wayman suggest that at any given time numerous potentially realigning issues may exist among the public's concerns. Whether voting defections are translated into new party loyalities depends largely on social and economic conditions, the images and issue stands of candidates, and the way political competition is depicted in the mass media. In a system of weak parties, elections are increasingly fought on grounds of issues and candidate characteristics. In this sense, the return of party salience in 1976 is no analogue to 1948; it is simply that issue opinions and retrospective evaluations favored the challenging candidate running under the Democratic banner.

To be sure, there are problems with this case study. Dearborn's citizens are older and more residentially stable, and their community is more exclusive than most of the

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country—a tidal pool is a better place to study stability than change. There are problems with the authors' analysis: their measurement of change over time leaves serious ambiguities about the magnitude of real effects; their reasonable speculations about the effect of the mass media are illuminated by none of the empirical data; and their model of the vote relies on several doubtful assumptions about causal priority and reciprocal influences among party, issue, and candidate components. These defects are all the more lamentable in that they could have been remedied if the authors had been willing to apply more sophisticated statistical methods to the excellent data they have assembled. But they are explicit about their analytical procedures and they describe their findings in a prose style largely cleansed of excess jargon. This is not a complete account of political change in the mid-1970s, but it is a well-told chapter in the larger story.

M. STEPHEN WEATHERFORD
University of California, Santa Barbara

Money, Sex and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism *by Nancy C. M. Hartsock. New York, Longman, 1983. 310 pp. Cloth, $18.95, paper, $12.50.*

Nancy Hartsock's erudite and stimulating book is a record of her long and continuing search for a correlating theory that will explain how the relations of domination and submission in our society arise not only from differences of class but also from those of gender and race. While Marxian theory does much to explain how capitalist domination is constructed and maintained, she points out that its account of society fails to explain the pervasive white male dominance that is so markedly its characteristic. Thus, while she agrees that Marx contributes importantly to our understanding of power, she charges that his lack of consideration of the role of gender leads to a partial view of how to create a more equalitarian society.

Having indicted her major objective of developing a more encompassing theory related to class, gender, and race, she proceeds to deal with her vast agenda by dividing it into two parts. The first part provides systematic, in-depth critiques of theories of power and their relation to the building of community. The second part deals with less familiar aspects of power and domination such as issues of sexuality, the nature of eros, and their relation to the structure of society. It concludes with three chapters particularly directed to her own concerns about feminism. The first of the three, one of the most interesting in the book, analyzes important writings on power by women, among whom Hannah Arendt stands out; the second deals with feminist historical materialism; and the third and concluding chapter with questions for the future on power, class, and gender.

The first, less distinctive, part of the book centers on the shortcomings of market-oriented analysis. Exchange theory is interpreted as social intercourse resulting only from indirect communication through "things." As a result, community becomes merely a by-product of market relations. Power and community studied within this context promote a system that erroneously recognizes dominance as an "inevitable and a positive social good" (p. 32).

Yet she notes that there is also a liberating potential in the role of the proletariat. As

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Marx pointed out, it is the first class in history that might create a classless society because its interests do not depend on the oppression of other classes. Should the proletariat generalize its own condition, it might create a community in which persons relate to each other directly and also to nature. Thus, though Marxian theory fails to deal with the genderness of power, the author points out that it might serve as a methodological guide to the feminist theorist through its emphasis on the practical and political importance of theories about the operation of power in society (p. 139).

The second section of the book begins, however, with a sharp criticism of the failure of Marxian theory to devote analytical attention to the significance of the sexual division of labor and the difference between labor power incorporated into manufactured commodities and that required to prepare and consume commodities at home, labor disproportionately done by women. As the concept of community is narrowed to the family, sensuality and physical power lead to a new kind of domination that the author terms "both more deep-going than the social synthesis constructed by exchange and more deadly" (p. 179).

The answer, such as it is, appears to come from the writings of women and, in particular, from Hannah Arendt's balanced theory that systematically reduces "the conflictual nature of the oppositions between necessity and freedom, intellect and body, and social and natural worlds" (p. 211), in a reconstituted public realm. From here on, the book moves to the need to develop a theory to contribute to a specifically feminist historical materialism. This remains the task for the future.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER
University of Florida, Gainesville

Feminist Politics and Human Nature *by Alison M. Jaggar. Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Allanheld, 1983. 408 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $8.95.*

This exhaustively researched book is a superb feminist analysis of four political philosophies—liberal feminism, traditional Marxism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. All of these theories claim to offer both the best means of diagnosing the causes of women's oppression and the best political strategy for achieving women's liberation. Jaggar, a professor of philosophy at the University of Cincinnati and also obviously a committed feminist, acknowledges early on that she finds socialist feminism the most normatively satisfying and empirically sound. Nevertheless, her discussion of all the philosophies, and the political agendas that have been developed by adherents of these philosophies, is balanced, lucid, and illuminating.

The analysis centers around the concept of human nature. As women seek improved positions in society, they are repeatedly confronted with the issue of what is "natural" for women; feminists of different philosophical stripes argue that many aspects of life once thought to be "natural" are in reality socially constructed and are, furthermore, oppressive to women. This argument leads inevitably to the question of how to distinguish that which is natural—in other words human nature—from that which is historically created.

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Thus, a major portion of the book is devoted to a critical examination of the four philosophies' conceptions of human nature. The analysis seeks to understand not only the epistemological roots of the assumptions made, but the implications of the assumptions for the goal of ending women's oppression. For example, Jaggar argues that in its discussion of class, Marxism conceives of human nature not as "natural," but as a product of historical materialism. However, with respect to family relations and the sexual division of labor, an unexplained biological determinism is introduced. Marxists find the sexual division of labor in the family to be "natural," and no convincing historical materialist account is provided for its existence. From this and a number of other criticisms, Jaggar concludes that the traditional Marxist account of human nature is "androcentric" and "profoundly gender-biased" (p. 79).

The newly emerging theory of socialist feminism draws from both traditional Marxism, in its use of historical materialism as a tool of analysis, and from radical feminism, which insists that gender is a fundamental determinant of roles and power within a society. Radical feminism's contribution is its analysis of many activities, formerly seen as outside the realm of politics—including sexual activity, childbearing and childrearing—as social practices that embody power relations and that are therefore appropriate subjects for political analysis. However, as Marxist categories are blind to gender, and thus have limited utility for feminists, radical feminism is blind to everything but gender, and thus greatly oversimplifies complex phenomena.

Socialist feminism's struggle to synthesize elements of Marxism and radical feminism aims at grand theorizing and ultimately, at major social upheaval, for the theory sees "capitalism, male dominance, racism and imperialism [as] intertwined so inextricably that they are inseparable . . ." (p. 124). As Jaggar acknowledges, socialist feminist writing is as yet unsystematized. This book is, in part, an attempt to pose questions that will help to create a comprehensive socialist feminist theory. Through her critique of the more developed theories, as well as by her insights into the political values and practice of socialist feminism, Jaggar succeeds admirably in this task. Her scrupulous fairness and the richness of her analysis make this an equally important book for those who do not share Jaggar's political agenda or sense of political urgency, but who want to understand the state of feminist theorizing today.

LESLIE J. CALMAN
Barnard College, Columbia University

TVA: Fifty Years of Grass-roots Bureaucracy *edited by Erwin C. Hargrove and Paul K. Conkin. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1984. 345 pp. $24.95.*

Ever since its creation in 1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has attracted attention from scholars who have been fascinated by the intellectual, political, and economic forces that have shaped it. In commemoration of the TVA's fiftieth anniversary, Vanderbilt University's Institute for Public Policy Studies pulled together a group of historians,

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political scientists, and economists to examine the TVA's long-standing role in American life and to assess its accomplishments and shortcomings. The product is a comprehensive and balanced portrait of America's most famous regional development agency. The book's twelve chapters address several major themes: the origins of the TVA and the development of the agency during its formative years; the leadership of the organization and its interactions with other governmental bodies; the controversies that enveloped the TVA in recent years as its traditional missions began to conflict with new environmental concerns and new public values about the appropriate uses of land and water; and the lessons the TVA's history has to teach us about politics and government in the United States.

The value of this book is not so much that its contributors take us into previously uncharted parts of the TVA's history or political life but that they have deliberately tried to take the broad view, assessing where this agency has been and how it got there. What they find, for the most part, is a dynamic, flexible, innovative, and vital organization, seemingly untouched by the stagnation and bureaucratic rigidity that we might expect of an agency of the TVA's size and years. Erwin Hargrove attributes this continued inventiveness to the creative political leadership of successive TVA board chairmen. He shows how they managed to find the political support necessary to sustain the organization through its periodic adoptions of new technologies and redefinitions of mission. Avery Leiserson, in an informative chapter on the administrative management and political accountability of this semi-independent government corporation, concludes that the key to the TVA's vigor has been its ability to take advantage of its autonomy in planning for the future and discharging its responsibilities, while at the same time remaining sensitive to changing political imperatives and shifting currents of public opinion. He points to TVA's largely successful record, for fifty years, "of having struck a practical balance between statutorily justified intransigence to any sort of political interference, on the one hand, and such opportunistic deference of political pressures that the agency could not be trusted even by recipients of its accommodations, on the other" (p. 147).

In chapters on the contemporary problems of the TVA, Dean Hill Rivkin, William Bruce Wheeler and Michael J. McDonald, and Richard Couto show how the TVA's job has grown more difficult as its enormous power generation activities have thrown it into conflict with its own conservation goals, thus inviting internal disagreements as well as external opposition from those to whom the goals of conservation and environmental protection have become paramount. Couto's essay is an especially interesting account of how, as popular support for the TVA began to diminish in the 1970s with higher electricity rates and environmental concerns, the organization was thrown back on its most loyal grassroots constituency, the power distributors, for badly needed political support. He further examines how this same constituency withdrew its support in the late 1970s when the TVA's leadership appeared to turn its back on a long-standing commitment to providing cheap power for regional development.

This book is a valuable contribution to the literature on government agencies. It explores intellectually interesting questions about organizational development and change in the TVA, and it illuminates the central problems facing executives of most public

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bureaucracies—reconciling competing goals, satisfying conflicting public wants, and meeting unrealistic expectations that have been inflated by the rhetoric of reformers.

JOHN T. TIERNEY
Boston College

A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the General Accounting Office and the Office of Management and Budget *by Frederick C. Mosher. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1984. 219 pp. $22.50.*

The General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget [OMB]) were created by the same act of Congress (the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921), and were initially housed in the same federal building. Frederick Mosher traces the evolution of these agencies during the past sixty years and explains why, despite common origins and purposes, OMB and GAO have had little to do with one another. Both agencies underwent a series of transformations in response to the progressive enlargement of the national government and the changing roles and relationships of the executive and legislative branches. The old Budget Bureau was launched as an expenditure control agency and was recast by the New Deal and World War II into the president's chief management staff. In the postwar era, it embraced a succession of budget reforms—from performance budgeting in the 1950s through zero-based budgeting in the 1970s. It was reorganized periodically in unsuccessful efforts to blend its budget and management roles together.

GAO also started as a control agency and through the first quarter century of its life, it concentrated on inspecting the many millions of vouchers and financial transactions of federal agencies. After World War II, GAO could no longer cope with the mountains of paperwork, and it decentralized most accounting responsibilities to the agencies. It was recast again, into a program evaluation and legislative support agency, during the long tenure of Comptroller General Elmer Staats.

Mosher analyzes these organizational shifts fairly and accurately, but unfortunately, without sufficient supporting detail. The reader gets Mosher's carefully balanced judgments, but not the evidence that leads to his conclusions. Thus, Mosher reports that the Budget Bureau became Franklin D. Roosevelt's preeminent staff agency when it was placed in the new Executive Office of the President, but he fails to indicate what it did for the president or how its preparation of the budget changed. Nor does he explain why management activities assumed less importance in the 1950s and 1960s. Similar inattention to detail characterizes his account of GAO's development. The most recent thirty years of its history are chronicled in less than thirty pages, with the result that one is hard put to know how—and whether—GAO really changed itself from financial auditor to program evaluator.

Mosher's appreciation of the contributions of these agencies to the quality of American

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government pervades this book. Yet one senses that Mosher is troubled by the role crises that now afflict OMB and GAO. Since its establishment by reorganization edict in 1970, OMB has not found its proper White House niche. OMB has lost a good deal of its "neutral competence," and the capacity of career examiners to advise the president has been impeded by the addition of two political echelons. Mosher sums up OMB's predicament in a delightful "interlude" that traces the geographical wanderings of the two agencies. OMB's political staff is housed in the Old Executive Building next to the White House; its civil servants work in a much newer office building one block away: "Thus does the OMB stand, a house divided. The older, more permanent staff are in the newer building; the newer, more transient poeple are in the older building" (p. 96).

GAO is also vexed by organizational tensions. It is pulled in one direction by an assertive Congress, in another by its new program evaluators, in yet another by its legions of auditors and accountants. It is, Mosher finds, a "quasi" agency—partly legislative, partly executive, and partly judicial.

The unstated thesis of this book is that GAO and OMB changed because they did not want to wither. Mosher's study leads to the conclusion that these agencies will have to undergo fresh transformation if they are to continue as vital instrumentalities of American government.

ALLEN SCHICK
University of Maryland

Uninformed Choice: The Failure of the New Presidential Nominating System *by Scott Keeter and Cliff Zukin. New York, Praeger, 1983. 247 pp. $29.95.*

This book raises and explores the most crucial question underlying the switch from the party-based presidential nominating system before 1968 to the mass-based system of today: Just how informed is the public when it renders its choice in presidential primaries? From the title onward, Keeter and Zukin pull no punches. The authors state in the introduction that "the quality of public participation in nominating politics" is "unhealthily low and incompatible with standards commonly associated with informed decision making" (p. vii). They then proceed deliberately and convincingly within the constraints of their data to support their case.

The book has two central foci—what the public knows and whether or how that information changes over the course of the campaign. To explore these questions, the authors analyze three sets of surveys: 1976 and 1980 CBS/New York Times surveys; 1980 National Election Study surveys; and 1980 Eagleton Polls.

Proponents of nomination by plebiscite will feel uneasy with every turn of the page. The authors find that at the beginning of a nomination campaign the public's level of interest is low and also that interest, exposure to the media, and attention to political information do not increase as the campaign progresses. Similarly, public awareness and recognition of contenders are low, and increases in both are predicated on strong early performances in primaries. Candidates who fail to capture the media's attention early

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never break through the public consciousness. Contenders who do do well early quickly reach a plateau, but they and the eventual nominees still remain unknown to a significant stratum of the American public at the end of the campaign. The authors also find that candidate unawareness is nonpartisan; Republicans are not any more aware of Republican contenders than Democrats are of Democratic contenders.

What the public knows and does not know about candidate ideology and issue positions is also disquieting. Most citizens either are unable to ascribe ideological identifications or positions on issues to candidates or get the identification or positions wrong. In addition, the campaign contributes very little to public education because public knowledge does not increase over the course of the campaign. Worse, primary voters are only slightly more knowledgeable about candidate ideology and issue positions than nonvoters.

While it is obvious that candidate choice is not random, public impressions, judgments of candidates, and candidate popularity are tied directly to primary success and the competitive standing of the candidates as interpreted by the media. In short, primary voters know little and learn little during presidential nominating campaigns. What information they do have and act upon is the horserace. What this suggests of course is that mass stampedes toward relative unknown candidates like Senator Gary Hart and Governor Jimmy Carter are based less on knowledge of and agreement with political vision, ideas, or ideology, and more on media hype, catchy slogans, or contrived styles.

One minor criticism of the book is its explanation for low citizen interest, involvement, and knowledge. In various places, the authors blame the presidential nomination system, the candidates, the media, and the public, but the relationships between the causes and the effects are not as clearly established as the documentation of the effect itself.

I recommend *Uninformed Choice* to scholars and practitioners of presidential nominating politics and to the next Democratic party reform commission. One would be hard-pressed to find a stronger argument for a greater party role in presidential nominating politics than the findings in this book.

JAMES I. LENGLE
Georgetown University

Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and Their Political Consequences *edited by Veronon Bogdanor and David Butler. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 267 pp. $39.50.*

Developed in 1982 partly from an Oxford University seminar, this well-edited collection of scholarly essays on various electoral systems reflects a recently increased British interest in examining alternatives to the familiar single-member, simple-plurality ("first-past-the-post") election to the House of Commons. That interest became more salient when, after the book was written, the 1983 general election gave the Alliance of Liberals and Social Democrats under 4 per cent of the seats for their 25 per cent of the national popular vote, and the Conservatives over 60 per cent of the seats for their 42 per cent of

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the vote. But for much of the preceding decade, the established election system, like many other once-cherished British institutions, had been losing some of its legitimacy. It was no longer so readily assumed, even in 1982, to provide satisfactory representation as well as stable majority government.

However much *Democracy and Elections* may have been inspired by contemporary British concerns, it is a broad, significant, and useful contribution to the field of comparative politics. The book is marked not by advocacy but by careful and sophisticated analyses. Separate chapters, by specialized scholars, are devoted to France, West Germany, Italy, Scandinavia, the Benelux nations, the Republic of Ireland, Greece, Japan, and the European parliament. Britain itself is briefly but adequately discussed in David Butler's crisply written chapter, "Variants of the Westminster Model," which also includes New Zealand, India, South Africa, the United States, Australia, and Canada. Bogdanor provides excellent introductory and concluding chapters that capture the careful analytical approach of the several authors. The same high level is maintained in a second introductory chapter by Richard Rose. While perhaps unnecessarily repeating some of Bogdanor's definitions and classifications, Rose's chapter has its own interesting comparisons. Among these is an ingenious tabulation of the proportionality of seventeen "proportional representation" (PR) systems and seven plurality systems. It indicates that a single-member, simple-plurality election may produce, as it does for the U.S. House of Representatives, a greater degree of proportionality than do certain PR systems. Plainly, a nation's political circumstances as well as its election system determine the results.

The point is convincingly made in the chapter on France by David Goldey and Philip Williams. They find that the second-ballot system has allowed disciplined parties, stable government, and regime legitimacy in the Fifth Republic even though it had supposedly precluded those advantages in the Third Republic. As Peter Pulzer remarks at the end of his excellent summary of West Germany's historical experience (p. 106), electoral rules are only sometimes decisive. "More often," he says, "they are not." From the experience of other nations besides France and West Germany, there is ample support for Bogdanor's conclusion that the same electoral system can have dissimilar effects in different countries or even in the same country at different times. Hence, he rejects the theory that the electoral system is a fundamental causative factor in developing party systems. Explicitly, both F.A. Hermens's and Maurice Duverger's arguments are disputed. The relationship between electoral systems, party systems, and social change, Bogdanor argues, are too complex to be summed up in scientific laws.

Other readers may not be persuaded, as I am, by the wisdom of the book's principal theme, but they too will find the several chapters useful at least for their information and clear exposition. For example, J.A.A. Stockwin's chapter on Japan is, for most of us who lack specialized knowledge about that nation, a valuable summary of election in multi-member constituencies without provision for vote transfer. Moreover, it provides support for the book's premise that election systems cannot be classified simply as PR or single-member, simple-plurality.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin-Madison

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110 Livingston Street Revisited: Decentralization in Action *by David Rogers and Norman H. Chung. New York, New York University Press, 1983. 241 pp. $20.00*

I, for one, wish David Rogers had revisited 110 Livingston Street to describe the changes that have occurred in the central school bureaucracy as a result of the 1969 decentralization. Instead, he and his coauthor Norman Chung have chosen to evaluate the New York City school decentralization by describing eight of the community school districts.

The profiles of the community districts, which make up three quarters of the text of the book, are mainly concerned with the role of the community superintendents who are the centerpiece of their evaluation. In fact, the most important variable considered by the authors is the management style of superintendents as a measure of district effectiveness. Significantly ignored in the evaluation is any measure of change in who exercises power as a result of decentralizations.

The district profiles that make up the separate chapters represent different models of political stability. The underlying thesis is that rapid or recent change in the characteristics of the population are the major cause of instability. The authors' analysis concludes that strong superintendents are more likely to emerge when districts are stable; strong superintendents in stable districts concentrate on educational problems and their districts are, therefore, more effective. Their scenario ignores the history of conflict as a stimulant to change. Some of the most effective districts have experienced the greatest political turmoil. Rogers and Chung rate District 4 as a most effective district because of its stability and strong superintendent in 1983, eschewing its volatile history in the 1970s. This suggests that the evaluation lacks historical perspective, but is more likely misguided in its definition of effectiveness.

The authors do not explain why the large majority of districts in New York City that are stable and have strong community superintendents have not changed their educational programs or are exemplary in any way. Nor do they explore sufficiently the role of community activism and organization in the development of effective districts. My own research suggests that the districts with the greatest turnover of school board members, the least stable by Rogers's and Chung's definition, are the most innovative. They are also the districts in which community groups are most well organized, active, and involved in educational issues.

The introduction to the book and the chapter headings imply that decentralization is a means of facilitating ethnic succession. One expects, therefore, to find discussion of this important issue. Unfortunately, no substantive data are provided on ethnic succession over the fifteen-year history of decentralization as reflected in school board memberships and administrative and teaching positions. Such data are available and are necessary to any decisive conclusions regarding the role of ethnic succession. The political analysis of the eight districts concludes that "effective" districts develop local leadership able to handle the turmoil of succession by developing cohesion and consensus. In several cases, the authors admit that ethnic succession has not occurred; nevertheless, because of a strong community superintendent, the district is labeled "effective." The study reports on outputs such as reading scores, attendance, and selected academic achievement of stu-

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dents. For each of the eight districts, data are presented to show improvement in the "effective" districts; some, however, do not show improvement in these measures.

One must agree with the authors that a more intensive evaluation of school decentralization in New York City should be provided for a fuller understanding of the complex issues and developments that have occurred under the 1969 school decentralization law. David Rogers had a unique opportunity to compare his earlier study of the New York City school system (*110 Livingston Street*) with practices under the decentralization. Although power in the system is not wholly a zero-sum game (unless central headquarters devolved some power downward), the districts could hardly become independent policymakers. It would have been useful if more attention was paid to the relationship between central headquarters and the districts to determine if any change has occurred in who makes school policy. Finance and budgeting, the important policies controlling the allocation of resources, are barely mentioned. Recentralization policies, such as the promotional gates program that was instituted system-wide in 1981, are also ignored.

David Rogers and Norman Chung have demonstrated that there is indeed much to be explored and studied in the New York City school system that offers an opportunity to evaluate not only decentralization, but also the evolution of local politics and the politics of education. Their book is a beginning of that effort and will test the mettle of those who follow to answer some of the questions they have raised and those they have ignored.

MARILYN GITTELL
City University of New York

The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power *by Robert A. Caro. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1982. 882 pp. $19.95.*

Robert A. Caro's *The Path to Power*, which is the first of a projected three-volume biography of Lyndon B. Johnson, has been widely reviewed in popular periodicals, and readers of this journal will be familiar with the basic interpretation. Briefly stated, Caro does not like Johnson very much. As David H. Donald has pointed out in the *New York Times*, Caro seems to approach his subject as a judge rather than as a biographer, and he clearly ranks as a hanging judge. Lyndon Johnson, according to Caro, was "unencumbered by philosophy or ideology" (xvii). He possessed only "a hunger for power in its most naked form" and in pursuit of that objective he permitted "no consideration of morality or ethics" (p. xix) to influence his behavior.

There is—at least in the opinion of this reviewer—considerable merit in Caro's analysis. The more we learn about Lyndon Johnson, the less admirable he appears. Yet not only does Caro's relentless indictment grow a bit stale when expanded over almost 800 pages of narrative, but his portrait of Johnson is curiously incomplete. As Caro makes clear, Johnson was an extremely able man. He was a gifted teacher who devoted enormous time and energy to building a successful debating team during the year he spent as an instructor at a Houston high school. He was capable of being a superior campaigner, most notably when he bested several better known contenders to win a seat in Congress during

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a 1937 special election. He was a superb manipulator who understood the sources of power both within Washington's bureaucratic labyrinth and in the halls of Congress. In recounting all of this, Caro is never able to combine the amoral, utterly ruthless, and essentially evil Johnson with the talented and hardworking Johnson who inspired great loyalty from subordinates, who consistently impressed more established leaders as an up-and-coming politician who merited encouragement, and who became a part of an inner circle of Washington liberals who played key roles in the formulation of policy during the New Deal and afterward. Caro's own evidence suggests that Johnson was a more complex and enigmatic person than this volume implies.

The Path to Power covers Johnson's career up until the time of World War II. As a political analyst, Caro is a member of the hard-boiled cynical school. He stresses the influence of money and special interest groups on the formulation of policy. Lyndon Johnson's principal financial backer during the early years of his congressional career was Herman Brown of the Brown and Root construction company. Although neither Brown nor Johnson thought much of the New Deal, Brown wanted to build things and Johnson wanted to get ahead, and thus Johnson campaigned for the House of Representatives and later for the United States Senate as a "100 percent" Franklin D. Roosevelt man. After all, Johnson explained: "Any money that's spent down here on New Deal projects, the East is paying for. We don't pay any taxes in Texas" (p. 472). Johnson's major enemies were the spokesmen for agriculture, cattle, and other enterprises that treasured cheap labor. Ultimately the "liberal" Johnson became the spokesman for the rising "oil and sulphur and gas and defense barons of the Southwest" (p. xxi). About the only politician to be treated favorably by Caro is Sam Rayburn, and the friendly but not particularly convincing description of Rayburn seems primarily designed to establish an admirable politician with whom Johnson can be unfavorably compared.

But whatever its biases, *The Path to Power* is an important book. Not only does the volume tell us an enormous amount about Lyndon Johnson, but it also comments perceptibly on the politics of both Texas and Washington. It also leaves the reader impatient for the appearance of Caro's next two volumes.

NUMAN V. BARTLEY
University of Georgia

The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan: Makers of the Postwar World *by Richard J. Barnet. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1983. 511 pp. $19.95.*

Richard Barnet has indeed, as his publishers assert in the jacket, written a book that blends in the story of personal ambitions with the panorama of world events since the war. And it is a compelling narrative, almost a page-turner, even for those jaded by the plethora of Cold War histories.

The Atlantic Alliance, he argues, was born out of mutual conviction that the United States had to become the hegemonic power inside Europe in order to prevent the continent from being dominated by either Russia or Germany. In this regard, he might have done well to note the rise of political science "balance of power" books published in

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America at the time, for the conjunction hardly seems accidental. It soon became necessary to undertake another formidable task, the integration of Japan, the "Honorary Europeans," into the postwar system. Throughout the lifetime of the Alliance, however, and not just today, many Europeans found themselves unhappy with their assigned roles, and deeply disatisfied with America's role—whether they were activists or passivists, and whether they were confrontationist or conciliatory toward the Soviet Union.

In the beginning, Americans themselves were unsure of what they wanted from Germany and Japan. The men who managed the occupation only knew what they did not want. They did not want any laboratory experiments along New Deal lines. As a result, the defeated enemies were given very traditional deflationary medicine for postwar dislocations and ailments. This "cod liver oil" treatment was administered by stern men, who loathed the very sound of the words "New Deal," let alone European pronounciations of the word "socialist," and who may very well have been trying to discourage socialist ideas in the U.S. by the indirect method of making the world economy go as it ought to have gone after America "straightened out" Europe in World War I.

However that may be—and Barnet does not speculate along those lines—the occupiers found a remarkable set of leaders who shared their basic convictions, albeit often for different reasons, and who, equally important, represented a considerable lode of political talent. Here, perhaps for the first time, in an American book at least, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer, and Shigeru Yoshida all receive their proper due. In the case of Japan, moreover, one of the obstacles to be overcome was none other than the eminent "viceroy" Harry Truman sent out to the land of the rising sun, General Douglas MacArthur, whose old time Progressive Era reforms proved to be an embarrassment.

Various specialists will find themselves on familiar ground here, but no one has quite put the story together in the same way. Each reader will come away with favorite parts of the book, and will relish certain insights. My own preference is for the discussion of the origins of Ostpolitik. Barnet traces the story back to the Berlin crisis of 1961, when Willy Brandt, who had strongly supported reunification of Germany, came to realize that the United States had no intention of risking war over the Berlin Wall. Observing the Americans closely, Brandt (then mayor of West Berlin) could see only what was beneath the surface of the great show of unity John F. Kennedy made by sending Lucius Clay and Lyndon Johnson. The latter made an especially vivid impression on the West Germans by demanding that a porcelain factory be opened on Sunday so that he could purchase dishes to take home. "Well goddamit,"Johnson exploded, "You're the mayor, aren't you? It shouldn't be too difficult for you to make arrangements so I can get to see that porcelain. I've crossed an entire ocean to come here . . ." (p. 230).

One hesitates to make too much of such a story. And Barnet does not, but it does reveal another corner of LBJ's mind, the same corner that made him unable to understand why the West Europeans refused to send "us some men and send us some folks to deal with these guerillas" [sic] in Vietnam (p. 265). By 1966, Johnson's appeals for an allied "presence" in the Vietnam War had netted twenty-three professors from Germany, two Dutch surgical teams, and eleven British police instructors.

In sum, the Alliance was no substitute for independent diplomacy in Europe. On the other hand, the Americans never were fully aware of how dependent they were on the Alliance until Vietnam brought home some unwelcome truths. Once in paperback, this book

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should be widely used as a text or collateral reading in political science and history courses. It demonstrates that "serious stuff" doesn't have to be be boring.

LLOYD C. GARDNER
Rutgers University

Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The Politics of Energy *by John E. Chubb. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1983. 319 pp. $29.50.*

This book argues that the political dimensions of the energy crisis remain poorly understood. This is evidenced in the failure of the large-scale efforts at energy policy reform. But it is also the case that energy analysts have now focused sufficiently on the political dynamics of energy policy formation. This book challenges the simple model of producer-dominated sub-systems, which is now fragmented as a result of crisis events over the past decade. Environmentalists, labor unions, and commercial energy users have exerted their political influence to alter the organizational relationships between particular commercial interests and the government bureaucracies charged to encourage or regulate their activites. How, why, and in what ways these organizations have changed are the main theoretical questions addressed in this book. Oil and nuclear regulation, research and development policy, and energy planning are the four focuses for empirical investigation. The study is based on a large set of detailed interviews conducted with energy elites in business, labor, environmental groups, and relevant government agencies during 1977–78.

The analytic conclusions of an intricate theoretical argument are that the commercial and public interest groups (the "interests") divide along the lines of their monopolistic, competitive, and monoposonistic (few clients) tendencies, while the bureaucratic strategies are corporatist, pluralist, and co-optive. Energy politics is, therefore, a curious and shifting mixture of corporatism, pluralism, and capture. Corporatism is illustrated by energy research and development, where monoposonistic interest group behavior is met by corporatist bureaucratic strategy. Pluralism is evident in energy planning, precisely because there is open competition between interest groups and shifting mandates among federal agencies. Finally, capture still exists in the arenas of oil and nuclear regulation, where interest group monopolies are met with cooptive bureaucratic responses.

On its limited terrain, the book is thorough, detailed, and scientifically rigorous. Hypotheses are formulated and assessed; relationships are quantified, even if the scales are sometimes arbitrary; but statistics do not get in the way or substitute for the argument. In these respects, the book is solid, focused, reasonably comprehensive and quite convincing in its organizational analysis.

The difficulty with the book is that one does not learn much about what is politically at stake in the energy debate beyond matters at the process and organizational levels. The primary organizational resources are assumed to be the sizes of budgets and staffs; little attention is paid to why environmental and other groups have exerted political influence beyond their money or direct access to the energy policy process. More is at stake in energy politics than ephemeral tactical victories against bureaucractic autonomy, as the Reagan administration has learned to its chagrin. An adequate political analysis of energy

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must deal with the questions in this book, to be sure, but it must also deal with the substance of alternative futures inspired and mobilized by the interests described. Unfortunately, the book virtually ignores the national and international economic dimensions of the energy system. It does not tell us anything beyond the obvious about the political differences (or their significance) among organizations as diverse as the National Petroleum Institute and the Sierra Club. It ridicules Carter's and others' efforts to pluralize the energy policy process—often on quite convincing grounds—but it does not press sufficiently the conclusion that energy policy is still too much dominated by client and beneficiary interest groups. The pluralism so admired by most political scientists is viewed here as politically disorienting and unstable.

As a window on the history of specific forces mediating interest groups and public agencies, the book is remarkably insightful. But we need more emphasis on how these relationships distort and corrupt; on these grounds the book is empirical and dispassionate to a fault.

DUDLEY J. BURTON
Brown University

The Political Economy of Inflation in the United States *by Paul Peretz. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983. 268 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $14.00.*

This is a very ambitious book in which the author sets out to use the issue of inflation as a test case for distinguishing alternative views of the political process in the United States—pluralist, elitist, and Marxist. At the same time, he wishes to examine the evidence for the existence of a political business cycle, add to our understanding of inflation, and examine the role of political factors in economic policymaking.

I think the author undertakes too much, and ultimately the book fails to present a convincing case that he has resolved the basic issues that he initially raised. However, it remains a very useful and interesting study in which the author has brought together a tremendous amount of information. The study is most effective in attacking a pluralist model in which people accurately feel the effects of inflation, form opinions based on those effects, make demands on the political system that reflect those opinions, and find those demands answered.

The book begins with a brief survey of the three competing models of the political process and establishes important areas of differences as they relate to the formulation of anti-inflation policy. The following two chapters provide a non-technical survey of alternative economic models of the inflation process, and a survey of the distributional effects of inflation. In reviewing the studies of economists, the author emphasizes those that examine only the effects on the distribution of income, without discussing the potential loss to the overall economy through processes such as the deterioration of efficiency or a weakening of economic incentives (through the interaction of inflation with taxes).

I found chapters 4 and 5 on public perceptions of inflation and how those perceptions are translated into political views to be the most interesting parts of the book. The public

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view that the average person is among the worst hurt by inflation and the well-to-do as being among the least hurt clearly does not fit the observed facts. And the public is almost as confused as economists about what to do about inflation.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the policymaking process and the extent to which representatives in that process are responsive to their constituents' interests. The description of the policy process is quite simplified, with some sweeping generalizations made that are hard to justify. For example, the Council of Economic Advisers may appear to be the most liberal of the participating groups if one refers only to the Kennedy-Johnson administration; but council chairmen of other decades do not fit that generalization. There is very little formal testing of the hypothesis that political groups and representatives accurately reflect their constituency's views, although the author seems to conclude that the pluralist model scores fairly well on this question.

The major argument against the pluralist model is provided by evidence that individuals do not accurately perceive the cost and benefits of inflation, and that they do not form coherent opinions about what to do about it. This may result from confusion between the public and economists about what is meant by inflation. To economists, inflation refers to a rise in the average level of all wages and prices. To many individuals, however, only the price increases of others are inflationary. Their own wage and price increases are a due reward for hard effort. Thus, inflation is a general term for the failure of the growth of their own incomes to meet their expectations. They do not distinguish the issue of inflation from discontent over the distribution of income. In addition, when it comes to doing something about inflation, the major problem results not from an inability to control inflation, but from the costs of those policies imposed in the form of unemployment and lost income. Thus, the issue of what to do can only be discussed in terms of choices between alternative outcomes. Yet few of the public surveys examined by Peretz pose the issue in a choice framework.

BARRY BOSWORTH
The Brookings Institution

Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor *by John J. Stephan. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1983. 228 pp. $16.95.*

American analysts have long regarded Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor as a desperate, ultimately fatal gamble. This provocative study of Tokyo's planning for an invasion of Hawaii shows that it was much more than that. The end product of years of civilian speculation and naval planning, the attack was the first step toward conquest of a vital strategic position that might have produced an early and very different end to the war. Pearl Harbor was also an event that revealed the divided loyalties of the Japanese-Americans of Hawaii.

The notion of an attack and invasion of Hawaii had taken root in Japanese popular consciousness and naval thinking well before 1941. Armchair strategists had discussed it

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since the first decade of the century, and by the 1930s their speculations had resolved several key issues. The Hawaiian Islands were the key to victory in war with the United States—not as a springboard for attack on the American mainland, but as a hostage with which negotiators might bring Washington to terms. Despite American fears of Japanese-American collaboration with the enemy, Tokyo's planners assigned no significant role to Japanese expatriates in the conquest of the islands. They did, however, include Hawaii within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940. In 1941, the most important naval planner, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander-in-chief of the combined fleet, triumphed over more conservative naval general staff strategists in winning approval for the Pearl Harbor attack. But he did not believe simultaneous attack on Oahu and occupation of the island of Hawaii was possible.

Once he realized that air strikes had not destroyed the American aircraft carriers, Yamamoto became an ardent advocate of invasion. He threatened resignation to win Naval General Staff concurrence. The staff's senior officers went directly to the emperor for approval of invasion plans in April 1942, hoping thereby to short-circuit army opposition to mid-Pacific moves that might give the navy control of grand strategy. Thanks to the Doolittle raid, which revealed Japan's vulnerability to attack by carrier-based aircraft, the soldiers yielded. Three divisions were ordered to prepare for coordinated attacks on the Aleutians and Midway. Then Palmyra and Johnston Islands were to be seized; the island of Hawaii occupied; and Honolulu blockaded into surrender. The naval disaster at Midway put an end to the plan.

Ironically the fruits of Hawaiian Japanese-Americans' collaboration with Tokyo did not appear until after Midway. The prewar expatriate community had provided greater per capita support for the Imperial Defense Fund than Japanese citizens at home. Sixty percent of Japanese-Americans in Japan during the final prewar year remained there throughout the conflict. Some of these Hawaiians became "prophets and planners" of the islands' "liberation" (p. 140), writing books and articles and working in government-financed research institutes. While their writings reflected the "victory disease" (p. 124) that made civilians more expansionist than military planners, they also mirrored their grievances at home. Had Japanese naval proponents of annexation or army planners for a governor-generalship of the eastern Pacific followed Hawaiian Japanese-American advice, they might have broken up Hawaii's Big Five corporations, reformed agriculture to reduce dependency on export crops, and removed barriers to Japanese-Americans' educational and occupational progress.

Stephan's compelling narrative untangles the bureaucratic struggles over strategic planning in Japan and exposes the secret wartime careers of Hawaiian Japanese-Americans. While few will dispute his conclusion that invasion plans were real, not all will be satisfied with his explanation of their demise or his assessment of their significance. If the Battle of Midway was as crucial to their end as Stephan suggests, then surely the battle deserves more than three paragraphs. He suggests that this episode validates Akira Iriye's thesis in *Power and Culture* (1982) that Japanese and American war aims paralleled rather than conflicted with one another. To this reader, visions of the conquest and occupation of Hawaii suggested rather different conclusions. Finally, while opening the door to further discussion of the issue of Japanese-American collaboration, Stephan has not demonstrated its extent or significance.

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These points aside, this book makes a major contribution to our understanding of the Pacific war. It offers the expert fresh and intriguing detail about Japanese war planning. In the classroom, it might well serve as the focal point for analysis of the problems of strategic decision-making. The general reader is certain to gain a fuller appreciation of Japan's position and a deeper understanding of the Japanese-American community before and during the war.

ROGER DINGMAN
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The Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor *edited by John Gerard Ruggie. New York, Columbia University Press, 1983. 506 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $15.00.*

The impact of the international division of labor on national welfare has become an increasingly important issue for developing and developed countries. Many interacting developments account for this, including rapid changes in comparative advantage, nationalistic responses to rising levels of interdependence, and the fascination with dependency approaches among many Third World and First World academics and intellectuals. In effect, uncertainties about the stability and direction of the international economic and political systems have arisen just as the latter have become more important for national welfare—and perhaps more hostile to the needs of the Third World.

This useful and interesting collection of essays by a number of younger scholars seeks to examine the impact of the division of labor and to look at the strategies open to the developing countries to achieve welfare gains for their citizens. The emphasis throughout is on the relative costs and benefits of choosing the open economy and export orientation (favored by the World Bank, among others); or on structural changes via international negotiations to establish a New International Economic Order; or the creation of a loosely defined policy of "selective dissociation" (in contrast to some radical appeals for more complete dissociation). Most of the essays about the developing countries raise substantial doubts about the continued viability of the export orientation for most developing countries, even the relatively advanced who have profited in the past but may find it increasingly difficult to move on to new stages of comparative advantage. At the same time, while they clearly favor a policy of selective dissociation, all of the authors are very aware of the enormous difficulties of implementing such a policy. The complexities of selecting wisely may be too great for poor countries, and the continuation of slow growth, protectionism, and national self-centeredness in the world economy may rapidly undermine any policy choice.

It is a major virtue of this book that the authors are too aware of complexity and too concerned with specific contexts to offer the kind of simple conclusions that prevail in much of the literature. The implicit message seems to be that each country will have to make its own choices, based on its own values, interests, and interpretations of likely trends, an obvious point that deserves to be reemphasized, not least because of increasing differentiation in the Third World. Also interesting is a suggestion (Robert Keohane, pp.

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89–91) that dissociation might be perceived as a short-run policy to create the conditions under which a successful policy of association might be undertaken (a point first made by Albert Hirschman some years ago), although a country capable of implementing such a strategy might already be capable of competing effectively. Another general theme is the important and relatively autonomous role of the state in making crucial decisions. This sharply challenges the oversimplified notions of many dependency theorists who have seen only a dominant international system and domestic regimes that are little more than puppets of external forces.

The book includes excellent essays on South Korea, Venezuela, the Ivory Coast, and Algeria, plus a fascinating argument for linguistic dissociation by David Laitin, a study of security issues, and a provocative essay by Ruggie on the "elasticities" of the prevailing international economic system for meeting Third World needs. Two brilliant essays by Robert Keohane on American development from 1776–1860 and by Peter Katzenstein on the small European states provide perspective and are especially noteworthy and original.

In short, while most of the generalizations on the Third World are not new, this book still makes a valuable contribution by providing a sophisticated analysis of the difficult choices confronting the developing countries.

ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN
Washington, D.C.

Equality Under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth Amendment *by Judith A. Baer. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1983. 308 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $17.50.*

There has perhaps never been a concept more vexing to American constitutionalism than that of equality. Americans justified their Declaration of Independence by its claims, framed their Constitution in its pursuit, fought a civil war and amended their Constitution to better secure it. Still there remains a growing concern that practice falls too short of principle. The reason for this political discrepancy, Judith Baer argues, is in large measure attributable to the way in which the promise of equality under the Constitution, and especially under the Fourteenth Amendment, has been interpreted and applied.

In Baer's judgment, the "promises of Reconstruction"—especially a notion of equality "based on natural entitlements to rights" (p. 104) and the attempt to "enact into the Constitution the principles of the Declaration" (p. 256)—have not been kept. Not only did legislative enthusiasm for equality wane, but judicial interpretation and application of the Fourteenth Amendment has been (at best) a "crabbed" effort that has "shackled" the true import of that most famous of the Civil War amendments, (pp. 253, 259). What Baer advocates is the abandonment of the stifling judicial doctrines that have evolved (especially the doctrine of "suspect classification") and the adoption of a full-blown doctrine of the "essential right of equality." The basic problem is to reclaim the "lavish and expansive" (p. 253) intention of the Fourteenth Amendment from a body of constitutional law that has been "stingy and niggling" at the expense of individual rights (p. 106). Baer advocates

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a new theory of constitutional equality that will stretch far enough to include the aged, the young, the handicapped, and homosexuals.

This is a book that has its moments. Its argument that a recovery of first principles is necessary for sound constitutional interpretation is an important one that needs to be taken seriously. Further, her argument that a good portion of constitutional adjudication has been patternless, with the effect that the contemporary constitutional doctrine of equality has been developed ad hoc without a sturdy jurisprudential foundation, is beyond dispute. But the jurisprudence Baer advocates in order to shore up that foundation misunderstands three important features—the idea of equality, the Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The jurisprudence presented here is a highly personal sort, based on "passionate, committed scholarship" (p. 13). As the author confesses: this is "a feminist book. My commitment to women's rights has molded my thoughts about the subject I address here" (p. 10). The basic problem is that the principles she seeks to explicate are inevitably distorted by peeping through her ideological lens. Instead of a philosophic discourse on the idea of equality, Baer has given us a polemical tract in defense of the new egalitarianism. The jurisprudence she offers is a case of the wish being parent to the thought.

The ultimate problem with Baer's theory of constitutional interpretation is that the Constitution loses. Advocating "looking beyond the four-corners of the document" has become the stock justification for those who basically agree with the results of the activist judiciary of the past few decades. Baer takes this further as her justification for the future expansion of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. But to argue that the meaning of a written constitution is to be found outside that written constitution seriously undermines the basic purpose of such a constitution. Baer's position—not unlike John Hart Ely's and Michael Perry's and others'—in the end only invites the judges to roam at large in the trackless field of their own imagination, as Chancellor James Kent once put it. But a written constitution, specifically the United States' written Constitution ("our peculiar security," Thomas Jefferson called it, and "the greatest of improvements on political institutions," as John Marshall said) was intended to prevent precisely that. While Baer's thesis may lead to greater ideological beneficence for the groups she is concerned about, it does so only at the expense of the original logic of American constitutionalism. While the ends she advocates may be politically noble ones, distorting the Constitution is not the proper means to achieve them.

GARY L. MCDOWELL
Newcomb College,
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The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt *by John Milton Cooper, Jr. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1983. 442 pp. $20.00.*

Comparative history is an engaging idiom, particularly when the protagonists, so alike yet so different, make excellent foils for one another. John Milton Cooper's *The Warrior*

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and the Priest offers much in the way of inviting comparison, and while the author reverts on occasion to a narrower view, his style is unfailingly graceful.

Whatever weakness there may be stems from the structural basis for comparison. Essentially, this is a book about Woodrow Wilson, with Roosevelt cast in the role of supporting player. Two-thirds of the narrative focuses on the period 1910–19 when T.R.'s star was no longer ascendant. Moreover, since Cooper's forte is domestic affairs, the reader is hard put to reconstruct Roosevelt's genius as an international broker. Additional criteria for comparison might have made clear which of the two statesmen was more skilled at tailoring policy to power and vice versa, which did more to enhance the standing of the nation overseas, and which of the two succeeded in keeping military intervention to a minimum. No issue was more hotly contested than military preparedness, yet this is mentioned only in passing and without reference to its larger significance.

Cooper works hard to maintain objectivity. We know his sympathy clearly lies with Wilson, but he is quick to recognize Roosevelt's sensitive patronage of the arts. He likewise credits the Rough Rider with recognition of the need "to make large-scale economic power accountable to society" (p. 215). At the same time, Wilson does not always appear to have the advantage. He is shown leaning toward particular sectional and economic groups, thus opening the door to divisiveness and class conflict (p. 229). Sometimes, in fact, the quest for impartiality overreaches itself, as when Wilson's concern for world peace is described as "an obsession" and the prophet of Princeton is said to have harbored a "fondness for war" (pp. 264, 270). To be sure, such lapses are rare. More often, it is T.R. who is made to suffer—with a "guilty conscience" for his part in Panama and the "legacy of distrust" he is alleged to have left in Latin America. The myth of the bellicose Roosevelt dies hard when terms such as "militarist" and "compulsive" suggest a throwback to outdated caricature.

The author is most effective in showing that the supposed dichotomy between realism and idealism, so often employed as a point of contrast, can be mischievously misleading. He also draws a choice parallel between Wilson's quad fight at Princeton University and his later struggle on behalf of the League of Nations. We are treated to a spirited defense of presidential interference in the election of 1918, and Wilson's view of states' rights, along with Roosevelt's stand on neutrality, are canvassed for potential inconsistency. Withal, there are many nice touches here, and not necessarily along lines one might expect. It is curious that young Wilson saw eye to eye with Roosevelt on nearly every issue of the day, including imperialism and the Panamanian revolt. To this may be added a common respect for the "strenuous life," even the redeeming value of war (pp. 57, 119, 132, 268). Paradoxically, it was Roosevelt the activist, rather than Wilson the professor, who proves to have been more avid as a reader, just as the man from Oyster Bay was more popular with youthful leaders of the future.

Such a juxtaposition of giants, each so rugged, original, and independent, is difficult to resist, given the proper contrasts and parallels. No one who has studied Wilson and Roosevelt separately can fail to appreciate them more fully when they are seen standing side by side.

FREDERICK MARKS
Forest Hills, New York

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Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789 *edited by William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. New York, Columbia University Press, 1984. 474 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $10.00.*

This book is a weighty effort to rescue economic explanations of history from Marxism. Unlike the so-called consensus historians of the 1950s, the authors are rightly convinced that American foreign policy cannot be understood without reference to capitalism as an economic system, especially in its much-neglected international dimensions. But lest the reader think that these writers have succumbed to revisionism à la William Appleman Williams and his school, they take great pains to disassociate themselves from any hint of conspiratorial explanation or severely anti-business judgments.

The result of this approach is a peculiar product. In its actual descriptions of the course of American diplomacy since the founding of the Republic, this is an excellent book. It is the first recent comprehensive survey of the economic dimension in U.S. foreign policy of its kind. The scholarship is excellent, the illustrations consistently interesting, and the writing style straightforward, if at times a little dull. (Rarely in an edited collection have I seen chapters written so much like each other—which I am not sure is a compliment). All students of both economics and foreign policy will benefit from the considerable accomplishments of these chapters.

In order to locate their perspective between pluralists and Marxists, however, the authors detract from their achievements by the consistent insertion of ideological *obiter dicta* that bear little relationship to their arguments. It is true that the ideology they adhere to is of a centrist and not especially controversial sort, but it is nonetheless ideology, and it is unnecessary.

As an example, for twenty years at the end of the nineteenth century, five different American presidents involved themselves directly in the internal affairs of Samoa. To a historian like Walter LaFeber, such meddling would be viewed as a preliminary effort to establish an American empire. But David M. Pletcher wishes to avoid such a controversial conclusion, and so he states that this intervention took place "for reasons that defy a rational explanation" and may have occurred out of "absence of mind" (p. 160). In the early 1920s, an energy-crisis mentality gripped American policymakers, resulting in the passage of the notorious depletion allowance that bedeviled later generations. But in his chapter on this period, Melvyn P. Leffler never mentions the depletion allowance and avoids any judgment that the "widespread alarm" (p. 231) he notes may have been intentionally engineered. One learns more about the actual tactics of men like Senator Boies Penrose (a major recipient of oil company funds) by reading the work of a journalist, Robert Sherrill's *The Oil Follies of 1970-1980.*

Unwilling to come to conclusions too unsettling to conventional opinion, the authors are occasionally led into a conceptual mishmash. Robert M. Hathaway, for example, makes a valiant effort to weigh economic motives against politics, ambition, and ideals, and then concludes that "these various elements ran together into one indissoluble blend, called for lack of a better name, the national interest" (p. 329). As many scholars of foreign policy know, the invocation of the national interest is often a confession of conceptual helplessness.

For all its faults, I nonetheless found *Economics and World Power* to be a valuable and

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important book. The chapters by David P. Calleo, and Robert A. Pollard and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. on more recent periods were particularly enlightening attempts to locate contemporary history in perspective. Read for its scope and historical detail, and not for its theoretical effort and underlying political agenda, this book is well worth examination.

ALAN WOLFE
Queens College, City University of New York

Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early Republic, 1783–1830 *by J.C.A. Stagg. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1983. 538 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $18.50.*

J.C.A. Stagg's masterful account of America's "second war of Independence" sets a new standard for scholarship in the history of the early republic. Nonspecialists may find the size and density of the book daunting, but students of American politics, diplomacy, and Indian relations will find these topics handled with assurance. The archival research is most impressive.

Stagg advances two related themes. First, he suggests that "the progress made in nation-building since independence" was insufficient to permit the United States to undertake a successful offensive war; the federal government was simply "too small and too weak" (p. 509). The bulk of the book substantiates this conclusion, though the exhaustive reconstruction of partisan and factional infighting and bureaucratic incompetence sometimes seems to point in the other direction. Stagg's second and more controversial argument is that the goal of the Madison administration's war effort "was to invade and occupy Great Britain's Canadian possessions" (p. 4). Of course, the immediate context for belligerence was the American determination to resist British depredations on American shipping. But Stagg contends that well before hostilities began, James Madison had become convinced both of the futility of economic sanctions such as Thomas Jefferson's ill-fated embargo, and that Britain's colonial system and maritime hegemony were most vulnerable through Canada. The British were able to deflect the impact of American efforts to starve their vital West Indian colonies by developing Canada's production resources—and by tapping American production through a flourishing illicit trade across the Canadian border. By taking the offensive, Madison reasoned, the British would be forced to make crucial concessions to the Americans on trade issues. The American conquest of Canada would complete the unfinished business of the American Revolution, extending the regime of republican freedom and making it possible for the new nation to reap the rewards of free trade. Stagg thus credits Madison with a coherent vision of what the war was supposed to accomplish, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding: "the attempt to conquer Canada was . . . a logical sequel to Madison's entire mode of thinking about Anglo-American relations after 1783" (p. 7). The problem with this interpretation, as the author acknowledges, is that Madison wrote or said nothing during the war itself to support it. The absence of such testimony makes Stagg's account of what the "administration intended to happen in the War" (p. x) conjectural at many key points. Madison's conduct of the

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war was so hopelessly compromised by a contentious Congress, uncooperative state governments, and confusion in the executive itself that policy—whatever it may have been—soon gave way to defensive improvisation. By 1814, it was clear that any possible Canadian campaign would fall short of its original promise, to "force Great Britain to respect American maritime rights" (p. 386). Instead, as Britain emerged victorious in Europe, Americans had good reason to feel their own vulnerability.

Though Madison's intentions may be difficult to fathom, Stagg's approach is nonetheless rewarding. By positing a Madisonian vision of international politics, Stagg throws the foreground detail—the politics of the war—into heightened contrast. Indeed, the constitutional and political obstacles to policy implementation would have defeated any administration. From this perspective, the survival of the government after the sacking of the capital in August 1814 was "itself no mean achievement, and for this Madison was largely responsible" (p. 436). If Stagg's Madison must remain something of an artifice—an imputed intelligence amidst the swirl of compromise, confusion, and national humiliation—the resulting study more than justifies the conceit. Stagg illuminates the connections and, perhaps more frequently, the lack of connection between republican ideals and republican politics. He thus captures a bewildered America at war, and his achievement is outstanding.

PETER S. ONUF
Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Nothing But Freedom: Emancipation and Its Legacy *by Eric Foner. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1983. 142 pp. $14.95.*

If this book comes to have the influence it deserves, the study of Reconstruction in the American South will be altered for the better in two significant ways. First, the emancipation of the slaves will receive the kind of comparative treatment that in the past has been used to great advantage by historians of American slavery. Second, political factors, which in recent years have been somewhat slighted as scholars have turned their attention to economic and social matters, will once again come center stage. As Eric Foner reminds us, political and economic developments were invariably closely related during these years.

Based on a brief lecture series (the prestigious Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures, delivered by Foner at Louisiana State University in 1982), *Nothing But Freedom* consists of only three chapters. The first provides the basis for his comparative analysis by describing aspects of emancipation in Haiti and the British Caribbean, as well as fundamental changes that took place in the structure of labor relations in southern and eastern Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Foner argues that central to the experience of all these societies was conflict between white elites and black freedmen and peasants over the ownership of land and the control of labor. In each case (with the exception of Haiti, where a revolution destroyed the ruling class), blacks were largely maintained in a condition of dependency, while the interests of planters (and, in the case of

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Africa, mine owners) were preserved. The explanation for this, Foner suggests, lies in the ability of planters and their allies to continue to dominate the political arena. Through coercive labor laws, regressive taxation, government-supported immigration, and the manipulation of the judicial system and the police, they were able to ensure that opportunities for blacks were narrowly circumscribed, even in regions where a labor shortage existed and a labor market had emerged.

Chapter two extends the discussion to the American South. Here, too, Foner finds that the plantation system was ultimately preserved by white elites through manipulation of the state. What sets the American experience apart, however, is that during the years of Radical Reconstruction black men gained the vote. For a time, aided by sympathetic Republicans in Washington, they exercised genuine political influence. They secured the enactment of laws favorable to their interests and elected officials who saw to it that their economic opportunities were at least partially defended. Although the vote was ultimately wrested from them, they did secure an enduring measure of autonomy during the years they exercised it and witnessed the enshrinement in the Constitution of rights that would be invoked by the federal government at a later date to give substance to the principle of racial democracy. Chapter three provides a convincing illustration of the importance for freedmen of political authority at the local level. It describes how rice workers along the Combahee River in South Carolina in 1876, under the protection of Republican officials, were able to carry out a series of strikes to gain more favorable working conditions and greater control over their own labor.

No doubt because it derives from a lecture series, *Nothing But Freedom* is far from comprehensive in its treatment of its subject matter and includes broad generalizations that are sure to attract criticism. As Foner readily acknowledges, the comparisons he draws out are highly selective, and he touches on racial attitudes only in passing. Furthermore, he tends to present both planters and freedmen in the South as monolithic groups. Yet as Thomas Holt has demonstrated for South Carolina, blacks were to a certain extent divided over what objectives to pursue when they held political power. Moreover, especially during the first years after the war, planters differed among themselves about how to regulate free black labor. For that reason they often faltered in their attempts to use the state to control the labor market. But such criticisms notwithstanding, this is a noteworthy exercise in historical interpretation. It should serve as a starting point for many fruitful studies by historians of Reconstruction in the years ahead.

MICHAEL WAYNE
University of Toronto

Protestants in a Catholic State: Ireland's Privileged Minority *by Kurt Bowen. Buffalo, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983. 237 pp. $27.50.*

Political scientists such as Basil Chubb, Brian Farrell and Tom Garvin, concerned with the political sociology of contemporary Ireland, have been quick to emphasize the extraordinarily pivotal role of religion, specifically Roman Catholicism, in shaping and con-

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straining Irish political culture. The extreme devoutness of most Irish people and the overwhelming dominance of Catholicism as the practiced religion (some 96 percent of the population) have assured that religion's complete permeation of Irish political culture and state institutions. This interpretation was confirmed by John Whyte's definitive study of church-state relations, *Church and State in Modern Ireland, 1923–1979.* Catholicism so informs the state that direct church intervention in public policy is largely unnecessary.

Such a context seems like an inhospitable environment for other religious groups to dwell in, let alone flourish. However, since independence the Irish Republic has always included several Protestant sects—the Church of Ireland, Methodist, Presbyterian and Quaker. Irish Anglicans are the most numerous and are the principal subject of Kurt Bowen's excellent book, though his analysis is usually applicable to all Protestant groups. Bowen addresses the important question of how this Protestant minority has maintained itself in the Catholic state and how it has been treated by that state. In answering these questions, Bowen has produced a well-researched and thoughtful study, which is a major contribution to the political sociology literature on modern Ireland.

Bowen's study traces the experience of Irish Anglicans between 1922 and the late 1970s, covering politics, education, religion, social life, and participation in the economy. It is based on interviews he conducted with eighty-three Anglicans in six parishes selected to reflect both urban-rural and class differences within the Church of Ireland community. This stratified sample is supplemented by the careful use of statistical and secondary historical sources.

Bowen argues that the Protestant minority has maintained a distinct identity within the Irish state. From 1922 until the 1950s, this identity derived from the minority's economically privileged position, as well as from the minority's Protestantism. Relatively, this privileged position has diminished since the 1950s, as general economic expansion has increased the prosperity of both the Catholic and the Protestant populations. This change becomes especially significant when combined with the Protestant population's overall decline and the increased trend toward mixed marriages.

Bowen organizes these trends analytically in terms of whether they imply assimilation (and thus the eventual absorption of Protestants) or integration (coexistence with the retention of separate identity) for Protestants within the Irish community. He concludes that industrialization and the growth of secularization in the 1960s and 1970s have made the possibility for integration much greater. The ecumenist movement of the 1970s (more than a little encouraged by the Northern Ireland conflict) enhances this possibility. Ireland is probably the only modern Western democracy where the separation of church and state has not yet fully occurred. However, economic growth and urbanization have facilitated a certain amount of secularization and a realization among some Catholics that religion is a question of private, rather than public, conscience. While there is unlikely to be a radical separation of church and state overnight in Ireland, this general trend does enlarge the possibilities for the coexistence of religious groups with differing beliefs, reducing the probability of assimilation.

It is difficult to find fault with Bowen's study. He is a meticulous scholar who makes judicious and sensible interpretations from his analysis. He also succeeds admirably in conveying a vivid sense of the life and community of Irish Protestants. In sum, Bowen's

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study fills an important gap in the extant social science literature on contemporary Ireland that concludes that Protestants are tending towards integration in the Irish state. While this latter is obviously a welcome trend for a democracy, the state into which Protestants are becoming integrated remains an unambiguously Catholic one. By implication Bowen's analysis raises the next challenge for scholars—to examine the extent to which the separation between church and state common to comparable democracies is occurring, or can occur, in Ireland.

DESMOND S. KING
Northwestern University

Solidarity: Poland 1980–1981 *by Alain Touraine et al., translated by David Denby. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 203 pp. $19.95.*

In the flood of recent books on Poland and the Solidarity phenomenon, this one has a number of qualities that set it apart—qualities that recommend it to readers looking for a view of the movement from the bottom up, but that also make it less accessible to those without fairly detailed knowledge of the period in question and a healthy appetite for sociological analysis.

As the authors state clearly in the introduction, this book "has no pretensions to being a history of those sixteen months of social ferment in Poland. [Rather,] "its aim is to understand the nature, the internal workings and the evolution of Solidarity" (p. 2) through a process of "sociological intervention," the distinguishing feature of which is "that it seeks to define the meaning which the actors themselves attribute to their action" through "a dialogue between the self-analysis of militants and the interpretations proposed by the researchers" (pp. xi, 7). Toward this end, the three French authors, together with a team of eleven Polish researchers, worked with six groups of Solidarity members at the factory level, each including eight to ten "militants"and each located in a different major city. The field work took place over a period of about eight months, from April through November 1981, coming to an end just weeks before the declaration of martial law and suspension of Solidarity on December 13, 1981. As a result, the Polish team was unable to participate in the final write-up of the research.

The methodology itself poses several potential pitfalls. Readers are never told how the groups of militants were formed and thus have no way of knowing how representative they were of the general membership. (The very use of the word "militants" here, by which the authors seem to mean rank-and-file activists, not all of whom were "militant" in the political sense, is confusing at best.) In addition, the authors assume too much about the readers' familiarity with the technique of "sociological intervention." Even those chapters that focus on discussions within the groups (and these are found only in the second half of the book) never fully describe the method of interaction between researchers and activists. A footnote (p. 8) directing readers to a more detailed discussion of the method in another book by Touraine is hardly a satisfactory substitute.

Equally serious questions arise from the intensity of the researchers' involvement with

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the subjects of their inquiry. Were they able to maintain their objectivity or, as participant-observers, did they begin to identify with the actors' cause? Conversely, how was the process of self-analysis and evolution of the groups influenced by the presence and active intervention of the researchers? The authors explicitly acknowledged these problems, but without a more forthcoming description of their method in practice, these questions must remain.

Nonetheless, for those willing to brave the methodological ambiguities and the occasional excess of sociological jargon, the book offers substantial rewards. Of all the studies this reviewer has seen on the Solidarity period, none comes close to the Touraine book in its dissection of the complex interplay of frustrations and aspirations that motivated the movement's 10 million rank-and-file members. The two main themes themselves are not new: the three strands, overlapping but sometimes in conflict, of economic grievance, national (and religious) self-assertion, and political democracy in Solidarity's program; and the concept of the "self-limiting revolution" that recognized the external constraints on Poland's independence of action.

Yet most books focus on the growing polarization at other levels—between the Party and Solidarity at the national level, within the establishment between intractable bureaucracies and cautious reformers, or within Solidarity between a moderate leadership cognizant of the constraints versus an increasingly radical rank- and file intent on pressing for unrealizable demands. Touraine's research team has probed more deeply into the insoluble dilemmas of a "self-limiting revolution," constantly under pressure to test those limits against a system unwilling and unable to engage in genuine dialogue toward tolerable compromise. The image of Poland's working class that emerges here is a more differentiated one than we find elsewhere. It is mature and articulate (in sharp contrast to the Leninist conception), and conscious of the limits of the situation but determined to press for satisfaction of its rightful demands.

This book is not for the casual reader, and one wishes the authors had not succumbed to the understandable urge to rush it to press (another sign of which is the absence of an index). Still, they should be forgiven—even congratulated—for providing an in-depth view of the fourth dimension of this complex picture—party, intelligentsia, Solidarity leadership, and now rank-and-file.

SARAH M. TERRY
Tufts University

Marxism, Central Planning, and the Soviet Economy: Economic Essays in Honor of Alexander Erlich *edited by Padma Desai. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1983. 285 pp. $35.00.*

This festschrift honors Alexander Erlich, whose *The Soviet Industrialization Debate: 1924–28* has become a classic in political economy. Regrettably for political economists, though, few of the fourteen contributions to this volume resemble Erlich's brilliant synthesis of theory and history. Evidently, few economists among this man's prominent ad-

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mirers were his students and followers, and only economists were included by Desai. Has the material for a younger Erlich run out? More likely, disciplinary proprieties no longer permit economists to comport near the districts of history and political science, except on strictly limited social occasions.

Devotees of Marxism, the topic of the first three papers included, can pass this book by. All three authors reduce Marxist economics to mathematical neoclassical theory and find, most impeccably, that Marxism adds little to their understanding. For example, John E. Roemer proves that capital shortage alone would be enough to make a poor country accept "unequal exchange," labor export, or capital import ("imperialism"). Economists will find the proofs elegant, if unnecessary; political scientists will find them obscure and trivial. The papers of Paul A. Samuelson on surplus value and Duncan K. Foley on money growth models are even less significant.

Part II of the book has seven minor articles by otherwise distinguished authors on central planning theory. Those by Abram Bergson, Martin L. Weitzman, and Padma Desai and Ricardo Martin pursue relatively small points in the theory of comparative measurement. By contrast, Franklyn D. Holzman describes the American policy response when in 1971 the Poles began in to supply a major share of U.S. demand for golf carts. Holzman explains how the Anti-Dumping Act was applied and analyzes how such matters should be handled in the unlikely event that a Soviet-type state tries to disrupt U.S. markets.

Robert W. Campbell's chapter, "Energy Prices and Decisions on Energy Use in the U.S.S.R.," also has policy relevance. A genuine expert in full command of the details, Campbell points out why there would be considerable room within the Soviet economy to substitute coal for exportable oil and gas, were Soviet planners willing to structure their own fuel balance to respond to world opportunities and to reprice industrial goods accordingly. They have not been willing to do so, at least not to date.

Holland Hunter's chapter is likewise very serviceable for political scientists. In a lucid synthesis of previous work, Hunter analyzes the costs of the First and Second Five-Year Plans (1928–37). Particularly noteworthy in his fascinating work with Everett Rutan III, indicating quantitatively how much collectivization and rearmament before World War II hurt consumption and labor utilization, but not fixed capital formation. Interestingly, the effect of the world depression on Soviet trade prices made little difference. Though the linear programming methodology assumes an ideal contrafactual comparison, anyone concerned to appraise Josef Stalin's Third Revolution will want to scrutinize this brief article.

The outstanding contribution of this book, in my opinion, is the publication of Joseph S. Berliner's study of the socioeconomic and cultural determinants of fertility among the union republics of the USSR. Now carefully revised from its first presentation in 1980, Berliner estimates that 57 percent of the inter-republican variance in fertility reported in the 1970 census can be attributed to the usual modernization variables – female participation in the labor force, urbanization, and education. But Moslem culture has a substantial direct impact, as well as working indirectly to keep the five or six Moslem republics different from the rest of the USSR with respect the aforementioned socioeconomic characteristics. Of course, insufficient data on individuals' completed fertility make this study

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tentative and possibly misleading about detailed developments in mixed areas like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. But since the Moslem/non-Moslem dichotomy has sharpened, according to all reports, and has lately received much worried attention in the official Soviet press, Berliner's study ought to prove fertile for a younger generation of social scientists dealing with the USSR.

MARTIN C. SPECHLER
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Dag Hammarskjöld Revisited: The U.N. Secretary-General as a Force in World Politics *edited by Robert S. Jordan. Durham, N.C., Carolina Academic Press, 1983. 197 pp. $16.95.*

The essays that constitute this book were commissioned to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld's death. The authors, James Barros, Indar Jit Rikhye, Oscar Schachter, Philippe de Seynes, Brian Urquhart, Kurt Waldheim, and Mark W. Zacher, either worked with Hammarskjöld or have written about him. Their essays deal both with the position and role of the U.N. secretary-general and Hammarskjöld's concept of the office and conduct in it.

Several themes run throughout the book. First, there is agreement among the authors that the secretary-general should and does have a political role in international affairs. Article 99 of the U.N. Charter provides a legal basis for this, but it would probably be the case even without this sanction, as indeed it was under the League of Nations. The essays demonstrate how Hammarskjöld skillfully developed this role. They also point up a crucial dilemma that is inescapable. To be effective, the secretary-general must retain the confidence and trust of the most powerful states and must be regarded by all as impartial, yet he must also support U.N. principles and norms. Both Trygve Lie and Hammarskjöld became impaled when, in the exercise of their responsibility as they saw it, they tried to defend U.N. principles against the opposition of the USSR. Barros argues the U.N. secretaries-general are more likely to be effective if they exercise their role privately rather than publicly as Lie and Hammarskjöld did. He offers Sir Eric Drummund as the model to be emulated. Waldheim, in an abstract discussion of the political role of the secretary-general, implicitly accepts Barros's conception. Perhaps all of Hammarskjöld's successors have been forced to a similar conclusion. This would mean that judging their effectiveness would best be done by careful students of the archives, like Barros. It would also mean a marked retreat from the ambitions that Hammarskjöld had, aspects of which are clearly analyzed in the essays by Schachter and Urquhart.

Secondly, there is agreement that Hammarskjöld imaginatively and constructively developed the U.N.'s capacity for peacekeeping. Considerable attention is given to Hammarskjöld's role in the constitution, deployment, and conduct of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Rikhye explains the arrangements that Hammarskjöld negotiated for the termination of UNEF. Zacher criticizes these arrangements, arguing that they were unrealistic and, if taken liter-

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ally, would have given the secretary-general uncontrolled power over the force. Zacher also maintains that U.N. peacekeeping forces cannot remain neutral in a conflict between a legitimately constituted government and a rebellious opposition, as Hammarskjöld insisted ONUC should. One difficulty with Zacher's position is that governments contribute military units to the U.N. on the assumption that they will be used for peacekeeping, not fighting. Whether they would be willing to contribute military forces if this assumption were dropped is moot.

Thirdly, there is agreement that the United Nations of the 1980s is considerably different from the institution in which Hammarskjöld worked. The essays show how Hammarskjöld contributed to the historical development of the U.N. However, only de Seynes speculates about what Hammarskjöld would have done in present circumstances; even he merely states that Hammarskjöld would have been "enthralled" by the global conferences of the 1970s. Barros argues that Hammarskjöld's concepts were at least partly inappropriate in the 1960s, and implicitly they would be even more so now. Yet in showing how skillfully Hammarskjöld could advance a global vision in the most unpromising circumstances, the analyses by Schachter and Urquhart suggest a contrary view.

Finally, all of the authors laud Hammarskjöld as an extraordinary person. One might have thought that all that could be said about Hammarskjöld had been said. This book proves that this is not the case. A helpful concluding bibliographical essay by Larry Trachtenberg will make additional research easier. Jordan deserves thanks for bringing this useful collection together.

HAROLD K. JACOBSON
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No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective *by Goran Hyden. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983. 223 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $9.50.*

The title of Hyden's new book aptly capsulizes his thesis. He has offered us a well-organized and refreshingly hard-headed assessment of the potential for real per capita economic growth in African societies where the peasant mode of production prevails. He defends the thesis that Africa needs a dose of entrepreneurial, local capitalism to give rise to social forces that can break the pre-capitalist relations of production and introduce a class-based social division of labor. The pernicious effects of such a strategy, he argues, must be borne. There are no alternatives, because the present forms of development administration and governance are permeated with a pre-capitalist "economy of affection" that retards development "by delaying changes in behavioural and institutional patterns capable of sustaining economic growth at the national level" (p. 17). Furthermore, the conditions for socialism in African societies do not exist. The capitalist phase cannot be skipped, for the state has proved ineffective in overcoming the limits of the economy of affection. The time has come to rethink the strategies of development and techniques used to promote that process.

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The bulk of the book is devoted to a critique of the administrative and organizational frameworks within which development work is carried out. Hyden outlines the limits and failures of such approaches as "development planning," "administrative reform," and parastatal economic management. In each case, he demonstrates that to be successful these approaches require the operation of a rationalized, bureaucratic society, in which productive forces can be manipulated through the use of abstract information. It is precisely because the division of labor in Africa has not advanced to the point where social interdependencies among producers make this manipulation possible that the existing frameworks of development fail. One of the most rewarding aspects of the book is the way in which Hyden uses his social model of African societies rooted in the economy of affection to explain the failures of development.

This book will draw criticism from both the practitioners and the theorists of development. The practitioners will want more concrete suggestions of what they can do to improve their performance short of renegotiating a new world aid order. While they will applaud the justification the book provides for the current thrust of development assistance, which emphasizes economic incentives and a free, private market, they may find its formulations too abstract to be useful in the field.

Theorists of development will point to the almost complete neglect in Hyden's analysis of the conditions of dependence and imperialism that thwart the growth of a strong bourgeoisie and a healthy domestic market in African economies. There is far too little analysis of whether the political and economic conditions (domestic and international) that are necessary for the implementation of his strategy can be built. This is the least satisfying aspect of the work. The book makes a convincing argument for the "dirty" process of capitalist growth, and it indicates the kind of macro-changes in thinking and doing that will have to accompany such a strategy. But Hyden offers no analysis or theory of where these changes will be initiated or of how the political project of national bourgeois development will overcome the constraints of neo-colonialism.

JAMES PLETCHER
Denison University

The Hidden Sun: Women of Modern Japan *by Dorothy Robins-Mowry. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1983. 394 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $13.95.*

In the wake of the riotous demonstrations occasioned by the revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1960, President John F. Kennedy appointed Edwin Reischauer ambassador to Japan to establish a dialogue between the two peoples. Discovering a great thirst among the Japanese for knowledge about American women, the ambassador recruited Dorothy Robins-Mowry as a women's activities officer on his staff. Serving her post at the United States Information Agency (USIA) between 1963 and 1971, the author travelled widely and came to know intimately a stupendous number of leaders, activists, writers, opinion makers, and female members of parliament. Her own experience, supplemented with extensive interviews with key figures, constitutes the source for this book.

The author's intention was to show Japanese women of today for what they are, their

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aspirations, the problems they face, the strains caused by rapid changes in their lives, and their grievances against male domination. The book could have been an interesting sociology of Japanese women if Robins-Mowry had confined herself to a few selected topics rather than trying to deal with the predicament of women in general. Instead the book is encyclopedic and anecdotal. It is also a "who's who" of feminist activists, and is quite useful in this respect. A reader will find a ready and capsuled answer to the questions of who is Empress Shotoku, Lady Murasaki, Hojo Masako, Yosano Akiko, Sakanishi Shio, and so on. A fourteen-page index is quite good.

Though the book is said to be updated through the early 1980s, its framework is distinctly 1960s, focusing on the Reischauer era and development. "Feudal" Japan is uplifting itself into modernity (equated with Americanization) under a somewhat condescending gaze of the big brother (or big sister). The activists here are as often as not from Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), the Christian Temperance Union, or the United Nations Education's Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The author exudes the boundless confidence of America in the "good old days" that the more liberation there is, the better things will always become. But then she may be right in a different sense—if the United States can seduce the Japanese women into Americanizing themselves, that may stop the march of the Japanese juggernaught. Though the author mentions it only in passing, Japanese men are totally dependent on their wives.

TETSUYA KATAOKA
Tsukuba University

Classes in Contemporary Japan *by Rob Steven. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 357 pp. $29.95.*

This book makes several contributions to the English langauge literature on Japan. First, as the author points out, there is very little Marxist literature on Japan in English, but much in Japanese. Steven's work helps to fill this gap. Second, his approach is thought provoking in that it deals with social classes as part of the "hidden world of the infrastructure" rather than part of the "concrete world of experience" (p. 10). He is therefore more concerned with modes of production than with class consciousness. Third, the result of this approach is that the book contributes to the growing literature arguing against a "group model" overemphasizing vertical relations and loyalty in Japanese society. Fourth, the work focuses on Japan in the 1970s, and offers the reader much recent data not readily available in English. Fifth, it lays the foundation for Steven's forthcoming study of patriarchy in Japan. As such, it is a contribution to feminist literature. Sixth, it is an overview of contemporary class structure in Japan, which is lacking in the English literature.

For the above reasons, the book will be widely read. On the other hand, certain aspects of the presentation make it difficult to determine what are its contributions to our knowledge of Japan. The rhetoric makes it difficult for the reader to identify the groups in question. One might ask, for instance, if the term "peasant" is appropriate to describe

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the various types of farm families in Japan today. In addition, many of the arguments and interpretations are too simplified. One example is Steven's assertion that the reason retired workers do not "buy themselves jobs in the peasantry" (p. 92–93) is that a family could not survive on the size farm such people could afford to buy. He does not take into consideration such basic factors as whether the retired worker has any farming skills, or desire to change his life style to an agricultural one. Nor does he consider other costs of such a move – uprooting a family; the availability of resources for wives and children; and locations in which such land might be available for purchase. Land in Japan is, after all, a limited commodity.

Another difficulty for the reader is the prescriptive nature of the book. Steven is basically arguing for overthrow of the state (p. 61). At the same time he points out that the "bourgeoisie" constitute a large proportion of the society, and equates the situation to that of the "white regime in South Africa" (p. 60). For this reason, he argues that revolution requires not only full mobilization of the masses, but also that the masses be unified in purpose. This approach is problematic for a number of reasons.

First, he does not deal with the issue of how separate the classes really are. Is it possible to have persons within a single family who belong to different classes? If so, how does this affect both perceived and real interest? What is the rate of mobility among classes? How does access to educational opportunities relate to the class divisions he has proposed? (This is a separate issue from adequate employment for university graduates.) Also, he does not adequately deal with what comes after the revolution. Where will the "oppressed classes" find opportunities? What is the evidence that there is mass interest in revolution? And is there not an essential difference between a society such as South Africa, where ethnic differences correspond to political power, and Japan? One can also raise questions about women's perceptions of men's work, but these are perhaps best left for Steven's forthcoming book.

The mere fact that the book raises so many questions is an indication of its thought-provoking nature. Its contribution to our knowledge of Japan would have been greater if it had dealt more with the "concrete world of experience." And its contribution to Marxist analysis would have been more useful to the Western reader if Steven had explicated relevant Marxist scholarship in Japan and related his work to that context.

ANNE E. IMAMURA
University of Maryland, College Park

The Unfinished Liberation of Chinese Women, 1949–1980 *by Phyllis Andors. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983. 212 pp. $22.50.*

In the past five years there have been a number of manuscripts published on the topic of the role of women in China. The works of Judith Stacey, Elizabeth Croll, and Kay Johnson come to mind. In addition, the works of Janet Salaff and Deborah Davis-Friedmann are closely related to the themes and central concerns of this volume. How does Andors's work fit into this group and what are her contributions?

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Against a backdrop of Marxist and development theory, Andors assesses the present situation of Chinese women. This analysis is presented in chapters that briefly summarize the status of women in pre-1949 China and then discuss the post-Liberation development through the First Five-Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward. She then sets forth the dilemmas in strategies and their relationship to the Dazhai and Daqing experience. Two chapters then address the Cultural Revolution (1966–69) and the post-Cultural Revolution period up to 1976. Andors believes that "the post-Cultural Revolution years represented significant progress as the Chinese leadership displayed understanding of the dialectical relationship between the politics of women's progress and the process of socioeconomic development" (p. 149). She concludes by examining the post-Mao period and current family planning programs. The volume is based on her dissertation and seems to have received little revision.

It is Andors's view, shared with many others, that there has been a broadening of opportunities for women, together with increased access to power and prestige. But she concludes (somewhat ruefully) that this progress is now in some jeopardy or at least in neutral because of current Chinese priorities with the Four Modernizations. This is a judgment that I share. In the development of this argument, however, history has not been kind to this author—an experience shared with others who have accepted some of the Chinese statements. The references to Dazhai have been seriously undercut by the more current information. Many of the individuals cited as successful examples of women's participation in development have disappeared in the post-Mao period.

More important for the thrust of her arguments, though, is the matter of emphasis on urban and rural sectors. Andors has, one assumes, somewhat reluctantly placed her emphasis on the urban experience. To be sure, developments in urban China represent the hopes for the future. Furthermore, most published data rely on suburban or urban experiences, and the units cited are commonly model units. Still, the rural sector represents the "here and now," and here her analysis is somewhat problematic. Her sources are limited and her judgment that the movement to send women to the countryside would have a leavening or progressive effect seems unconfirmed. She might well have been more secure had she supplemented the Chinese sources with the work of William Parrish and Martin Whyte, some of the volumes first mentioned in this review, or consulted with the authors of *Chen Village* (Jonathan Unger, Anita Chan, and Richard Madsen), who have done extensive interviewing in China.

The volume is a slender one. There are footnotes, but no list of references or bibliography. Indiana University Press does not seem to have taken its editorial responsibilities very seriously. It did not decide whether or not to use capital letters for the term "xian," did not edit for repeated terms such as clear and clearly (pp. 88–89), and did not attempt to limit the repetition of phrases and arguments that are quite distracting (pp. 23, 25). Given the cost of the book, they should have been more helpful to Andors and more concerned about the readers.

Andors is an intelligent scholar with a perspective that is very useful for this topic, and she asks interesting questions. Had she taken more direct account of the work of others,

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updated some of her observations, and in essence revised the thesis, this volume would have had more lasting value.

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
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In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power *by Daniel Pipes. New York, Basic Books, 1983. 373 pp. $22.50.*

In this comprehensive survey of Islamic views on matters social and political, Daniel Pipes starts from two underlying assumptions. One is that when people express religious beliefs, they must to some extent be taken as meaning them. In the case of Islam, Muslims have certain loyalties and hostilities by virtue of their faith alone that inform their political views and practices. Much else may be added to produce their overall set of attitudes, such as their national affiliation; but that they are Muslims is itself a fact of irreducible importance, one that cannot simply be derived from other aspects of their background and life situation.

Piper's second assumption is that when it comes to political and social matters, there is something specific about Islam. Quite simply, it legislates for these domains to an extent unique among major religions. Judaism certainly prescribes on matters social and customary, and Christianity has something to say on these matters, too. But the Islamic prescriptions, codified in Shari'ah law and inscribed in Muslim traditions, go further in providing a set of views that concern the whole of lived experience. Among other conclusions, this means that in Islam there is no concept of the secular, of a domain beyond the control of religion.

So far, so good. Pipes writes well, is erudite in his references, and has a determination, rare among scholars of the Muslim world, to cover the wide range of countries embracing the faith. But this book, for all its range, is deeply flawed because it overstates its case, ending up with that fallacy that besets so many who write about Islam, not least of all the faithful themselves. This fallacy is essentialism—the idea, for which the evidence is rare indeed, that the behavior of Muslims throughout all centuries and countries can be explained primarily by reference uniquely to their belief systems. That all Muslims share some things in common is indisputable. But suggesting that there is a common Islamic essence to their attitudes and behavior is mere fancy, a trivial idea bolstered with some scholarly supports.

What is striking about Pipes's book is the degree of historical and sociological innocence that pervades it. We learn almost nothing about Muslim societies, about the forces and groups within them that endow written tradition with meaning, transmit it to the next generation, and shape it to meet their temporal needs. "Modernity" comes up again and again, but components of modernization such as urbanization, migration, employment patterns, levels of income, and increased communication figure little in the face of the

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timeless essentialism Pipes offers us. He frequently tells us that there is something that can be called "a Muslim approach to politics," but after all that he writes, and indeed after 1,400 years of Muslim history, we are left wondering what it is. To try and explain the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price rises in terms of Islam is absurd, apart from being news to the Venezuelans. OPEC pricing policy has no more to do with religion than the monopoly prices charged by anyone else in a privileged market position.

It is the sublime dismissal of all specific and contingent matters that dooms this book. Those wanting a contemporary account of the Muslim movements in different countries would be better advised to read Edward Mortimer's *Faith and Power*, a much wiser book, which Pipes mocks. Those wanting to get inside the Muslim mind, in a variety of social situations, could read *Recognising Islam* by the anthropologist Michael Gilsenan, a truly learned work that Pipes does not even mention.

FRED HALLIDAY
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Vietnam Under Communism, 1975–1982 *by Nguyen Van Canh. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 312 pp. $34.95.*

Based on his own experiences, interviews, and various other sources, Nguyen Van Canh, visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution, has written this impressive work on Vietnam. Since the conclusion of the Vietnam war, many books in English have been published on America's involvement in Vietnam; but very few volumes have concentrated on what has happened inside that country. *Vietnam Under Communism* helps fill this gap.

This book is a straightforward treatment of the events taking place immediately before and after the Communist takeover of the South. No theoretical framework is offered. In twelve chapters and an epilogue, the author deals with Vietnam's new leadership, political structure, social control, culture, economy, religion, and foreign policy. The story presented here, albeit strongly critical of the Communist regime, is a personal, heartfelt, and hard-to-obtain account that deserves our serious attention.

Although one may disagree with the author that Vo Nguyen Giap and five other Politburo members were "purged" at the Fifth National Party Congress in 1982, the treatment of the new leadership (pp. 63–68) is informative and useful. Also informative is the structure (diagram) of the Vietnam Communist Party's relationship with front organizations (pp. 113–118). Undoubtedly, all Communist parties utilize front organizations well. And the Vietnamese party has been especially skillful in establishing and mobilizing the support from these organizations ever since Ho Chi Minh's days. Yet, many people in this country have either ignored or refused to accept this fact.

Like other Communist regimes, the Vietnamese government adopts the concept and policy of exclusiveness and utilitarianism to handle political and social affairs. It is, therefore, not surprising to see that "freedom of speech" and "freedom of movement" have been denied, and "thought reform" has been imposed upon the people (pp. 150–155).

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Moreover, "Vietnamese Catholics" have been changed to be "Catholic Vietnamese" (p. 172). Such Vietnamization of the Catholic faith bears a striking similarity to China's Patriotic Catholic Church that since 1950 has been required to conform to the PRC's constitution and social needs. The same exclusive and utilitarian policy applies to Vietnamese Buddhism. However, if during the Vietnam war we had endorsed the independent mind and great courage of the Buddhist leaders Thieh Tri Quang, Thieh Thien Minh, and others, we should equally be concerned about the indescribable sufferings they have experienced under the current Communist regime as discussed by Canh (pp. 181, 216). Double standards or apologies for such a serious violation of human rights are intellectual crimes.

The author has a critical view and harsh words on several other aspects. For instance, he asserts that elections in "Communist Vietnam are rigged in advance" (p. 75), argues that the Vietnamese Communists are "experts in mass murder" (p. 120), and states that New Economic Zones are "concentration camps without fences" (pp. 217–221). One may agree with him on some of these assertions, but not all. In comparison, Pol Pot's Communists are truly experts in mass murder. Nevertheless, one must fully realize the fact that the author is speaking from his conscience.

Informative as the book is, the discussion is mainly limited to the south. It does not cover the post-1975 situation in the north in which we are equally interested. Moreover, some sources should have been cited, particularly for tables (pp. 101–102). In an event, this useful book should be widely read by students of Vietnamese affairs.

KING C. CHEN
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Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods *by Joanne Gowa. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983. 208 pp. $27.50.*

Joanne Gowa treats the Nixon administration's suspension of dollar-gold convertibility in 1971, which laid the ground for the formal adoption of floating exchange rates in 1973. Coming after years of mounting U.S. balance of payments deficits, the events of 1971 represented a break with the postwar international monetary regime and resembled other monetary watersheds such as the gold-exchange standard's collapse in 1931. She provides a balanced, informed summary of Bretton Woods. Her objective, however, is to assess the sources of the 1971 decision, that is, those in the "international regime," in U.S. domestic politics, and in Nixon administration peculiarities.

America's decision reflected a growing conflict between its domestic goals and international obligations. This conflict was relatively new. In the 1950s, America's domestic expansion coincided with the international economy's need for liquidity. World liquidity under Bretton Woods depended upon the outflow of U.S. dollars. So long as the U.S. could convert dollars to gold at $35 per ounce, foreigners held dollars as official reserves and in offshore, "Eurodollar" capital markets. But with mounting U.S. inflation, offshore dollars surpassed America's gold assets, thus revealing the gold-backed dollar as fiction.

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America then faced three alternatives. First, it could restore confidence in the gold dollar by deflation combined with a negotiated realignment of currency values permissible under Bretton Woods. Second, it could negotiate a new system of floating exchange rates, Third, it could break with gold unilaterally, thus reneging on dollar liabilities and expanding domestically without regard to international repercussions. The Nixon White House, facing a trade deficit and new inflation, chose the "nationalistic" third course.

The book illuminates the administration's consensus for a dramatic, unilateral improvement of America's monetary position. The usual tendency to attribute this largely to Treasury Secretary John Connally is erroneous. Nevertheless, the Treasury Department, preoccupied with domestic problems, dominated the policy process, while voices in the Federal Reserve Board, the State Department, and the National Security Council preferred flexible exchanges. The latter group had, in her view unfortunately, little input. Meanwhile, the only clear proponents of retaining the "rules" of Bretton Woods were presidential adviser Arthur Burns and officials of the New York Federal Reserve, which oversees U.S. foreign-monetary policy. They viewed the break with gold as a dangerous precedent, a rejection of international principle, and harbinger of more serious inflation. However, the very structure of decision-making blocked dissenting viewpoints by monetary experts or inhibited potential dissenters in an atmosphere choked with worry about the economics of the 1972 elections. The narrative of these events is interesting and insightful. Regrettably, the terms of Gowa's interviews with key officials forbade direct quotation.

Her utilization of the events of 1971 to challenge "international regime" theory succeeds, but the implications for monetary relations need clarification. The Nixon administration's refusal to be constrained by "international" rules and sensibilities, she observes, is typical of American presidents' preoccupation with domestic economic growth, with sometimes tragic consequences for foreign economies. But the Bretton Woods regime itself always expressed American interests, was vulnerable to American exploitation, and was likely to collapse when it conflicted fundmentally with U.S. domestic goals. Thus, arguing the "primacy" of domestic politics in 1971 seems circuitous. Moreover, is the subsequent regime of floating rates substantially different in this regard? The volatile dollar is, after all, still the chief reserve asset and trading medium, and American fiscal policies still basically shape international monetary relations. In retrospect, the differences between advocates of a floating system and the Nixonian unilateralists seem largely tactical. Neither readily accepts international constraints. Meanwhile, the precondition for a "primacy" of the "international regime"—a balance of power able to limit the externalization of the effects of U.S. spending excesses—may not have existed since 1945.

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America in the Gilded Age: From the Death of Lincoln to the Rise of Theodore Roosevelt *by Sean Dennis Cashman. New York, New York University Press, 1984. 370 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $13.50.*

Standard political history, once the mainstay of the academic historian, is almost everywhere in decline. One of the few cases of interest left is the so-called Gilded Age, those years in the latter part of the nineteenth century that had for so long been dismissed as dull, turgid, and corrupt, with fatuous politicians representing indistinguishable parties and mouthing meaningless slogans while the real problems of the nation went unmet and unsolved.

This portrait, which received its classic formulation in Matthew Josephson's witty, malicious 1930s trilogy, has been challenged in the last few decades on a wide front by a small army of revisionists. Their work, however, has not yet seeped down into the standard textbooks, so it is with some anticipation that one welcomes Sean Cashman's *America in the Gilded Age*, which announces itself to be "a work of synthesis, drawing from recent scholarship and from some primary sources" (p. xiii).

A glance at the bibliography, a well-chosen basic list of representative recent interpretive works, heightens the anticipation. Alas, once one plunges into Cashman's narrative itself, these hopes are dispelled—we are back in the world of Matthew Josephson, where all businessmen are robber barons, all successful politicians corrupt, and all farmers and laborers noble and oppressed.

In a striking example of what our colleagues in English departments call "cognitive dissonance," Cashman's text reflects almost nothing of the books he has allegedly read in the bibliography. That bibliography lists Irwin Unger's Pulitzer Prize-winning study of *The Greenback Era* (in a section labelled "Farmers' Movements"), but in the text Cashman blithely declares that businessmen supported deflation, as if Unger's persuasive argument to the contrary had never been made. The bibliography includes the works of H. Wayne Morgan, Robert Marcus, David Rothman, and others who have shown how the Republican party in these years served as a great nationalizing force. In the text, we get the same tired old stories of Republicans "stalwarts" and "half-breeds" engaged in some incomprehensible struggle for spoils. The bibliography should (but does not) include the influential works of Richard Jensen and Paul Kleppner, which illuminate the ethnocultural differentiation between the major political parties. We are told that parties were interested in little more than power for its own sake: "They were not . . . committed to any philosophy besides the needs of their interest groups" (p. 215). And so it goes.

That is not to say that there is nothing new in this volume. Where else, for example, could one discover that Jewish men were not allowed to vote until the mid-nineteenth century, that the mean winter temperature in Bismark, North Dakota is minus 45 degrees Fahrenheit, or other such startling nuggets of misinformation? One could compile a lengthy list of Cashman's blunders, omissions, misconceptions, and examples of gullibility, but it would be a pointless display of pedantry.

In the mid-1970s, historian Vincent P. De Santis reviewed the literature dealing with the politics of the Gilded Age and was struck by how little impact revisionist scholarship had on the customary textbook treatment of the period. A Rip Van Winkle who dozed off

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in the days of Matthew Josephson, De Santis concluded, could have awakened in 1975 to find the interpretation of Gilded Age politics virtually unchanged. From the evidence in Cashman's book, "Old Rip" could have peacefully slumbered for yet another decade.

ALLAN PESKIN
Cleveland State University

The Politics of TV Violence: Policy Uses of Communication Research *by Willard D. Rowland, Jr. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1983. 320 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.50.*

Literature about the effects of television on social and political behavior dominate the library of mass communication research. Among researchers, there is sharp, often heated, disagreement about mass communication effects. Policymakers continue to look for a preponderance of evidence supporting one of two effects propositions—that the mass media are not powerful, their influence is indirect with limited effects on human behavior, or that the mass media are powerful influencers of, and have direct effects on, behavior.

These two propositions suggest, on one side, that what a viewer "brings" to the television set (predispositions learned earlier from various socialization agents) is more of a determinant of after-television viewing behavior than is the content of a particular program. A violent scene in the context of a dramatic program would prompt subsequent aggressive or violent behavior only among those viewers who are inclined to participate in violent behavior to begin with. The other side maintains that violence in television programming directly influences viewers. Continued viewing of such programs, it is argued, brings about an acceptance of violence as a way of life.

In 1969, Congress asked the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to examine "the relationship between televised violence and the attitudes and behavior of children." Their report was published in 1972. Ten years later, the National Institute of Mental Health reexamined that relationship and offered four conclusions: there is a causal relationship between television violence and aggressive behavior of the viewer; most researchers agree that television violence leads to aggressive behavior; the amount of television violence remains at consistently high levels; television cultivates attitudes among viewers; and heavy viewers are more likely to be fearful and less trusting than are light viewers. These findings have been challenged by several respected researchers and by the television networks. Broadcasters have resisted threatened government regulations by conducting their own studies, challenging the methodology of several reported studies, and widely disseminating their review of television violence research. Researchers, television broadcasters, Congress, and a host of special interest groups continue to raise the public's anxiety about the relationship between television and violence. The debate continues, but the politics of that debate have just recently been examined.

Willard Rowland, in an extraordinary examination of the interaction among events, actors, and institutions, enters the debate using historical, cultural, critical, and (with abounding courage) symbolic-analytic perspectives. He traces the early development of

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communication effects research, details the relationships among researchers (who "begat" whom) and how they set the social science research agenda, and outlines the historical aspects of violence effects research. He plows through the sometimes painful review of violence studies by every significant vested interest group, including governmental agencies, Congress and academia. He concludes with a symbolic analysis of television and violence views among the academy, industry, government, and reformers.

The sheer expanse of the material covered is impressive. Rowland's treatment of the history of effects research is, at times, open to questions. He avoids the political communication revisionists' theory, which arose beyond his historical effects time-span, but is critical in evaluating effects research today. Other scholars will find fault with one or another detail.

Overall, however, Rowland makes an outstanding contribution to the understanding of the dynamics of the debate on violence and television. Policymakers will not find a resolution to the dilemma. Rowland did not solve the problem, but that was not his mission. He correctly assesses the resiliancy of the topic in that "it regularly reappears as a major topic for debate in congressional and academic forums, and there are no signs, at least yet, that the issues will wither away entirely" (p. 304). Broadcasters and researchers will continue to make claims supporting their particular views. The public will remain anxious.

Rowland certainly presents a very thoughtful, well-executed, and descriptive view of the political implications of events and deeds surrounding the examination of violence and television. His work may be viewed as a "case study" of the attempts to formulate public policy on the basis of social science reseach.

SIDNEY KRAUS
Cleveland State University

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

American Peace Directory 1984 *edited by Melinda Fine and Peter M. Steven. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984. 225 pp. $12.95.*

Bibliography on Economic Cooperation Among Developing Countries, 1981–1982: With Annotations *compiled by Nada Verbič. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1984. 299 pp. $27.50.*

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1984 (2 vols.) *compiled by Gale Research Co. Detroit, Gale Research Co., 1984. 1,524 pp. $80.00.*

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, vol. 1: General Economic and Political Matters (in two parts) *edited by William Z. Slany et al. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, 1983. 1,887 pp. $27.00.*

Geography of the Soviet Union *prepared by J.P. Cole. Stoneham, Mass., Butterworth Publishers, 1984. 452 pp. $29.95.*

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India *compiled by Brijen K. Gupta and Datta S. Kharbas. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 264 pp. $42.00.*

Lyndon B. Johnson: A Bibliography *compiled by the Lyndon Baines Johnson Libary. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1984. 257 pp. $25.00.*

Mexico *compiled by Naomi C. Robbins. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 165 pp. $35.00.*

The Middle East Political Dictionary *compiled by Lawrence Ziring. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 452 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $15.00.*

OECD Economic Outlook: July 1984 *prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Washington, D.C., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1984. 165 pp. $12.00.*

The Papers of John Marshall, vol. 4: 1799–1800 *edited by Charles T. Cullen and and Leslie Tobias. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1984. 365 pp. $35.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 45: 1917–1918 *edited by Arthur S. Link et al. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1984. 626 pp. $32.50.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol 46: 1918 *edited by Arthur S. Link et al. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1984. 648 pp. $40.00.*

Poland *compiled by Richard C. Lewański. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 267 pp. $40.00.*

Political Handbook of the World, 1982–1983 *edited by Arthur S. Banks and William Overstreet. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1984. 728 pp. $49.95.*

Political Science Abstracts, 1982: Annual Supplement (3 vols.) *edited by Samuel Long. New York, IFI/Plenum Data Co., 1983. 2,060 pp. $425.00.*

State Political Action Legislation and Regulations: Index and Directory of Organizations *compiled by the Interstate Bureau of Regulations. Westport, Conn., Quorum Books, 1984. 818 pp. $185.00.*

The Third Reich at War: A Historical Bibliography *compiled by Lance Klass, Susan Kinnell et al. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 270 pp. $28.50.*

World Economic Outlook: A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund. *Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 1984. 222 pp. $12.00.*

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

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

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

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

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Richard F. Bensel

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